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Plato and the Older Academy, Part III.
By Eduard G. Zeller
The philosophy of Plato is primarily Ethical. He starts from the Socratic enquiries on virtue, which furnished the material for the earliest development of his dialectic method, and for those conceptual determinations from which the doctrine of Ideas eventually sprang. His own procedure is essentially directed not only to theoretic science, but to moral training and the Socratic knowledge-of-self.1 He would have been untrue to himself and to the spirit of the Socratic teaching had he not constantly paid special attention to such questions. But the later development of his system required that the ethical views acquired during his intercourse with Socrates should be essentially enlarged, more precisely defined, recast, and applied to actual conditions. Therefore, although his own speculation was from the commencement under the influence of the Socratic Ethics, the form which he gave to ethical theories was conditioned by his Metaphysics and Anthropology, and also more remotely by his Physics; and apart from these it cannot be fully explained. That which is the starting-point |436| in the historical beginning of his system appears in the perfected system at the end also. The purity, fervour, and decisiveness of his moral endeavour, his conviction of the necessity of moral knowledge, the fundamental conceptions of his Ethics, Plato brought with him from the Socratic school. But the lofty Idealism by which his Ethics so greatly transcended those of Socrates — the accurate determination which they received in the concept of the virtues and of the State — would never have been attained but for the doctrine of Ideas and the Anthropological part of the system. As to their particular contents, the Platonic Ethics fall under three divisions of enquiry: —
I. The ultimate aim of moral activity, or the highest Good.
II. The realisation of the Good in individuals; or Virtue.
III. Its realisation in the Commonwealth; or the State.2
I. The Highest Good. Socrates had designated the Good as the supreme and ultimate object of all human endeavour; and the concept of the Good was the primary ethical idea of all the minor Socratic schools.3 By the Good, however, Socrates had only understood that which is a good for man and conduces to happiness. This, indeed, naturally resulted from the Greek view of Ethics, and so far Plato and Socrates are agreed. The question of the highest moral problem |437| coincides with that of the highest Good, and this with the enquiry for happiness. Happiness is the possession of the Good, and the Good is that which all desire.4 But wherein does the Good or happiness consist? A twofold answer to this question may be deduced from the presuppositions of the Platonic system. The Idea is that which alone is real; Matter is not merely Non-being, but the opposite of the Idea, hindering its pure manifestation.5 The soul, in its true essence, is declared to be an incorporeal spirit destined for the intuition of the Idea. Hence morality might be regarded negatively; the highest end and Good might be sought in withdrawing from the life of sense and retiring into pure contemplation. But the Idea is the underlying ground of all |438| form, and the cause of all that is good in the world of Sense. This aspect might be more prominently brought forward for its representation in human life; and thus among the constituents of the highest Good might be reckoned, side by side with the knowledge of the pure Idea, the harmonious introduction of the Idea into sensible existence, and the satisfaction of which this is the source. Both of these enunciations are to be found in Plato, though they are not so entirely separated as to be mutually exclusive. The first occurs in passages where the highest problem of life is sought in flight from sensuality; the second, in places where even sensuous beauty is described as worthy of love; and external activity, sensible pleasure, is included among the component parts of the highest Good.
We meet with the former view as early as the Theaetetus.6 As earthly existence, says Plato in that dialogue, can never be free from evil, we must flee away as quickly as possible from this world to God, by making ourselves like to Him through virtue and wisdom. This thought is still further expanded in the Phaedo,7 where the deliverance of the soul from the |439| body is considered the most necessary and beneficial of all things, and the philosopher’s special aim and concern. To the same effect is the celebrated passage of the Republic,8 which represents us as living here like prisoners in a dark cave, who are accustomed to see nothing but dim shadows, and are with difficulty brought to the vision of the Real, in the daylight of the Idea. In connection with this, there is the reiterated assurance9 that the true philosopher would never voluntarily descend from the heights of scientific contemplation to mind the affairs of the State, but only when compelled to do so. Souls, so far as they are faithful to their destiny, are only prevailed on by Necessity to enter this earthly existence; and those who have entered it, and recognise their true vocation, trouble themselves as little as they can with the body and its concerns. Here the body appears as a fetter, a dungeon of the soul: the grave of its higher life.10 It is an evil to which the soul is chained, and from which it longs to be free as soon as possible.11 The body is, indeed, the cause of all evil; for though unrighteousness |440| has place at first in the soul, and is its own deed — though, consequently, it is the soul itself that in the world beyond will be cleansed from it and punished for it; yet the soul would have no motive or inducement to evil if it were not in the body. When it entered the body it first acquired those lower elements by which its proper nature is hidden and defaced.12 From thence proceed all disturbances to spiritual activity — all the appetites and passions. which seduce us from our true destiny.13 Philosophy is therefore essentially a purification.14 As perfect deliverance from all evils is to be found only in the separation of the soul from the body, — so the nearest earthly approach to such a deliverance is that philosophic dying, by which alone the soul even after the body’s death is fitted for incorporeal existence.15 |441|
If Plato had stopped short at this view of morality, the result would have been a negative theory, at variance not only with the spirit of Greek antiquity, but also with many essential elements of his own philosophy. He proceeds, however, to complete it with other representations, in which a more positive importance is ascribed to sensible things and our concern with them. A series of these representations we have already noticed in his doctrine of Love. The proper object of this Love is that which is desirable in and for itself, namely the Idea; but the sensible Phenomenon is here treated not merely in the manner of the Phaedo, as that which conceals the Idea, but also as that which reveals it. The enquiry of the Philebus concerning the highest Good has the same tendency. How this dialogue refutes the doctrine of pleasure has been already shown: it is further to be noted that the argument does not side unconditionally even with the opposite view (the Cynic-Megarian identification of the Good and intellectual wisdom16), but describes the highest Good as compounded of various constituents. Intelligence and reason, we are told, are certainly far above pleasure, inasmuch as the latter is related to the Unlimited or Indefinite, and the former in the closest manner to the First Cause of all.17 But yet a life without any sensation of pleasure or pain would be pure apathy, not worth wishing for.18 And within the sphere of intellect, |442| pure Ideal knowledge (though far higher than aught besides) cannot in itself suffice: Right Opinion must be added to it, otherwise man could never find his way upon earth. Further, Art (the Philebus especially mentions music) is indispensable to the adornment of life; in fact, all knowledge is so, and every kind of knowledge; fur each in some way participates in truth.19 Pleasure cannot be quite so unconditionally reckoned a part of the highest Good. We must here discriminate true and pure sensations of delight,20 and necessary, harmless, and passionless pleasures (above all, those that are consistent with reason and health of mind), from deceptive, impure, and sickly pleasures. The former alone can be included in the good.21 On the whole we get this result.22 The first and chief constituent of the supreme Good is participation in the Eternal nature of proportion (in the Idea).23 The |443| second is the realisation of this Idea in actuality; the formation of that which is harmonious, beautiful, and |444| perfect. The third, reason and intelligence. The fourth, special sciences, the arts, and right opinions. The fifth and last, pure and painless pleasures of the senses.24 We cannot fail to perceive the moderation, the respect for all that is in human nature, the striving for the harmonious culture of the whole man by which the Platonic Ethics prove themselves such genuine fruits of the Greek national mind. Plato is far removed from the apathy of the Cynics, as may be seen in his remark25 that it is impossible not to sorrow under heavy trials (for instance, the death of a son); all that can then be expected of a man is moderation and control of his grief. That life according to nature, which the older Academy adopted as its watchword — that Metriopathy, which perhaps descended to the later Sceptics from the New Academy — is entirely in harmony with the spirit of Plato.
II. Virtue. The essential and sole means of happiness is virtue. As each nature can only attain its destined end by the virtue befitting it, so it is with the soul. Only in attaining that end can the soul live well; if it misses this, its life must be evil. In the one case it will be happy; in the other, miserable. |445| Virtue is therefore the cause of happiness, vice of misery.26 Virtue is the right constitution, the internal order, harmony, and health of the soul: vice is the contrary condition. To enquire whether justice or injustice is the more advantageous for man, is no wiser than to question whether it is better to be sick or well; to have a marred and useless soul, or a soul that is capable and strong;27 to subject the human and divine element in our nature to the animal, or the animal to the divine.28 The virtuous man alone is free, and follows his own will; for in his soul it is Reason that bears rule — the part to which rule belongs. He only is rich in himself, cheerful and at rest. Wherever passion occupies the throne, the soul is essentially poor and enslaved: fear and sorrow and disquietude run riot through it.29 Only he who takes hold on the Eternal and fills himself therewith can be truly satisfied. All other delights are alloyed and delusive, in proportion |446| as they deviate from the only true pleasure — that of the Philosopher. And true philosophy and perfect morality are the same.30 Virtue can therefore dispense with those impure motives by which it is generally recommended.31 It carries in itself its own reward, as vice does its own punishment. Nothing better can befall a man than that he should grow like the Good and the Divine: nothing worse than that he should become like the evil and the Non-divine.32 Even if we put aside all the advantages which virtue ensures — if we suppose the impossible case of a righteous man mistaken by gods and men, or an evil-doer concealing his wickedness from both — still the former would be the happy person, the latter the unhappy.33 That this, however, is quite inconceivable — that right and wrong, as a rule even in this life, but certainly in the life to come, are duly recompensed, Plato constantly affirms as his settled conviction.34 This seems to him necessary, on every account; as little can the righteous man be deserted by God,35 as the wicked escape His punishment: he must either be cured by it of his ungodliness; |447| or, if he be incurable, must serve as a warning to others.36 But as Plato holds moral obligation and the unconditional worth of virtue independently of future retribution, this view does not affect the purity of his principles.37 The Socratic doctrine of expediency38 is immeasurably transcended by Plato; it has become purified and deepened in the spirit of the Socratic life. |448|
Socrates had made virtue to consist entirely in knowledge. He had consequently maintained that there could in reality be but One Virtue, and that the disposition to virtue must be similar in all. He had assumed that virtue, like knowledge, could be taught.39 In all these respects Plato at first followed him; as against the ordinary notions of virtue he would indeed always have acknowledged the view of Socrates to be substantially correct.40 But riper reflection led him in after-life to modify the Socratic doctrines and to determine them more accurately. He became convinced that side by side with perfect virtue, which is, no doubt, founded on knowledge, the unscientific virtue of ordinary men has also its value; that though the former is based on instruction, and the latter only on custom, yet that this virtue of custom precedes the higher kind as an indispensable preparatory stage. He observed the variety of moral dispositions, and could not deny its influence on the forming of morality in individuals. Lastly, he learned to combine the distinction of many virtues with the Socratic doctrine of the Unity of all virtue; for he looked on the particular virtues as so many different sides of a proportion, which considered as a whole is virtue. These determinations we have now to examine in detail.
All virtue presupposes a natural disposition for virtue, which is not merely bestowed on human nature in general, but varies according to temperaments and individuals. Plato instances the contrast of σωφροσύνη |449| and ἀνδρεία, of fiery temperaments and calm, as a difference in natural disposition.41 He also speaks of a special gift for philosophy,42 and in the Republic43 indicates a threefold gradation of capacity. On the lowest stage he places those who by nature are limited to the virtues indispensable for all classes, — justice and self-control, — and even in the exercise of these require external guidance; on the second stage, those who, in addition, are capable of valour; on the third and highest, such as are endowed with philosophy. If this series of dispositions be combined with the above-stated theory of the divisions of the soul, and with that of the virtues, on which we are just entering, it would seem that the disposition to virtue varies according as the moral impulse is chiefly manifested in the appetitive, courageous, or rational part of the soul. It is quite consistent with this that the different grades of moral disposition should be related to each other, as the different parts of the soul, that the higher should include the lower. The disposition to philosophy at any rate (Republic vi. 487 A) seems to comprehend all other capacity for virtue; and similarly the superior ranks in the State are, in addition to their own virtues, to possess the virtues of the lower. Plato, however, has nowhere expressly drawn out this parallel, and the exposition of the Politicus would not fall in with it. |450| Self-control is there not subordinated to valour; they are coordinated in relative opposition.
In directly identifying virtue with knowledge Socrates left only one way open for the cultivation of the moral disposition, the way of intellectual instruction. Plato in his earliest dialogues expresses himself in a similar manner, but even in the Meno he has discovered that there are two guides to virtue, Right Opinion and scientific Knowledge; and though the one rests on cognition, and the other is uncertain and blind, still he allows that this traditional goodness has produced brave men and noble deeds.44 In the Republic he goes a step farther, plainly saying that ordinary virtue, founded on habit, custom, and Right Opinion, must precede philosophy and philosophic morality; for the rulers of his State are first to be educated by music and gymnastic to the lower kind of virtue, and subsequently only, by scientific instruction, to the higher.45 Thus the opposition of philosophic and ordinary virtue with which Plato, as a disciple of Socrates, began, transforms itself more and more into their close interdependence. Philosophic virtue presupposes the virtue of custom, and this again must perfect itself in the virtue of philosophy. |451|
Plato’s theories on the unity of virtue were also essentially rectified in his later years. He continued, indeed, to maintain that all particular virtues are only the realisation of the One Virtue, and that knowledge or wisdom could not be conceived without them; that justice must comprehend all virtues, and that in the perfect philosophic virtue all moral aims and endeavours unite; but, instead of stopping short at this point, he afterwards admitted that this unity of virtue did not exclude a plurality of virtues, and that some part of these (the rest being rejected) might be preparatory stages of moral training, without ceasing on that account to be real virtue.46 The cause of this plurality is sought by Plato — and this is the peculiarity of his theory — not in the diversity of the objects to which moral activity refers, but in the diversity of mental powers at work in it (or, according to his view, the parts of the soul). In this way he arrives at the four primary virtues, which had indeed already appeared in the sophistic and Socratic enquiries, but seem first to have been definitively established by Plato, and only in his more advanced age.47 If the virtue |452| of the soul — the right constitution and proper relation of its parts — consists in the efficient performance of the special work of each and the harmony of all one with another, Reason, with clear discernment of that which is good for the soul, must be the ruler of the soul’s life: and this is Wisdom. Secondly, Courage must defend the award of Reason concerning things to be feared and not to be feared, as against Pleasure and Pain: this is Valour, which thus appears in the Platonic theory as primarily directed by man against himself, and secondarily against external danger. In the third place, the inferior parts of the soul, Courage and Desire, must submit themselves to Reason, and come to an agreement with it, as to which is to obey and which to rule: this is Self-control or Temperance (σωφροσύνη). Fourthly and lastly, that there may be this harmony of the whole, each part of the soul must fulfill the task allotted to it, and not meddle with anything else. This is Justice,48 which is thus primarily concerned with the |453| internal condition of the soul, the arrangement of its activities, and only indirectly with duties to fellow-creatures.49 |454|
If, then, we imagine tins theory of virtue farther extended so as to show, in the case of individuals, what activities proceed from each of the four virtues, and how each should manifest itself in the various relations of life, the result would be a representation of subjective morality from the Platonic point of view. Plato, however, as far as we can judge from his writings, never proposed to himself such a task; it would therefore be unwarrantable to attempt to construct from his scattered utterances a detailed system of duties or virtues.50 We may, however, without any impropriety, omitting all the less distinctive characteristics, set forth his moral view of the world on certain points which deserve our attention, either in regard to their general acceptation among the Greeks, or their changed aspects among the moderns.
Some instances of this kind have already come before us. We have seen that Plato, in enunciating the principle that the just man should do only good, even to his enemies, greatly transcended the limits of ordinary Greek morality.51 We have considered those singular views of truth and falsehood52 which make the real lie to consist only in self-deception and to be under all circumstances and conditions reprehensible; whereas the deception of others is to be allowed in all cases, for their good: Plato in his Republic forbidding, on these grounds, all untruth to individuals, but permitting it with dangerous |455| freedom to the State, as a means of education and government.53 We have also spoken of54 the peculiar form of friendship which was so closely bound up with the social life of Greece. It is here only necessary to observe that, in the moral treatment of this connection, Plato throughout follows Socrates.55 On the one hand, he allies himself with the custom of his nation, and its sensuous aesthetic side is in no way alien to him. Friendship thus becomes Eros, a passionate excitement, the workings of which among men are portrayed in glowing colours;56 and he not only approves of this passion in regard to innocent concessions, which, however, always betray the element in question,57 — but he expresses himself as to its greatest excesses with a leniency58 that would be surprising if we did not bear in mind that Plato was a Greek. On the other hand, he does not conceal his own decided disapprobation of these excesses. The Phaedrus59 describes them as a degradation of the Divine to which love properly belongs, — as an animal and unnatural pleasure, to which man is hurried away by the ‘vicious steed’ of the soul. The Republic declares that the |456| excitement and disorderliness of sensuous delight are incompatible with the pure and fair harmony of true love.60 And in the Laws61 they are treated as altogether contrary to nature, and corrupting to manners, to be tolerated in no well-ordered State. In this dialogue, simple unchastity is not quite so severely dealt with; but it is to be banished, or at any rate repressed and concealed to the uttermost:62 whereas the Republic63 puts no restraint on those who have had children, and thus fulfilled their duty to the commonwealth. But Plato has certainly not as yet discovered the right point of view for the general relation of the sexes. As he limits their specific differences to physical organic distinctions, and considers all other differences to be merely questions of greater or lesser strength,64 he can only regard marriage physiologically; and as this aspect can have no independent importance in his eyes, it is the more natural that he should have adhered to the Greek view, which makes the aim of marriage entirely objective — to furnish children to the State.65 In the Republic, indeed, this view so entirely predominates that the moral character of marriage is altogether lost sight of. Plato seeks, however, to exalt the female sex both mentally and morally,66 thus reprobating |457| the entire neglect of women among the Greeks. But he has too mean an opinion of its special vocation; he shares too entirely the prejudice of his countrymen (who only saw merit in the activity of men) to imagine such an exaltation possible through the ennobling of woman’s sphere of action. What he seeks is the entire abolition of that sphere. He would have women share in the training and pursuits of men to an extent that is quite incompatible with the peculiarities and social requirements of their nature.67 In this, as in so many other cases, his suggestions are striking, as showing how he strove to get beyond the Greek morality and view of life, without being able to free himself altogether from their defects, or to attain the result which was subsequently accomplished on another soil.
He was still less successful with regard to two other points which must now be mentioned. The contempt of the Greeks for handicraft arts he not only upheld, but intensified; and he makes no objection to slavery,the cancer of antiquity, though he tries to mitigate its practical evils by judicious management. Those occupations which among the Greeks were so scornfully branded as vulgar and paltry must inevitably have appeared to Plato degrading and unworthy of free men, if only for the reason that they fetter the mind to the corporeal instead of leading it away to something higher.68 In his opinion, they all relate to the satisfaction |458| of merely bodily wants: it is the sensuous, appetitive part of the soul, not reason, nor courage, from which they proceed, and which they call into action.69 He can therefore only imagine that, in a man who devotes himself to them, the nobler faculties must become weak, and the lower attain the mastery; that such a man wears out his soul and body and acquires no kind of personal efficiency.70 On this account, in his two political works, he prohibits to the perfect citizens not only trade and commerce, but even agriculture, which was everywhere except in Sparta held to be a free and noble occupation. Tradesmen and agriculturists are in the Republic condemned to complete political nonage. Plato thinks it hardly worth the trouble to provide even for their education, since the State is very little concerned with them.71 On similar grounds he seems to defend slavery, when he says that the ignorant and base-minded are to be thrust by the statesman into the class of slaves.72 There is here an indication of the thought which was afterwards turned |450| to account by Aristotle — viz. that those who are incapable of mental activity and moral freedom have to obey the will of another in rendering bodily service. Plato, however, does not in his writings pursue the subject. He presupposes slavery as a necessity;73 and even the remembrance of the danger which once threatened him in Aegina did not disturb him in this conclusion. Any express justification of the practice he appears to think superfluous, especially if it be acknowledged that slaves are often distinguished for their virtues.74 On the other hand, he gives directions as to the relations between master and slave which do honour to his intelligence and feelings. He forbids Hellenes to enslave Hellenes, or to hold their countrymen in possession75 when enslaved. He speaks, in reference to servile revolts, of the risk incurred by accumulating slaves of the same race and language. Above all, he insists on a just and humane, yet withal a strict and well-regulated, management of slaves, so as not to spoil them by familiarity and unsuitable indulgence.[76] That a time might and must come when there should be slaves no longer, was a thought beyond the imagination even of a Plato.
Finally, as to the moral permissibility of suicide — a question on which even the opinion of antiquity was divided — Plato, like the Pythagoreans, decides in the |460| negative;77 for the reason that man, the property of God, ought not willfully to quit the place assigned to him. The Stoics, as is well known, afterwards took a different view. All this, however, and whatever besides might be quoted from the Platonic writings as to particular points of so-called practical morality, is entirely disconnected. Plato attempted no systematic application of his moral principles except in politics.
Endnotes
1^ See p. 216 sq., and Phaedrus 229 E sq.
3^ See Pt. i. 124 sqq., 221, 257, 297 sq., 304.
4^ Symposium 205 A sqq.: Κτήσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες, καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, etc. All strive after an enduring possession of the good: Ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί. Euthydemus 288 E sqq.: no knowledge is valuable unless it is useful to us, i.e. (289 C sq., 290 B, D, 291 B, 292 B, E) unless it makes us happy. Philebus 11 B sq.: see p. 280, 148; cf. Gorgias 470 D sq., 492 D sqq.; Republic i. 354 A, et alibi; Aristotle Eth. Nicom. i. 2, beginn. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. The fact that Plato censures the confusion of the good with the pleasant, or the foundation of morality on pleasure and external advantage (see pp. 182, 185, 186 sq.), proves nothing against this, for happiness is not identical with pleasure or advantage; nor is there any real contradiction involved when, in Republic iv. beginning vii. 519 E, he explains that the enquiry into the State must be conducted without regard to the happiness of the individual members, for this only refers to the good of the whole being prior to that of the individuals. Indeed (loc. cit. 420 B), happiness is pronounced to be the highest aim for the State, just as afterwards, 444 E, Republic ix. 576 C-592 B, the advantage of justice, the happiness or unhappiness involved in every constitution, whether of state or soul, is made the basis of their different values.
6^ Theaetetus 176 A: Ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη — οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. On the latter principle cf. Republic vi. 500 B; Timaeus 47 B, where it is found as a natural consequence that he who contemplates God and His eternal ordinance does himself become well ordered in soul.
7^ E.g. 64 sqq., Phaedo 64 E: οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; 67 A: ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. Cf. 83.
9^ Republic vii. 519 C sqq.; cf. i. 345 E sqq., 347 B sq.; Theaetetus 172 C sqq., especially 173 E. It is not correct to say that the discussion in these passages is throughout only concerned with the immoral and incomplete states (Brandis, Gr.-röm. Phil. ii. a. 516): Republic vii. 519 fcreatfi of the Platonic state.
10^ Phaedo 62 B; Cratylus 400 B. In the former the doctrine of the Mysteries, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, in the latter the Orphic comparison of the σῶμα to a σῆμα and a prison, are quoted; but only in the first passage with an expression of assent. Cf. vol. i. 388 sq.
11^ Phaedo 66 B: ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν: φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.
13^ Phaedo loc. cit.: μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν: ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι, seeing that it is always a question of possession, and possession is coveted for the body’s sake. The worst point is that the soul in its thinking activities is continually hindered by the body, so that it can only arrive at the intuition of truth by withdrawing from the body, Cf. 82 E sq., 64 D sqq.; Republic ix. 588 B sqq. is quite in accordance with this exposition, in showing all kinds of immorality to depend merely on the triumph of the animal over the human element of lust and savage, irrational courage over reason, for these lower elements of the soul arise from its connection with the body.
14^ Phaedo 67 C: κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, etc.; ibid. 69 B; cf. also Sophist 230 D.
15^ Phaedo loc. cit. Cf. the quotations p. 393, 13; pp. 412, 413 and Cratylus 403 E: it is wise of Pluto not to have any intercourse with mankind except ἐπειδὰν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρὰ ᾖ πάντων τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, for it is then only that any moral influence can be successfully exercised upon it.
16^ We have already seen, Pt. i. p. 261, 5, that it is probably against these persons, and next to them, against the Cynics, that the polemic of the Philebus is directed.
17^ Philebus 28 A sqq., 64 C sqq.; cf. p. 185.
18^ Philebus 21 D sq., 60 E sq., 63 E: we may observe how briefly this point is always settled — doubtless because Plato, after expressing himself elsewhere so strongly against pleasure, is at a loss how to assign it a place and value scientifically, Plato’s own explanations, Phil. ii. B, Republic vi. 505 B, and the Megaric and Cynic doctrines on the point (see Pt. i. pp. 221 sq., 257 sqq.) do not allow us to suppose that it was ‘because he did not feel the necessity of refuting those who estimate φρόνητις too high’ (more precisely, who consider φρόνητις alone to be the highest good, entirely excluding pleasure), Ribbing, Plat. Ideenl. i. 107 sq.
20^ Those which do not depend on an illusion, and are not conditioned by the opposite of pleasure, as is generally the case (see p. 185 sq.) in the pleasures of sense. The pleasure connected with virtue and knowledge is not specially represented (see p. 186; Laws, ii. 662 B sqq., 667 C; Republic i. 328 D, vi. 485 D; Philebus 40 B sq.; Phaedrus 276 D; Timaeus 59 C).
23^ 66 A: ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ᾽ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν ἀίδιον ᾑρῆσθαι [Herm, εἰρῆσθαι, which, however, does not give a suitable sense] φύσιν … δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης ἐστίν. This passage, however, gives rise to a difficulty. As the μέτρον and σύμμέτρον are mentioned here quite generally, and both are separated from νοῦς, it might appear as if something not belonging to man but existing externally were intended; by the μέτρον, etc., the Idea of the Good (Hermann, Ind. lect. Marb. 183-2/3; Plat. 690 sq. A 648, 656; Trendelenburg, de Philebi Consil. 16; Steger, Plat. Stud. ii. 59) or even the Ideas in general (Brandis, ii. a. 490), by the σύμμέτρον, etc., everything beautiful in the world. On the other hand, the Philebus generally has not only aimed at giving a definition of the highest Good for mankind (see p. 280), but in the passage before us it treats expressly of the κτῆμα πρῶτον, δεύτερον, etc. The Good, therefore, is here considered not in its essence, but in reference to the subject in which it occurs (so Stallbaum in Philebus Prolegg. 2 A p. 74 sq.; Ritter, ii. 463; Wehrmann, Plat de s. bono doctr. 90 sq.; Steinhart, PI. WW. iv. 659 sq.; Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 52; Philologus Supplementbl. ii. 1, 77 sqq.; Strümpell, Gesch. d. pr. Phil. d. Gr. i. 263 sqq.). Plato says of the first and second term of his classification that they are περὶ μέτρον, περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον, etc., of the following simply: τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς, etc. As the first element of the highest Good, participation in the μέτρον is specified (i.e. immutable laws form the measure of all living activities); as the second element, the beauty and completeness proceeding thence. The first of these points was previously described (64 D sqq.) more definitely as the unity of κάλλος, συμμετρία and ἀλήθειά; it must then be intended to stand generally for the Ideal in human nature, from which springs all that is precious and really true in life, while the second point comprehends the effects proceeding from the former. But we have still to explain how it is that both these are brought prominently forward, and that νοῦς gets only the third place (cf. Schleiermacher, Platon’s WW. ii. 3, 133 sq.; Ribbing, Plat. Ideenl. i. 287 sq.); and the answer is, that as the highest Good, according to Plato, does not consist in an individual activity, but in the whole of all activities which are agreeable to nature, the first condition of it (the αἰτία ξυμπάσης μείξεως, the τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστ᾽ αἴτιον therein, 64 C sq., 65 A) is the harmony of human existence. By virtue of this the production of such a whole is to be aimed at; this harmony we have displayed in our two first determinations, and then come the individual Goods. Still there remains a certain obscurity in the exposition of the Philebus, even if it be recollected that one and the same concept, that of the Good, is intended to denote that which is highest in man and in the universe. This inconvenience makes itself felt much more strongly in the Republic, vi. 505 B sqq., than in the Philebus (and therefore cannot be turned into a proof of the spuriousness of the latter, with Schaarschmidt Samml. plat. Sehr. 305 sq.). We must not attribute too much importance to such classifications in Plato, nor make the distance between their particular terms absolutely the same; they belong to a mannerism of style in which he allows himself every freedom: cf. Phaedrus 248 D; Sophist 231 D sqq.; Republic ix. 587 B sqq., and supra, p. 219, 147; Plat. Stud. p. 228.
24^ With the argument of the Philebus may be compared the discussion of the Laws, v. 728 C sqq.: cf. iv. 717 A sqq., on the relative values of the different goods; which, however, is too unscientific to be noticed here.
26^ Republic i. 353 A sqq., e.g.: ἆρ’ οὖν ποτε, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον; Ἀδύνατον.ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. … ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τἀναντία. … ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Similarly Gorgias 506 D sqq.: cf. Laws, ii. 662 B sqq., v. 733 D sqq.
27^ Gorgias 504 A sqq.; Republic iv. 443 C-445 B: cf. viii. 554 E, x. 609 B sq.; Phaedo, 93 B sq.; Timaeus 87 C: cf. Laws x. 906 C, and supra, p. 187. Hence, Republic iii. 392 A; Laws ii. 660 E sqq., to portray injustice as profitable, the bad as happy, the just as unhappy, is a heresy, radically pernicious, and not to be tolerated by the State.
28^ From this point of view the contract of morality and immorality is exhibited in the detailed discussion, Republic ix. 588 B-592 B: cf. Phaedrus 230 A.
29^ Republic ix. 577 D sq., with the addition that this holds good in the highest degree of those who externally have the very highest power, viz. tyrants. Phaedrus 279 C: πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν.
30^ Republic ix. 583 B-588 A, where finally this thought is, strangely enough, and of course by a very arbitrary calculation, reduced to the formula that the philosopher is 729 times happier than the tyrant. (On this number cf. vol. i. 368, 4, 3rd edit.) The same result was previously (580 D sqq.; cf. Laws ii. 663 C) obtained from the consideration that only the philosopher knows how to judge of the worth of different lives, and consequently that which he prefers must be the best. Cf. the quotation, p. 187.
31^ See p. 182; Theaetetus 176 B.
32^ Theaetetus 177 B sqq.; Laws, iv. 716 C sq., v. 728 B.
33^ Republic iv. 444 E sq.; cf. with ii. 360 E-367 E, x. 612 A sq.
34^ Republic x. 612 B sqq. et passim; see supra, p. 207 sq. 215, 134, 218.
35^ Republic x. 612 E.; Theaetetus 176 C sqq.; Apology 41 C sq.; Laws, iv. 716 C sq.
36^ Plato considers punishment in general as a moral necessity. For its particular justification he combines the two points of view, of improvement and deterrence. Protagoras 324 B: ὁ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται — οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη — ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. Punishment is a means of purifying the soul from wickedness (Gorgias 478 E sqq., 480 A sq., 505 B, 525 B sq.; see p. 379 sq.; Republic ii. 380 A, ix. 591 A sqq.; Laws v. 728 C, ix. 862 D; ibid. xi. 934 A, where retaliation as the object of punishment is expressly rejected, as in Protagoras loc. cit.); indeed, Plato thinks it quite indispensable for this purpose: Gorgias loc. cit.; Republic ix. 591 A sq., he goes so far as to declare that everyone must wish to be punished for his transgressions because it is better to be healed than to remain sick, and Republic x. 613 A, he would consider many evils which befall the just as an inevitable punishment of previous sins. The theory of the future expiation of curable injustice is based on the same view (see p. 390 sq.). But, on the other hand, there are absolute punishments, for the justification of which this definition does not suffice, such, for instance, as the punishment of death in civil administration, and of eternal damnation in divine justice. Some further end in punishment must be therefore supposed: the criminal who is beyond reformation is at least made useful for the general good, by being made to contribute to the maintenance of moral order as a deterrent example (Gorgias 525 B sq.; Laws, v. 728 C, ix. 854 E, 862 E). With this is connected, as regards the future, the conception of a natural distribution of individuals in the universe (see supra, p. 409, 53); with reference to the State, the idea (in which can be traced the germ of a theory of elimination) that it must be purified of irreclaimable criminals by putting them to death or banishing them (Politicus 293 D, 308 E; Laws ix. 862 E. The latter passage adds that it is really better for themselves that such men should live no longer).
37^ After having first proved the superiority of justice as such, and apart from its results, he turns to the latter with the words, Republic x. 612 B: νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστιν πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι.
41^ Politicus 308 A sqq.; cf. Republic iii. 410 D. The statement of the Laws, xii. 963 E, that courage dwells even in children and beasts, is not applicable here: it is not the mere disposition to courage that is referred to in that passage; and in Republic iv. 441 A we certainly find the statement made with regard to θυμός.
42^ Republic v. 474 C, vi. 487 A.
43^ Republic iii. 415, in the myth about the different mixture of the souls in the three ranks.
45^ See p. 214 sq.: cf. Republic vii. 518 D: αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος-τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν-ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. Accordingly, we read, in what precedes, that a peculiar methodical and scientific education is necessary.
46^ Cf. Republic iii. 410 B sq., where the warriors are trained to σωφροσύνην and ἀνδρεία by means of music and gymnastic, while knowledge, and consequently σοφία, are still absent, and Politicus 309 D sqq., where Plato calls these two virtues ἀρετῆς μέρη ἀνόμοια καὶ ἐπὶ τὰναντία φερόμενα. The contrast is put in a still stronger light in the Laws (i. 030 E sq., ii. 661 E sq., iii. 696 B, xii. 963 E and passim). Perhaps Plato intends this to refer only to the ordinary form of these virtues. Still, even then there is something strange in these expressions: in his earlier period Plato would scarcely have so expressed himself without at the same time intimating that a valour, e.g. which takes away all self-control, cannot be true valour.
47^ The Protagoras, 330 B sqq., mentions, as a fifth, piety (ὁσιότης), which is specially discussed in the Euthyphro (likewise in the Laches, 199 D, and Gorgias 507; the latter dialogue, however, seems to embrace wisdom in σωφροσύνη, which it proves to include all virtues). Similarly Xen. Mem. iv. 6, piety, justice, valour, and wisdom are mentioned; the latter in Mem. iii. 9, 4, is identified with σωφροσύνη). Republic ii. 402 C does not give a complete classification of highest goods any more than Theaetetus 176 B.
48^ The above account follows Republic iv. 441 C-443 B. But a difficulty arises here owing to what is said about σωφροσύνη and its relation to δικαιοσύνη. Plato himself remarks before, in the discussion on the virtues of the state (see chap. xi.), 430 E, 431 E. that its σωφροσύνη,unlike its wisdom and valour, has its seat not merely in a part of the people, ἀλλὰ δι’ ὅλης [τῆς πόλεως] ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη ξυνᾴδοντας, that it resembles a symphony and harmony; and he likewise says that the individual soul, 442 C, becomes σώφρωη through the φηλία and ξυμφωνία of its parts. R. Hirzel is so far not incorrect when in his thorough examination of the present question (‘über den Unterschied der δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη,’ etc., Hermes, viii. 379 sqq.) he insists on σωφροσύνη being not merely a virtue of the ἐπιθυμητικὸν, but of the entire soul. Still, however, it is not the virtue of it without any limitation, but only that virtue which consists in τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὼ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ (442 D), in the right of reason to control courage and desire being unanimously acquiesced in by all parts of the soul. But for this it is necessary in the first place that the two inferior parts submit to the sway of reason (the μὴ στασιάζωσιν required of them). Reason has the consciousness of its right to rule over the others given to it in its σοφία, just as immediately as it has right opinions as to what is to be feared and what is not to be feared, in the observance of which by the spirited element true valour consists. And as in the latter there is no need of any further distinct activity on the part of reason beyond knowing, so also in the case of σωφροσύνη. Hence, if σωφροσύνη consists in a definite condition of the whole soul, in the acquiescence of its three parts in the rightful domination of reason, the condition for the existence of this is in the subordination of the mortal to the immortal parts of the soul. And as σωφροσύνη cannot be called so exclusively the virtue of the ἐπιθυμητικὸν as valour that of the θυμός (which according to Hirzel’s account, loc. cit., is done not only by the pseudo-Aristotle, De virt. et vit. 1249 a. 30 sqq., 1250 a. 7, but also by the genuine, Top. v. 1. 7, 8, 129 a. 10, 136 b. 10, 138 b. 1), the determination given in our text does not contradict Plato’s meaning. For δικαιοσύνη Plato demands all three parts of the soul. It consists, according to 441 D sq. (cf. 433 A, and Hirzel, loc. cit. 396 sq.), in the fact that each part of the soul τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, which means that each part performs its own allotted task and at the same time does not hinder the others in the performance of theirs (the former is τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, the latter μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, 433 A: cf. 434 B sq.). According to Plato this is the fundamental condition for the health and order of the life of the soul, just as τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων in the different ranks is the fundamental condition of the health and success of the life of the state. Justice is (as Hirzel, loc. cit., rightly recognises) the root of all virtues, that ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν [-έχει], as is said in 433 B, with reference primarily to the virtues of the state. In the individual soul, by preventing its parts from ἀλλότρια πράττειν and πολυπραγμένος, it makes a man at one with himself, σώφρων and ἡρμοσμένον (443 D), and therefore it can be identified with the health of the soul, ἀρετή in general (444 A sqq., 445 B).
49^ Cf. on this passage Republic iv. 443 C sqq., where I agree with Hirzel’s view.
50^ As Tennemann does, Plat. Phil. iv. 115 sqq.
52^ P. 170, 24, 25: and further, cf. Republic iii. 389 B sqq., 414 B, v. 459 C sqq., vi. 485 C; Laws, ii. 663 D.
53^ The former, as we shall find later on, in the primary education of youth by means of myths; the latter, when, in the distribution of the women and the classification of the citizens into the three ranks, all kinds of fictions and even false lots — in elections — are brought into use.
56^ Phaedrus 251 A sqq.; Symposium, 215 D sqq., 218 A: cf. 192 B sqq.
57^ Republic iii. 403 B, v. 468 B sq.
58^ Phaedrus 256 B sq.: if the lovers in unguarded moments are carried too far by their passion, provided this does not occur too often, and they remain true to each other all their life long, although they do not attain to the highest destiny, still they have a happy lot after death.
59^ 250 E sq., 253 E sqq., 256 B sq.
60^ Republic iii. 402 E. The same truth is set forth historically in the Symposium, 216 C sqq., in the example of the true lover, Socrates.
61^ Republic i. 636 C, 836 B sqq., 838 E, 841 D.
62^ Republic viii. 839 A, 840 D, 841 D.
64^ Republic v. 451 D sqq., 454 D sqq., with which the quotations from the Timaeus and Phaedrus, pp. 392, 394, do not entirely agree: cf. p. 434. In Republic iv. 431 C, v. 469 D; Laws, vi. 781 A sq., the weakness and imperfection of the female sex is still more strongly emphasised.
65^ Laws, iv. 721 B sq.: cf. vi. 773 B, E, 783 D.
66^ Cf. with respect to this provisionally the remarks in Laws, vii. 804 D-806 C on the neglect of the education of women.
67^ This point is treated in detail in the discussion on the state of the Republic and the Laws.
68^ Socrates held a different opinion, as was shown, Pt. i. p. 142.
70^ Republic ix. 590 C: βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί οἴει ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, etc., vi. 495 D: the want of true philosophers results in unworthy persons of any profession throwing themselves into philosophy, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν … ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.
72^ Politicus 309 A: Τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τε αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους εἰς τὸ δουλικὸν ὑποζεύγνυσι γένος. Republic ix. 590 C: if anyone is not in a position to control his desires himself, ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, etc., which, however, does not here refer to slavery, but to the rule of the higher classes over the uneducated masses.
73^ E.g. Republic v. 469 B sq., 431 C; Laws vi. 776 B sqq.
74^ Laws vi. 776 D: πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀδελφῶν ἤδη δοῦλοι καὶ ὑέων τισὶν κρείττους πρὸς ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν γενόμενοι, σεσώκασιν δεσπότας 776e καὶ κτήματα τάς τε οἰκήσεις αὐτῶν ὅλας.
75^ Republic v. 469 B sq. Elsewhere Plato censures the opposition of Hellenes and barbarians (see 297, 93), but his own tone of thought is nevertheless entirely pervaded by it: cf. p. 416.
Virtue is the highest good for individuals, and the highest aim of the State; the right constitution of particular souls depends upon the proper and natural relation of their parts, and the same is true of the community. Of the two comprehensive works which Plato has devoted to the State, the Republic, with its precursor the Politicus, will first engage our attention, the Laws being reserved for a later place.
a. End and Problem of the State. It has just been asserted that virtue is the end and aim of the existence of the State. Plato seems at first to contradict this by a much more external derivation of it. The State, he says,1 arose because the strength of individuals is not sufficient to supply their material wants; they therefore combine and form a society. The primitive State, therefore, consists entirely of handicraftsmen, who are without artificial wants and higher culture, and lead the simplest lives. Luxury alone necessitates the class of warriors and rulers, and with them the whole state-organism. The same is |462| mythically expressed in the Politicus.2 In the Golden Age, we are told, mankind living under the protection of the gods, in material abundance, formed no states, but only accumulated flocks and herds. States and laws became necessary on account of the deterioration of the world. Plato, however, clearly shows that he was not in earnest when so speaking, for in the Republic3 he describes the so-called healthy ‘natural State’ as a city of swine; and in the Politicus (272 B) he only admits the Golden Age to have been happier than ours, on the supposition that the men of that time improved their external advantages to the acquisition of higher knowledge. Such descriptions seem intended to disabuse us of the false ideal of a natural State4 rather than to instruct us as to the origin of communities.5 These, in Plato’s opinion, are founded on moral necessity.6 His philosophy had led him far beyond the one-sided political theories of his countrymen; for him the State could not possess the unconditional importance that it did for the ancient Greeks. In their view, the State was the first object of all moral activity; the virtue of a man was wholly identical with political efficiency. Plato, like his master, regards the work of man in himself as his first duty; and participation in government |463| only as a relative and conditional duty.7 The Greeks in general knew of no higher problem than work in and for the State. Plato sees in the calm life of the philosopher, in the contemplation of what is essential and eternal, a far more glorious and attractive end. In comparison with this, the aims of ordinary politicians appear to him worthless, and their arts and endeavours slavish. He says, in regard to States as they are usually constituted, that the philosopher dwells in them with his body alone, his soul being a stranger, ignorant of their standards, unmoved by their ambitions;8 and that everyone who desires to do the right must keep clear of public concerns, or he will speedily perish.9 And in his city of philosophers10 the best of the inhabitants will only descend upon compulsion from the blessed heights of intellectual contemplation to the common affairs of life in the dark prison of this present world. But though this abolishes the absolute and unconditional value of public life, which made it impossible for the earlier Greek to conceive a noble human existence apart from political activity, public life is still, according to Plato, morally necessary. The necessity, however, is indirect, and not immediate. The State is neither the first nor the highest object of man’s energy, but it is the indispensable condition for knowledge and virtue, the sole means of producing and continuing them, of establishing their dominion in |464| the world. If education and instruction be wanting, virtue is a matter of chance. Natural disposition is so little able to engender it? that the most gifted, under the influence of wrong treatment, usually take to the worst courses, unless protected by exceptionally favourable circumstances. Education is only possible in the State; and conversely, bad government is the source of the most fatal and irresistible of those evil influences, to which the most brilliant talents as a rule most surely succumb. So long therefore as the life of the State is diseased, and public institutions are defective, no thorough improvement in moral conditions is to be hoped for. Some few individuals may perhaps be saved, by a special aptitude for knowledge and virtue: but these cannot attain the best of which they are capable, even for themselves. Still less can they assist others; it is much if they can make their own way, and neither become contaminated with the wrong that is around them, nor fall in battle with it before their time. Nothing can rectify this but an entire reformation of the commonwealth. The State alone can secure the general victory of good over evil.11 The proper end of Government is the virtue of the citizens,12 the happiness |465| of the people as a whole:13 for virtue and happiness are the same thing. The State in its highest acceptation is an educational institution:14 its special and primary function is the care of Morality and Science; in a word, of Philosophy. The ends which ordinary State-craft has in view are utterly worthless, and, so far as they interfere with that higher end, are absolutely pernicious.15 The true State should be a pattern of true virtue. Plato’s first purpose in designing his Republic is to seek the concept of Justice, where it is written in large letters;16 and in the first pause of his description, he refers to it as the seat of all virtues.17 This entirely corresponds with his determinations on the problem of the State. The complete realisation in the commonwealth of the moral idea constitutes that happiness of the whole which is the State’s ultimate end. |466|
If such be the purpose of social community, it is evident that a State deserving: the name can only arise under the same conditions and by the same forces that produce morality in general. The only power that can place morality on a firm foundation, that can purify its content and motives, free it from the contingent character of ordinary virtue, and guarantee its existence and continuance, — is, according to Plato, Philosophy.18 The highest problem of political life can therefore only be solved by founding it upon Philosophy. When everything in the State — every law and regulation — springs from scientific knowledge, then alone will it be possible for all to subserve the one end of the State and to be regulated in reference to it. In proportion as any part withdraws itself from this guidance, the perfection of the Commonwealth and the fulfillment of its vocation must suffer. The main principle of the true State is the absolute dominion of Philosophy, and consequently the dominion of philosophers.19 ‘Unless philosophers become rulers, or rulers truly and thoroughly study Philosophy; unless political power and Philosophy are united in the same hands, there will be no period to the troubles of States and of humanity.’20 These words are the key to Plato’s whole theory of Politics. |467|
b. The Constitution of the State. The most essential element in the State is the absolute rule of true State-craft, — of Philosophy. At the outset of the enquiry it seems indifferent in what manner and under what forms this consummation shall be brought about. It is of little consequence whether one or more, few or many, rich or poor, wield the power; whether they do so by the will of the people or against it, rule by fixed laws or without laws, use gentle means or harsh. If only the government is good and statesmanlike, is based on true knowledge, and tends to the common weal, all else is of secondary importance.21 But this is merely a preliminary explanation, to keep us from confusing what is accidental with what is essential. On closer deliberation, Plato finds that these determinations are not so immaterial as they at first appear. With regard to the question whether a government shall rule by consent of the people or by force, it is not to be expected, he thinks, that reasonable laws will ever be tolerated by the mass of the people, without coercion. It is no pleasant treatment to which the true statesman subjects those committed to his care: he orders them bitter medicine. He will have nothing to do with the flattery of their inclinations, or the satisfaction of their desires: he educates them in a strict school to virtue and wisdom. How could such a discipline be at its commencement agreeable to those who are first trained by its means to morality?22 Plato acknowledges that a State like the one he intends, |468| could scarcely be established without great and effectual external helps.23 Once established, it would be impossible, he conceives, to find in any other so great unanimity and general contentment.24 Again, after declaring it a matter of small consequence whether the ruler is or is not bound by existing laws, he goes on to show that it would be wrong to limit the really discerning statesman by the law, which, being a universal, can never fully adapt itself to the individuality of particular persons and cases; and being unchangeable, cannot keep pace with changing circumstances.25 In the absence of true State-craft, however, it would certainly be better to be bound by laws that have the warranty of experience, than to follow senseless or self-interested fancies.26 As respects the distinction of rich and poor, Plato knows too well the political dangers with which this contrast is fraught27 not to take precautions against them. We shall presently see that in one of his political works, he seeks to eradicate this distinction, by a universal community of goods, and in the other to render it innocuous. Lastly, though it may in itself be immaterial how many |469| shall hold the supreme power, yet we can at once understand that a philosopher who was convinced that the true art of government is never possessed, nor the possessor of it endured, by the majority, — that out of a thousand men, there would hardly be found fifty statesmen,28 — such a philosopher would be certain to limit the rulers to one, or, at any rate, to a very small number.29 The Platonic State can only be an aristocracy,30 a government of virtue and intelligence exercised by one or a few. As in the soul the simplest, and, with regard to its extent, the smallest part is to rule, so in the State the sceptre is to be wielded by the minority who in knowledge and character excel all the rest.31
This idea is more particularly developed as follows. As every kind of occupation is better attended to if a man entirely devotes himself to it, than if he is busy in many directions, so there must be a division of labour in the work of the State. Each person must do for the community the service for which training and disposition have especially adapted him, and none shall |470| exceed the limits of this his specific task. The government of the state and its protection against external and internal enemies must be confided to other persons than those concerned with the arts which supply the necessaries of life; and accordingly the first division is between the ‘guardians’ of the State; to whom is entrusted the care of public affairs, and the handicraftsmen. The former are further divided into those who rule and those who obey — the rulers proper, and their assistants.32 Thus we obtain three grades. First, the people, that is, agriculturists and traders, the industrial class33 (Nährstand). Secondly, the guardians or warriors, the military order34 (Wehrstand). Thirdly, the rulers or official order,35 which, however, we shall find to be at the same time the teaching order (Lehrstand). Nature herself has laid the foundation for this division,, by her various allotment of dispositions; some are raised above the mass of men by their courage, others by their powers of thought.36 The art of government is concerned with the right and proportionate arrangement of |471| the three grades. And such an arrangement cannot be attained unless each grade devotes itself to the business incumbent upon it, paying no attention to other spheres. Nothing is more dangerous to a State than a confusion of these boundaries; when public matters are entrusted to one who is naturally unfit for them, when artisans would be warriors, and warriors rulers, or the same person lays claim to all these functions at once.37 All that belongs to the business of government must exclusively devolve upon the class of rulers: their power is unbounded and unshared. The protection of the State, both within and without, is restricted as exclusively to the second class. The mass of the people is not to meddle with weapons; for they are not in a position to learn the proper management of them. All industrial activity is, for the same reason, prohibited to the higher ranks. Trade and agriculture are only permissible in the third class: the other classes are not merely debarred from these common pursuits, but are forbidden to possess private property, the first condition of such pursuits: they must devote themselves entirely to the community, and derive their subsistence from the labour of the third class.38 The virtue of the State depends upon the maintenance, and perfect carrying out of this order. The State is wise, when the rulers possess true knowledge. It is courageous when the warriors hold fast a true opinion of what is and is not to be feared, about pains and dangers, as well as pleasure |472| and desire. Its temperance, σωφροσύνη, is the agreement of governors and governed as to who is to rule, and who to obey: for then the sensual passions of the multitude will be bridled by reason and the noble impulses of the good. Its justice is to be found in the maintenance of this proportion as a whole, — in the fulfillment by everyone of his appointed duty without overstepping its bounds (the οἰκειοπραγία of the three classes).39 Special constitutional laws, like all particular legislation, Plato, as already observed,40 considers superfluous, and even injurious, in a well-ordered State. He only decrees that the rulers should devote the greater portion of their time to philosophic meditation,41 and a smaller portion, periodically, to affairs of State: so that State affairs will thus be managed by a selected number of the ruling class, in rotation.
The constitution is but partially founded on the principle of division of labour. This principle is itself externally derived from teleological considerations; and even if established, it would not involve that work for the commonwealth must be distributed precisely in this way, and that the grade corresponding to each kind of work is to become a permanent caste. The distinction of classes and the constitution of the State are manifestly based upon wider grounds; and the theory of the division of labour was subsequently applied to their scientific justification. The sole dominion of Philosophy followed directly from Plato’s views on the political |473| problem and the conditions of true morality; it was indeed included in the Socratic principle that the wise alone are entitled to rule. But it was impossible for the philosopher who so lightly esteemed the intelligence and moral status of the multitude, to assume that the majority would voluntarily conform to that sway. He must therefore arm the philosophic regents with power to compel obedience to their ordinances. He must place at their side a sufficient number of able and willing instruments; for they themselves, as we have seen, would be too few to fulfil the task. A special class of warriors was thus required, more for the purposes of internal administration than for external protection: and Plato has neither entirely overlooked nor satisfactorily removed the difficulties with which his arrangement is ultimately beset.42 Lastly, there were other reasons, apart from division of labour, why Plato should forbid industrial occupations to the higher classes. As a true aristocrat, he too greatly despised material work, and ascribed to it too evil an influence on character, to expect from those engaged in it the political and military ability necessary for his ‘guardians.’43 The distinction of classes and the unconditional subordination of the lower to the higher were therefore inevitably required by his political views. There was also this advantage in it: that the State was thus divided similarly to the Cosmos and the human soul; that it represented an enlarged picture of man, and a miniature copy of the world. As the three estates correspond to the three |474| parts of the soul,44 so they may be compared with the three divisions of the universe; the dominion of the Idea (or what is the same thing, of Reason) over the material world by means of the soul, is brought about in the same manner as that of the first class over the third by means of the second.45 It was only through this determination that Plato could apply his concept of justice to the State, or make the State sufficiently a work of art, to correspond with his view of morality. Virtue for him, according to Greek, and especially to Pythagorean notions, consists in harmony, in the agreement of all the parts, and their subordination to the purpose of the whole.46 This does not necessarily exclude |475| a freer movement of political life, in which the separate activities are exercised by the same persons, sometimes in turn, sometimes together; but irrespective even of Plato’s philosophic absolutism this latter view is not the most agreeable to him. He likes to keep that which is Ideally distinct externally separate; — to realise the moments of the Idea in clear and well-defined presentations. It is quite in accordance with this plastic genius that the different political activities should divide into as many grades, distinct and separate, each existing for its specified task, and representing only this one particular concept. As the Idea belongs to a special world, outside the world of phenomena, so the reason of the State is assigned to a special class over and above that of the people, and as the Soul, or motive power, comes in as a particular essence between the Idea and the phenomenon, so does the warrior class which carries out the resolutions of the ruling philosophers interpose between these and the people. Everything is fixed and determined, bound together by unchangeable relations. It is a work of art in the severest style — transparent, harmonious, well-proportioned, plastic. But it is a work of art only. The Platonic State rests wholly upon abstractions: it cannot endure the multiplicity and elasticity of actual life.
The first condition of the State, and at the same time its ultimate aim, is the virtue of the citizens. In order to secure this, stringent regulations concerning their education, manner of life and even of birth, must be enforced. Where men are not as they should be, the |476| best laws are worthless; but where men are of the right kind, good laws will always be forthcoming.47 All therefore that tends to improve men must be of the highest importance. In discussing this subject, however, Plato has entirely confined himself to the two higher ranks; for the mass of the people he presupposes the ordinary way of life,48 and then seems to leave them altogether to themselves.49 How they are to attain even that kind of virtue which he requires in them, without proper guidance, it does not appear; but from his aristocratic point of view, their condition seems a matter of indifference to the commonwealth.50 In political affairs they have no voice: the separation of caste withdraws the higher ranks from their moral influence; and as to their economical importance, Plato, despising as he did every kind of industrial activity, could never entertain the question at all. |477|
c. The Social Regulations of the Platonic State.
1. To make a political life such as Plato desires, possible, two things are necessary; first, all disturbing elements must be banished from the community, and secondly, an aftergrowth of well-disposed citizens must be secured. For it is obvious that out of worthless materials nothing good can arise.51 Plato expects to accomplish the first end by those vigorous measures which are to clear the way for the rule of reason.52 For the attainment of the second, he would place the parentage of the citizens entirely under State control. So great an importance does he attach to the circumstances of a man’s birth, that the only possible cause he can foresee for the future degeneracy of his pattern State is some mismanagement in this direction.53 Hence those expedients which to us sound so strange. The public authorities are not only to decide upon the number of children required, and the ages within which the citizens may become parents, — but they are to superintend each individual case, and take away the children immediately after birth. All kinds of artificial means are to be used in order that the children of the good may be more numerous than those of the bad.54 Plato indeed recommends that the latter, as well as all sickly children, shall |478| be got rid of; and that the offspring of marriages unsanctioned by the authorities shall be destroyed or exposed.55 He cannot quite conceal from himself that these regulations would be difficult to carry out;56 but the inhumanity of many of them, and the degrading view of marriage as the merely economic supply of population, do not disturb him in his political ideal.
2. The State being thus provided with material for worthy citizens, the next and most important thing is to see that the children born at its behest shall be exclusively trained for its service and purposes. This can only be achieved by State Education. From the first moment of their existence, they belong to the State alone. The newly-born infants are at once to be conveyed to public nurseries, and care is to be taken that neither parents nor children shall ever know one another.57 They are to be brought up publicly.58 No individual can choose his station, nor can the parents determine it; the magistrates are to place everyone in the class for which his disposition and character have fitted him.59 Nothing is so important for the well-being of the State as that its affairs should be given into right hands.60 The part that individuals will take in the |479| direction of those affairs cannot then be left to their own discretion. As to the more particular training of the higher classes, Plato considers the ordinary education of his countrymen, in music and gymnastic, as essentially proper and sufficient61 for the warriors. Only he requires that both arts shall be pursued differently from what they usually are. In gymnastic, the body should be far less considered than the soul and the whole man. Gymnastic and music, in natural combination, will produce the fairest of all results, — the harmony of the individual with himself: they cause bodily and mental development to keep equal pace; and even within the soul itself they effect a union of force and gentleness, of courage and morality.62 Gymnastic should be directed to the hardening and simplifying of life;63 music is to produce the love of the beautiful, the moral discipline and healthfulness, which before a man attains scientific knowledge, keeps him steadfast in the right way.64 Music is by far the more important of the two. Plato thinks so highly of its influence that he calls it the fortress of the State, in which nothing can be shaken without involving the entire ruin of the existing customs and laws.65 Intelligent |480| rulers will therefore pay great attention to music; — neither suffering an immoral and effeminate character to creep into its harmonies, nor allowing to poetry forms which might alienate the citizens from simplicity and love of truth. In the sphere of the plastic arts, they will only tolerate that which is noble and seemly: but especially they must supervise the contents of poetical compositions, and forbid all that is immoral and derogatory to the gods.66 Art, in a word, is to be strictly subordinated to ethics: it is to be a means of moral education, and nothing else. The Platonic State will not suffer any art that does not conform to this standard. Homer and all poetry imitated from him are denied an entrance there.67 After this preparatory discipline, the first rank is to receive intellectual training, the nature and stages of which we have already examined.68 This course of instruction, however, is not intended only for youths; it extends far into manhood: nor may the pupils enter the guild of rulers, until they have been tested by many years’ practical activity.69
3. In order that no one may belong to himself or his family even in advanced age, but all to the State, — Plato, in a series of remarkable ordinances, lays down for the two higher ranks a rule of life which goes far beyond anything hitherto proposed or attempted in |481| Greece.70 Nothing is more beneficial to the State than that which unites it, nothing more baleful than that which divides and splits it up. Nothing is so uniting as an identity of interests, nothing so sundering as a division of interests. The more absolutely the citizens call one and the same thing their own, or not their own, the more perfect will be their concord, and the better it will be for the State.71 Thus the main point of view for the social economy of the Platonic State is the abolition, as far as possible, of private interests. This, in Plato’s opinion, can only be attained by the abolition of private possessions. He therefore forbids private property to his warriors and rulers, beyond what is absolutely necessary; they are to have common dwellings and common meals, to possess neither gold nor silver, and to have a certain prescribed maintenance which is to be provided by the third class, and must not exceed moderate requirements.72 He substitutes for family life, a community of wives and children, the chief characteristics of which have been already noticed.73 Since such a mode of life would put an end to the household sphere of women, he demands (conformably with the Socratic theory of the similarity of moral disposition in both sexes74) that they should share the education of men, in war and in political affairs.75 Further regulations for the lives of his guardians |482| Plato holds to be unnecessary, for the reason quoted above; — that persons properly educated will themselves find out what is right; while those who are deficient in this main qualification are beyond the help of laws. All attempts to support a State by particular legislation are merely makeshifts.76 He also thinks that lawyers and doctors will have little occupation in his State; — for the strictness of manners and the virtue of the citizens will allow of no lawsuits, and their healthy mode of life will diminish diseases. He who cannot be cured quickly and by simple means had better be suffered to die: it is not worthwhile to live for the care of a sickly body.77 Another department of legislation, the arrangement of public religious worship, he leaves entirely to the Delphic God;78 but he enlarges on the conduct of war, with a view to the introduction of a more humane martial law, especially among the States of Greece.79
Since Hegel’s excellent observations on the subject80 it has been generally acknowledged81 that Plato, in this |483| State of his, could not have intended to portray a mere ideal in the modern sense, that is, a fancy picture impossible to reduce to practice.82 Everything is against such a supposition. The principle of the Platonic commonwealth is thoroughly Greek; it is expressly said to be an Hellenic State,83 and its legislation takes account only of Greek conditions.84 The fifth, sixth, and seventh books of the Republic are entirely devoted to the means of its realisation. Plato distinctly declares that he considers such a State not merely possible, but absolutely necessary; and no other to be deserving of the name. In it alone public affairs are duly shared and divided; from it alone he expects the welfare of mankind;85 all other forms of government he regards as evil and mistaken.86 The whole character of his philosophy contradicts the notion that that which was definite in its Idea could be unreal and impracticable. We cannot doubt, therefore, that his propositions are seriously meant. In the enquiry as to how Plato arrived at so peculiar a theory, we must bear in mind |484| his well-known political principles and those of his family; his aristocratic modes of thought, and that predilection for Doric forms and customs87 which had early exposed him to censure.88 The traces of such influence are very evident in the Republic. The principle he so prominently upheld, — that the individual belongs to the Whole, and exists entirely for the sake of the Whole, was carried out in no Grecian State so uncompromisingly as in Sparta: in none do we find such strict subordination of the citizens to law and authority, such perfect control of education and of the entire life, exercised by the State for its own ends. Plato forbids agriculture and trade to his guardians; in Sparta they were given over to the Perioeci and Helots. He requires them to dispense with domestic habits and to live in public like a garrison; the Spartan State even in peace was a camp;89 meals, exercises, recreations, even sleeping-places were in common for the male population, as for the army in the field. Plato requires the utmost simplicity and austerity, and this is truly Spartan. His refusal to allow the possession of gold and silver recalls a similar prohibition of Lycurgus, with his iron coinage. The community of goods has a precedent not only in the equality and invariability of inheritances, but also in the use of others’ tools, stores, domestic animals, and slaves, which was sanctioned by Lacedaemonian custom. The community |485| of wives finds its counterpart in the enactment that an elderly man might pass on his consort to another, and that an unmarried man might borrow the wife of his friend. The Spartan law, like that of Plato, fixed a definite age for marriage. In the Platonic state all parents are to be universally honoured as fathers; in Sparta, similarly, they had a general claim on the reverence of the young, and each might chastise the children of others. Comradeship was allowed by Plato, and also by the Spartans, but its excesses were strictly prohibited. In both States, gymnastic exercises are principally directed to efficiency in war; Plato throws them open to women, and in Sparta the maidens at any rate were accustomed to take their part. There, too, music and poetry were carefully supervised as a means of moral education: we often hear of State interference against a too ornate style of music, and of the banishment of poets. Sickly children also were exposed. Plato forbids the dedication of captured arms to the gods; so did the Spartans.90 Besides all this, his preference for the Doric aristocracy is well known. The Platonic State thus offers numerous characteristics which may be regarded partly as a repetition, partly as a development and enforcement of Spartan regulations, and Plato is himself careful to draw our attention to the points of similarity.91 But the most distinctive element of his political theory cannot be derived from this source. Not to speak of the community of wives and goods, the |486| germs of which were only just discernible in Sparta, — not to dwell on Plato’s severe censure of the Lacedaemonian constitution,92 — it is plain that his main political point, the philosophic education of the rulers, is entirely alien and contradictory to the Lacedaemonian spirit. Between the Spartan legislation, founded on ancient usage and unchallenged tradition, — directed only to the military greatness of the State and the manly energy of its citizens, — and the Platonic constitution, originating from the Idea, consisting wholly in the service of Philosophy, there is such a radical difference, that to regard the Republic as an improved edition of the State of Lycurgus, is to overlook its most essential determinations. We might rather perhaps find in it a reminiscence of the political tendency of the Pythagorean society, which also aimed at a reform of the State through philosophy, and doubtless was not without some influence on Plato. But this precedent is no adequate explanation of his political system. So far as we know, the Pythagoreans sought only to maintain the existing aristocratic governments, and somewhat to improve them on minor points; not to realise in the State theories that were essentially new. Hegel’s remarks,93 striking as they are, on the interconnection of the Platonic policy with the principle of Greek morality and the then state of Greece, only help us in part. The Platonic Republic exhibits indeed very strikingly the specific peculiarity which distinguishes the Greek from the modern spirit — the subordination |487| of the particular to the "Whole, the limitation of individual freedom by the State, the substantiality, in short, of Greek morality. It is also true that Plato must have had a strong motive, in the political experiences through which his country had only just passed, for unduly emphasizing this view. It was the unbridled self-will of individuals which, in the Peloponnesian war,94 had been the ruin of Athens and of Greece. We have here therefore this phenomenon — that the Greek spirit at the same instant that it withdraws from actuality into its Ideality, recognises this severance of the subject from the State as his destruction, and demands his enforced subordination to the State. One of the most essential constituents of the Platonic State, the formation of a distinct military class, was supported not only by the precedent of Sparta, but by the transmutation (brought about by the great increase of mercenaries) of the old national militia into the standing armies with which Philip and Alexander soon afterwards conquered the world. Plato founds this institution upon the theory that the art of war, in order to be perfected, must be made a life’s calling, like any other art;95 a theory which must have been greatly elucidated by the successes of Iphicrates and Chabrias with their companies. All this, however, does not show the connection between Plato’s politics and his philosophic principles. It lies, as already indicated, in that dualism which is metaphysically |488| expressed in the transcendency of Ideas; anthropologically, in the theory of the parts of the soul; ethically, in the postulate of the philosophic death. The Idea is here too abruptly contrasted with the phenomenon, and Reason with Sense, to allow of a satisfactory result from the natural growth and development of individuals and of Society. Only the few who have attained to the contemplation of pure Ideas, and who are able to behold the Idea of the Good, live in the light — all others lead a shadowy existence, and can at best produce but a mimicry of true virtue.96 How then is it possible that a commonwealth corresponding to the Idea can be established except through the unconditional dominion of these few? How can we hope that the generality of mankind will voluntarily submit themselves to a government, the necessity and reasonableness of which they are not in a position to comprehend, and the severity of which they can only regard as an unbearable restraint upon their sensuous nature? How could even the philosophers become fit for their task, if they did not renounce those inferior occupations and pleasures, by which man is disturbed in his intercourse with what is higher, estranged from his true vocation, and rendered incapable of virtue; — if they too were immersed in the small particular interests which divide the commonwealth, and never arrived at full self-devotion to the State?97 From this point of view we must interpret the severities of the Platonic theory — the unnatural and violent suppression |489| of the individual, the reckless disregard of personal and political freedom. Plato was compelled to this course, because his system left no other open to him. The realisation of the moral Idea cannot be brought about by the free activity of individuals, by the recognition of their personal interests as justifiable in themselves, — it must develop itself by conflict with these; because the Idea stands over against man as something opposite, to which he can only raise himself by flight from the world of sense. As in his physics Plato required a universal architect, in order to subdue Matter by force to the Idea, so in his politics, absolute sovereignty is necessary in order to control individual egoism. He is not content with the community of spirit arising from the free action of each separate member; the Idea of the State must exist as a particular rank. And it can only be realised in individuals, when they have been denuded of everything in which individual interest finds satisfaction. In all this there is a union of the speculative element with the practical, like that in the mediaeval church, which has been aptly compared with the Platonic State.98 In that church the presupposed transcendency of the Divine gave rise to a separation of the kingdom of God from the world; to an external government of the community by means of a faith distant and inaccessible to it, and deposited in a special order, pledged to the renunciation of essentially individual aims in priestly and monastic vows. |490| In the Republic similar presuppositions produced very similar results.
This parallel may also serve to throw light on Plato’s political ideas from another side. His ideal state appears to us strange and impossible to carry out; but its affinity with our modes of thought and with the subsequent historical reality is all the more remarkable. We might even say that it is unpractical only because Plato attempts to accomplish on Greek soil and in Greek fashion that which was destined to be realised under entirely different circumstances and conditions; because he boldly anticipates the laws and endeavours of the future. His error did not consist in setting up new aims invented by his own caprice or fancy, but in seeking prematurely, and therefore with insufficient means,99 to solve the problems of after-history, which his prophetic vision anticipated. The discord in his work between two principles, — the political Absolutism which sacrifices all the rights of the individual to the State, and the philosophic Idealism which leads man away from public life into himself, to give him higher aims in another world, — may be a disturbing feature, but it is the very struggle which was afterwards repeated in the conflict of Hellenism with Christianity. Though his verdicts may sometimes be unjust on the States and statesmen of his country, history has ratified his conviction that the existing kind of government was past help, and must be superseded by another essentially new. In declaring the philosophic discernment of the |491| rulers to be the indispensable means of this reform, and in constituting his State out of the well-known three orders, he has not only set a pattern, — among the Greeks the first and only pattern, — for the mediaeval distinction of teaching, fighting, and producing classes (Lehr, — Wehr, — Nährstand), but for the modern institutions resulting from these. Though Plato would scarcely have recognised his guardians in our standing armies, or his ruling philosophers in our civil functionaries, — the separation of a special class educated for war, as opposed to the old national armies, and the demand for the scientific training of those holding office, are in principle coincident with his ideas. We are justly startled at his projects for the community of wives and children, and for the education and pursuits of women, but the general idea of equality between the sexes, and of extending the same attention to female as to male education, is in perfect harmony with the requirements of Christianity and of modern times.100 Lastly, although his severity in regard to the great poets of his country was displeasing to antiquity and surprises us not a little, its underlying cause is the well-founded conviction that religion stood in need of a thorough reformation from the moral point of view. Plato is an Idealist, not in the ends for which he strove, but in the means by which he hoped to attain them.101
Side by side with the perfect form of government, |492| Plato treats somewhat minutely of the defective forms known to actual experience, and of their nature and institutions.102 Though these discussions are in themselves very interesting, and prove that the Philosopher in his estimate of political conditions was deficient neither in experimental knowledge nor in keenness of perception, we cannot at present examine them in detail, as they only serve to elucidate his views on minor points. It should be mentioned, however, that there is a slight difference, in regard to them, between the Republic and the Politicus. The Politicus enumerates, over and above the perfect constitution, six which are imperfect; distinguished from each other partly in the number and rank of the rulers, partly in the legitimacy or arbitrariness of their rule. In order of merit, they follow one another thus: — Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy that conforms to law, and Democracy that dispenses with law, Oligarchy, and Tyranny. The Republic names only four defective constitutions, and estimates them somewhat differently, so that Timocracy comes first, then Oligarchy, next Democracy, and lastly, as before, Tyranny. This variation is, doubtless, to be explained by Plato’s having only subsequently arrived at the more precise definitions of the Republic; while in the Politicus, being chiefly concerned with the difference between false statecraft and true, he describes the former, in reference to the ordinary classifications,103 |493| which he admits to be inadequate.104 As to the form of this representation, it has been elsewhere observed105 that the derivation of the different governments from one another is evidently intended to mark their relative proportion of truth and merit, and not their historical order.106
Endnotes
2^ 269 C sqq.; cf. especially 271 E sqq., 274 B sqq.
4^ As Antisthenes had maintained; cf. Pt. i. p. 278 sq.
5^ Steinhart’s objection, iii. 710 sq., that Plato seriously commends those states in which a natural virtue rules, is not to the point: a state in which, ‘instead of law a natural, innate, and educated virtue rules,’ is found in the Platonic Republic; and there is no need of the state of the Golden Age, or that sketched Republic ii.
6^ Cf. Susemihl, ii. 112 sqq.: his deviations from my view are unimportant.
7^ Symposium 216 A: cf. Pt. i. p. 55.
8^ Theaetetus 172 C-177 B: cf. Republic vii. 316 C sqq.; Gorgias 464 B sqq. 518 E sq.
9^ Apology 31 E; Gorgias 521 D sqq.; Politicus 297 E sqq.; Republic vi. 488 A sqq., 496 C (see p. 29, 62).
10^ Republic vii. 519 C sqq.: cf. i. 347 B sqq., vi. 500 B.
11^ Republic 490 E-495 A, 496 A sqq. (see p. 13, 23, and p. 29); Timaeus 87 A; Gorgias 521 D sqq.: cf. quotation on p. 176 sqq. as to the casualness of customary virtue.
12^ Gorgias 464 B sq.: the problem of state-craft is the θεραπεία ψυχῇς. Ibid. 515 B: ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσῃ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα: Ibid. 504 D, 513 D sqq., 517 B, 518 E; Republic vi. 500 D. The Laws in particular speak continually of this, e.g. i. 631 B sqq., iii. 688 A sq., iv. 705 D, 707 C sq., 718 C, v. 742 D sqq., vi. 770 E, xii. 963 A.
13^ Republic iv. 420 B, 421 B sq., vi. 500 D sq., vii. 519 E, where it is particularly insisted on that State-management is concerned with the happiness of the whole and not of apart; cf. Laws, iv. 715 B, viii. 828 E.
14^ Politicus 309 C: the statesman is to unite the citizens by ties human and divine. By divine ties are meant Τὴν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων πέρι καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐναντίων ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως … Τὸν δὴ πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ἆρ᾽ ἴσμεν ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατὸν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὀρθῶς μεταλαβοῦσι παιδείας. This is the leading point of view in the Platonic State; and its result is rightly summed up in the words (Timaeus 27 A): δεδεγμένον ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας, παρὰ σοῦ δὲ πεπαιδευμένους διαφερόντως.
15^ Theaetetus 174 D sqq.; Euthydemus 292 B: freedom, peace, riches are in themselves neither good nor evil; if State-craft is to make the citizens happy, it must give them wisdom and knowledge. Gorgias 518 E: we praise the old statesmen because they satisfied the desire of the people and increased the State: ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι’ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν.
17^ Republic iv. 427 B sq., 443 B. Further details presently.
19^ According to Plato, knowledge can in nowise be separated from the knowing subject. It cannot be possessed as a dogma, but only put into practice as an art, and every special knowledge can only be rightly applied by the philosopher (see p. 198, 75). Hence (Politicus 294 A; see p. 467 sq.) not the law, but the ἀνὴρ μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικὸς is to have the highest power in the State.
20^ Republic v. 473 C: cf. Politicus 293 C: πολιτείαν … ταύτην ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἂν εὑρίσκοι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας, etc.
23^ Republic vii. 540 D sqq.: the philosophical ruler must remove all the inhabitants of the State over ten years old in order to educate the rest according to his principles. Politicus 293 D, 308 D sqq.; the true statesman will admit no bad material into his State; those who cannot be educated to virtue may be put to death or banished; those who cannot be raised out of ignorance may be degraded into the condition of slaves.
24^ Cf. Republic v. 462 A-164 B, 465 D sqq.
25^ Politicus 294 A-295 B, 297 A-299 E. The objection here to laws is virtually the objection of the Phaedrus (cf. p. 156) to all written statements. Like books, laws will answer no questions and take no information. The Phaedrus 257 E, 277 D, from its fundamental principles, does actually make this objection to laws.
26^ Politicus 295 B, 297 B sqq., 300 A sqq.
28^ Politicus 292 E sq., 297 E sqq.; Gorgias 521 D sqq.; Apology 31 E; Republic vi. 488 A sqq.
29^ Politicus 293 A: ἑπόμενον δὲ οἶμαι τούτῳ τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν περὶ ἕνα τινὰ καὶ δύο καὶ παντάπασιν ὀλίγους δεῖ ζητεῖν. In the Republic the ruling class appears certainly somewhat more numerous, although it is still meant to form only a small part of the population (see iv. 428 E). This is rendered possible only because care is taken for a methodical education towards the art of government. Plato’s political ideal itself has not changed in the Republic (as Steinhart believes, Pl. W. iii. 611).
30^ So he calls his ideal constitution, Republic iv. 445 D, viii. 544 E, 545 C, ix. 587 D: cf. iii. 412 C sqq., viii. 543 A. In the Politicus (see below) he applies this name to the constitutional rule of a small number. In the Laws, iii. 681 D, iv. 712 C sq., it is used in the ordinary sense, but in iii. 701 A it apparently means a rule of the best, in a favourable sense.
31^ Republic iv. 428 E: cf. ix. 588 C sq.
32^ Republic iii. 374 A sqq.: cf. 369 E sqq., iii. 412 B, 413 C sqq.
33^ γεωργοῖς καὶ δημιουργοῖς, iii. 415 A; δῆμος, v. 463 A; μισθοδόται καὶ τροφέις, ibid.; ἀρχόμενοι, iv. 431 D.
34^ Usually called φύλακες or ἐπίκουροι, also προπολεμοῦντες (iv. 423 A, 429 B, 442 B, viii. 547 D; Timaeus 17 C) or (iii. 398 B, iv. 429 E, v. 470 A) στρατιῶται.
35^ As a rule, ἄρχοντες or τὸ προεστὸς (iv. 428 E), together with the warriors (e.g. v. 463 B sq.), φύλακες, in distinction from them, iii. 414 B, iv. 428 D: cf. 415 C, φύλακες παντελεῖς or τέλειοι, the guardians, properly speaking, by whose side the warriors stand only as ἐπίκουροι.
36^ Republic iii. 415 A sqq.: this is mythically expressed by saying that those who are qualified for rulers have gold in the composition of their souls, while the warriors have silver, and the artisan class copper and iron. As a rule, the children are like their parents, but it may also happen that a son of a man in a higher rank may have a nature qualified only for an inferior rank: cf. p. 423 sq.
37^ Republic iv. 433 A sqq., 435 B, iii. 415 B sq.
38^ Loc. cit. ii. 374 A-E, iii. 415 D sqq.: cf. subsequent quotation as to the life cf the φύλακες.
39^ iv. 427 D sqq., and supra, p. 453, 48.
40^ See p. 468 sq.: cf. Republic iv. 425 A sqq.
41^ Republic vii. 519 D sqq., 540 A sq.
42^ Cf. Republic iv. 422 A sqq.
43^ V. quotations, p. 459; and p. 472, 37.
44^ Cf. Republic ii. 363 E, iv. 434 C sqq., and supra p. 470, 31.
45^ Neither of the comparisons, of course, can be strictly carried out between such, dissimilar things as the State and the soul, the State and the universe. The rulers of the Platonic State are (as Strümpell, Gesch. d. prakt. Phil. d. G-r. i. 456, rightly observes) merely a committee chosen out of the second rank, in the manner of life and education of which they partake, except that the education of the rulers is completed by scientific instruction. They are the ἄριστοι φυλάκων, the τέλειοι φύλακες, the ἀσιστεύσαντες who are chosen out of the collective number (iii. 412 C, 413 E sqq.; iv. 428 D; vii. 540 A, etc.). As such they stand far nearer to the warriors than reason, the immortal part of the soul, does to θυμός, which is only the more noble of the mortal parts. The position of the soul in the universe corresponds more accurately to that of the second rank in the State. But even in this parallel (not expressly drawn out by Plato) there is this distinction to be noticed, that the soul proceeds from the Ideal world in its connection with the corporeal world (see p. 346 sq.), whereas the warrior class inversely produces the ruling class out of itself. Susemihl’s objection against the comparison of the three ranks with the triad of Ideal world, soul, and corporeal world seems to me unimportant. He gives, instead of this, the division of the universe into fixed stars, planets, and earth. I fail to see here a sufficiently strong point of comparison; the planets are not the instrument by means of which the earth is ruled from the sphere of the fixed stars.
47^ Republic iv. 423 E, 424 D sqq.
48^ E.g. iii. 417 A, iv. Beginn. Still (iv. 423 D), even their employment is to be determined by authority.
49^ As Aristotle rightly objects, Politics ii. 5, 1264 a. 11 sqq. In his own state, iv. 431 B sq., he supposes that the masses merely follow sense, and that their desires are ruled only by the reason which resides in the few.
50^ Cf. iv. 421 A: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν, φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύασιν, καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν. This definite statement, and the fact that Plato nowhere mentions the necessity of any provision for the education of the lower classes or the means adapted to that purpose, seem to forbid Strümpell’s supposition (Gesch. d. pr. Phil. d. Gr. i. 387 sq.) that ‘Plato intended his reform of moral and religious instruction to apply to the third class also (see p. 479 sq.), but omitted’ (for reasons which are, to me, far from satisfactory) ‘to say so.’ This class would of course have been influenced by the banishment of Homer and by the rest of Plato’s scheme. But it does not follow that in forming his scheme Plato had this third class or its needs in view.
52^ See p. 468, 23 and Republic vi. 501 A: the philosophic statesmen λαβόντες, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, for they will not attempt any legislation πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.
54^ Republic v. 457 C-461 E. The Politicus, which cannot presuppose the constitution as given by the Republic, demands less definitely (310 A sqq.) that in marriages care should be taken to combine peaceful and fiery natures.
55^ Republic v. 460 D, 461 C admits no other explanation. In the Timaeus, 19 A, this is repeated, with the alteration that the children of the bad are to be degraded into the third rank.
58^ As appears from the whole exposition of ii. 375 E, vi. 502 C.
59^ iii. 413 G sqq., 415 B sq. (cf. p. 470, 36): as a rule children will take after their parents, but exceptions may occur.
60^ 415 B (with reference to the myth mentioned loc. cit.): τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται μηδ’ οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, κ.τ.λ. Even their own sons are to be inexorably degraded into the artisan class if they are unfit for anything higher; and, conversely, the sons of the people, if fit, are to be raised to the warrior or the ruling class, ὡς χρησμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς φυλάξῃ. Cf. iv. 423 C, 434 A, and supra p. 471.
61^ Republic ii. 376 E sqq.; cf. supra 214 sq.
62^ Republic iii. 410 B sqq., ix. 591 B sq.; Timaeus 87 C sqq. To this belongs the account of the Politicus, 306 A-310 A as to the combination of σωφροσύνη with ἀνδρεία. This combination is the ultimate end of the education of the warriors in the Republic.
65^ iv. 423 E sqq.; cf. Laws, vii. 797 A sqq. These expressions are not to be referred to melodies only, as has been so often done from Cic. Legg. iii. 14, 32 downwards. The subject discussed is music (including poetry) and moral culture in general, παιδεία καὶ τροφή.
66^ ii. 376 E-iii. 403 C. Further particulars, pp. 510 sq., 498 sq., p. 501 sq.
69^ vii. 536 D sqq.: as boys, they are to be educated rather in play; from their 20th year, more scientifically (in the mathematical branches); from their 30th year in dialectic; at 35 they are to be employed in positions of command, and other offices; and they are not admitted among the rulers until their 50th year.
70^ Cf. Aristotle, Politics ii. 7 beginn.: οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν.
72^ iii. 416 C sqq., iv. Beginn.
73^ iv. 423 E, v. 457 C-461 E; cf. supra, p. 478 sq.
75^ v. 451 C-457 B (an amusing limitation, however, with regard to fighting occurs, v. 471 D), The way in which the participation of the women in gymnastic exercises is here described is very significant from the Greek point of view. We are offended by the demand that they should display themselves naked, and by the loss of the feeling of shame. Plato’s only fear (452 A) is that people might think it ridiculous; and his answer is given in the beautiful words (457 A): ἀποδυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπείπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται. ["The women … will be clothed with virtue as a garment."]
77^ iii. 405 A-410 B, and cf. p. 435, 140.
78^ iv. 427 B sq.; cf. 469 A, vii. 540 C, v. 461 E.
79^ v. 469 B sqq.: Greeks are not to be made slaves, nor their cities destroyed, nor their lands devastated, nor the dead plundered, nor are the weapons of the slain to be hung up as trophies in the temples. Strife among the Greeks will not be regarded as war, but as civil discord.
80^ Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 240 sqq.
81^ Strümpell, Gesch. d. prakt. Phil. d. Gr. i. 353 sqq., expresses himself to this effect at considerable length. But he decidedly goes beyond Plato’s own statements (see note 6) in asserting (p. 367 sq.) that ‘Plato does not construct from the Idea, and, consequently, does not construct an ideal state, which would always and everywhere be the best and the only true one. He is merely making proposals for the reform of the Athenian state.’
82^ As previous writers generally suppose, e.g. Morgenstern, De Plat. Rep. 179 sqq. Further details apud Susemihl, ii. 176.
83^ v. 470 E: τί δὲ δή; ἔφην: ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται; Δεῖ γ᾽ αὐτήν, ἔφη.
85^ Republic vi. 499 B-502 C, 497 A sq., iv. 422 E, v. 473 C, ix. 592 A sq.; Politicus 293 C, 300 E, 301 D; cf. Supra, p. 467and p. 464, 9. It has already been shown in my Plat. Stud. p. 19 sq., to which I here give a general reference, that passages such as Republic v. 471 C sqq., ix. 592 A sq. prove nothing against this.
86^ Republic v. 4-19 A, viii. 544 A; Politicus 292 A, 301 E sqq.
87^ See Morgenstern, De Plat. Republic p. 305 sqq.; Hermann, Plat. i. 541 sq., and Hermann, ‘Die historischen Elemente des plat. Staatsideals, Ges. Abhandl.’ 132-159.
89^ στρατοπέδου γὰρ πολιτείαν ἔχετε, says Plato to the Spartans, Laws, pp. ii. 666 E.
90^ For detailed evidences of the above (to be found mainly in Xenophon, De Republic Laced.) cf. Hermann’s Staatsalterth. § 26 sqq.
92^ Republic viii. 547 E; Laws i. 625 C-631 A, ii. 666 E sq., vii. 805 E sqq., etc.
93^ Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 244 sq.
94^ Cf. the quotations, pp. 464, 481; and p. 470, 29, and Republic viii. 557 A sqq., 562 B sqq.
95^ Republic ii. Τί οὖν … ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; etc.; cf. p. 470.
96^ Republic vii. 514 sqq.; Meno 100 A; Symposium 212 A; cf. p. 175 sqq., 215 sq., 436.
97^ Cf. p. 438 sq., 443, 459 sq.
98^ Baur, Das Christliche d. Plat. Tüb. Zeitschr. 1837, 3, 36.
99^ Cf. Hermann, Ges. Abhandl., 141; Steinhart, Pl. W. v. 16 sqq.; Susemihl, ii. 286 sqq.
100^ Cf. Laws vii. 806 C; see p. 457, 66.
101^ Cf. with the above the pamphlet: ‘Der plat. Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit’ in my ‘Vorträgen und Auhandlungen,’ p. 62 sqq. (2nd edit. p. 68 sqq.).
102^ Republic viii. and ix. B; cf. iv. 445 C sq., v. 449 A; Politicus 300 A sqq.
103^ The arguments of Deuschle, Plat. Polit. 36, and of Susemihl, genet. Entw. ii. 307 sq., who follows D., to explain the order of the constitutions in the Politicus in a different way, do not seem to me convincing, nor can I give more than a partial assent to the remarks of Hildebrand on the subject (Gesch. und Syst. d. Rechtsund Staatsphilosophie, i. 146 sq.).
104^ See Politicus 292 A, and supra 467 sq.
105^ Plat. Stud. 206 sq., with which Hildebrand agrees, loc. cit. 147 sq.
106^ This is clear, as Hildebrand rightly remarks, from the tact that the ideal constitution, from which all others are to arise by a process of deterioration, is not posited by Plato himself as historical (beyond the myths in the introduction to the Timaeus and Critias). It is expressly acknowledged (ix. 592 A sq.) that even if such a constitution were not in itself impossible, it is nowhere to be found as a matter of fact. And Plato could not possibly fail to see that the historical succession of the different forms of constitution by no means agrees throughout with his scheme. But, apart from this, the parallel with the development of the individual soul, which regulates his exposition throughout, and the form of genealogical succession which this necessitates (viii. 549 C, 553 A, 558 C, ix. 572 D), show that the development of the state is ideal, not historical. Aristotle, in his critique (Politics v. 12), fully recognises this.
Chapter XII. Plato’s Views on Religion and Art
Plato has frequently discussed both these subjects, but only incidentally. Neither the philosophy of religion nor aesthetics proper are so included in his scheme of doctrine that they might be coordinated with Dialectics, Physics, and Ethics as parts of his system, or classified under either of these sciences. In the evolution of his theories, however, he must too often have encountered Art and Religion, either as enemies or as allies, to escape the task of determining for himself and for his readers their relation to philosophy. Therefore, although we could not assign a place to such discussions in the foregoing exposition, we can as little venture to pass them entirely over, and they are here treated of supplementarily.
1. Religion. We have already seen that Plato makes true religion absolutely identical with philosophy, and the truly divine with the highest objects of philosophic contemplation. To him, philosophy is not merely theoretic speculation, but moral conduct; — it is Love and Life, the filling of the whole man with the truly Existent and the Infinite.1 What special field then |495| is left side by side with philosophy for religion? The philosopher alone is the truly pious man, well-pleasing to God; all things must work together for his good; death itself is for him only a reunion with God, for he lives wholly in the Divine, and moulds himself according to it, holding all else as contemptible,2 in comparison with this one end. The eternal essence of things, with which philosophy is concerned, is the highest that exists. Ideas are those eternal gods from whom the world and all things in the world were copied;3 and the Deity, in an absolute sense, is not distinct from the highest of the Ideas.4 Even when Plato is speaking in an unscientific manner of God or the gods, it is easy to perceive that such is his real opinion. He proves the existence of gods as against materialistic Atheism,5 by the same arguments that he elsewhere uses to refute the Materialism of Philosophy. He maintains the causality of Ideas and the rule of reason in the world,6 on the ground of its being impossible to explain the Derived, except from an Underived; movement, except by the soul; the orderly adaptation of means to ends in the economy of the universe, except as the work of reason. And in all that he says about God, the Idea of the Good, of the highest metaphysical and ethical perfection, is the leading point of view. His highest |496| Idea stands above all other Ideas, as the First Cause of all Being and Knowledge; so, above all other gods, equally difficult to find and to describe, is the One Everlasting, Invisible God, the Fashioner and Father of all things.7 As the highest Idea is denoted by the concept of the Good, so the most essential attribute of God is goodness;8 Plato therefore combats the ancient notion of the envy of the Divine Being, and the opinion that evil originates with Him, by the principle that being altogether good and just He can only produce absolute goodness and justice.9 In opposition to the mythical stories of the gods appearing in visible form to men, he deduces from the goodness of God His unchangeableness: for that which is perfect can neither be changed by another, nor alter in itself, and thereby become deteriorated. He further says that God will never show Himself to man otherwise than as He is: for all lying is alien to Him. He is not subject to |497| ignorance and self-deception, which are the veriest lies of all; and with Him there can be no necessity for deceiving others.10 Plato also extols the Divine completeness, wanting in nothing that is fair and excellent;11 the Divine power, all embracing, and able to do whatever can be done at all;12 the wisdom, which has everywhere so perfectly adapted means to ends;13 the omniscience, which nothing escapes;14 the justice, which leaves no crime without its punishment, and no virtue without its reward;15 the goodness, which cares for all in the best possible manner.16 He repudiates not only the anthropomorphism of conceiving that God could have a body,17 but also those tales which ascribe passions, quarrels, and crimes of all sorts to the gods.18 He declares the gods to be above pleasure and pain,19 and untouched by evils.20 He indignantly denies that they allow themselves to be propitiated, or rather bribed, by prayers and offerings.21 He further shows that all |498| things are ordered and governed by the Divine Providence, and that this Providence extends to the small no less than to the great:22 he is convinced that men are the cherished property of God,23 and that all things must conduce to the welfare of those who by their virtue have gained the Divine favour.24 If it be objected that the distribution of human lots is unjust and unequal, Plato replies that virtue bears within itself its own immediate reward, and vice its own punishment; and that perfect retribution is certain to both hereafter. Even in this life, however, as a rule, recognition and gratitude are sooner or later the portion of the righteous man, and hate and aversion of the sinner.25 The |499| existence of Evil in the world seemed to him too inevitable to require any express justification of the ways of God.26 All these discussions ultimately lead to one and the same result. It is the Idea of the Good, from the application of which Plato derives the sublime doctrine of God, the purification of the popular faith, religion. He declares that the worship of God consists solely and entirely in a disposition to morality. He only can please God who is like Him; and he only is like Him who is wise, pious, and just. It is impossible that the gods can accept the gifts of the wicked. The virtuous man alone has the right to invoke them.27 God is the Good: he who does not carry in himself the image of God’s goodness cannot hold communion with God.
Besides the Eternal and Invisible God, Plato, as we have seen, recognises visible and created gods: the universe and the heavenly bodies.28 In the Timaeus, these visible gods are represented as fashioning the mortal part of man;29 which seems to express the thought that the human race arose under the influence of the sun and the stars. But their significance is afterwards limited to their natural connection with our globe, and to the setting forth of the eternal laws; the knowledge of which Plato declares to be the best thing we |500| can gain from the contemplation of the heavens.30 The theory which pretends to discover prognostications of future events in the position of the stars, he clearly designates31 as a superstition arising from ignorance.
Through this doctrine of the divinity of the stars, Plato comes in contact with the popular religion, which likewise deified the brightest of the heavenly bodies: and he does not hesitate to profit by this circumstance when his object is to prove the existence of the gods from the ordinary point of view.32 This, however, is the extent of his agreement with the national faith. He calls the soul of the universe by the name of Zeus;33 he repeatedly speaks of the gods when he means only the Deity; he introduces Zeus, Apollo, and the rest into mythical representations; but the existence of these divinities as held by the Greeks he has never believed, nor does he in the least conceal it. Even in passages which apparently acknowledge them, his expressions clearly show that he only regards them as mythical imagery. He attacks the prevailing notions about them in all aspects,34 making use of these notions, and intermingling them in his myths with the freedom of an Aristophanes.35 In the Timaeus36 he |501| says that to tell of their origin is beyond his power: the customary belief, however, should be accorded to the men of old time who have spoken on such subjects: for they asserted themselves to be the offspring of the gods, and must certainly have known best about their own ancestors. Such an explanation spares us all further enquiry.37
The same course is pursued with regard to the Daemons. Often as Plato mentions these intermediate beings,38 and much as has been borrowed from him by later daemenology, he nowhere says a word to imply that he really believes in them. On the contrary, while in some passages he speaks in the traditionary manner of guardian spirits, he declares (Timaeus 90 A, C) Reason to be the true guardian spirit of mankind; and in the Republic39 he ordains that distinguished men shall, after their death, be reverenced as daemons. The daemon is, after all, only the truly human element. The popular faith and time-honoured religious worship he desires to be maintained,40 for the State and the |502| great majority of the citizens: both faith and worship, however, are to undergo a moral purification,41 and the excessive pretensions to which their leaders were even then inclined are to be checked.42 In the Laws43 not only atheism and other offences against religion, but private worship and its attendant abuses, are visited with severe penalties, and even with death. Though the popular faith might be very imperfect, and not much bettered by the allegorical interpretations then so much in fashion,44 Plato still thought that such a faith was indispensably necessary for all without intellectual culture. Men are first to be educated by falsehoods and afterwards by the truth. Wholesome convictions are to be imparted to them under the disguise of stories.45 Only a very small proportion of mankind ever become fit for the reception of a purer knowledge. Myths, and a religious worship founded on myths, are therefore the primary form of religion for all; and the |503| sole form for the great majority.46 Plato’s own opinion cannot of course be deduced from this conditional acknowledgment of the popular belief; but he lets us see pretty clearly in what relation he stood to it.
It appears then, from the foregoing observations, that the religious character, for which the Platonic philosophy is so justly celebrated, is to be sought far less on its scientific than on its practical side. Plato’s scientific convictions placed him, with regard to the Greek religion, in an antagonism, only very partially counterbalanced by the acknowledgment of visible gods; and these convictions, if logically developed, must have made impossible to him more than one of the determinations which connect him with ordinary Monotheism. If the Universal be the only primary and absolute reality, it is not easy to understand how God can be conceived otherwise than as impersonal. And, though the disposition and governance of the All by the Idea of the Good brings the assumption of a moral order in the world quite within the scope of the Platonic system, no place is left for a Providence superintending that order in every particular, which Plato so warmly maintains. Nay, more; however perfect the general scheme of the world, it would seem, with regard to particulars, as though God Himself could not avert the evils which result from the nature of the corporeal; and, at any rate, that man (whose free will, however, is decidedly affirmed) must, by means of that nature, necessarily |504| introduce much that is wrong. That which prevented these considerations from occurring to Plato, and gave to his philosophy a warmth and a practical bent transcending even his scientific principles, — that which compels him to the closest alliance possible under his circumstances, with the popular faith, is the moral religious interest which in him, as a genuine Socratic, is so intimately connected with the scientific interest. Philosophy, as he regards it, is not merely knowledge, but a higher life, penetrating the whole man; and though it is presupposed that this life in its highest perfection shall throughout be grounded on knowledge, Plato freely acknowledges that its essential contents may be present in another form. He points to the enthusiastic love of Beauty, as the common root of Morality and Philosophy, antecedent to all Knowledge. He bids us recognise in unphilosophic virtue a preliminary stage of philosophic virtue; in religious faith, an analogue to intelligent discernment, replacing the latter in the majority of men. Can we wonder that he feared to violate unnecessarily these imperfect, but, from his own point of view, well-directed forms of education? or used them to fill up gaps in his system, and to enunciate principles which that system was unable to establish, but of which personally he entertained no doubt? We must not, however, over-estimate the value of such utterances. The religious importance of Platonism lies chiefly in the blending of the speculative and practical elements, in the ethical tone given to it by the Socratic teaching, by virtue of which philosophy was no longer restricted to knowledge, but was applied |505| directly to the personal life of men. The particular notions which bring Plato in contact with positive religion are, for the most part, mere outworks of his system, or else an inconsistent relapse into the language of ordinary opinion.47
2. Art.48 Plato has instituted no independent enquiries49 into the essential nature of Art and of the |506| Beautiful any more than into that of the philosophy of religion. He often alludes to both, but always in connection with some other discussion; and what he says does not give us a very clear idea of their distinguishing characteristics. Because Plato is himself an artist, though a philosophic artist, he cannot be just to pure art. Because his scientific view of the world is at the same time aesthetical, he cannot discriminate sharply enough the object of art from that of philosophy, — the Beautiful from the True and Good. It is quite otherwise with Aristotle. He renounces all artistic treatment, excludes from the contents of his system all aesthetic motives (so far as this was possible to a Greek), that the scientific motives may alone prevail: but, for that very reason, he gains, with respect to art, freedom to understand and maintain it in its specific essence.
This is shown in the primary concept of aesthetics — the concept of Beauty. The two elements which intermingle with each other in all beauty are the sensible phenomenon and the Idea — the concrete individuality and the universal import. Plato ascribes no specific value to the former; the immaterial Universal is alone, in his opinion, true and essential. The material and the particular can, indeed, lead up to this, but only in such a manner that we then immediately turn away from the particular and leave it behind us. Plato must therefore seek for the essence of the beautiful in the contents, not in the form; he must ignore his discrimination of it from the true and the good, he must degrade the |507| beautiful phenomenon over against the shapeless concept as a subordinate and unimportant, even disturbing accessory. Plato maintains the Greek idiom, so significant of Greek thought, by which ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’ are made nearly equivalent, but he inverts it. Whereas the prevalent acceptation tends to reduce the good to the beautiful, he, following the example of Socrates,50 though more ideally, reduces the beautiful to the good. There is only a faint indication of a difference between them in the remark51 that Beauty produces such an extraordinarily powerful impression, because in the heavenly world it has outshone all other Ideas, and, even in this world, differs from wisdom and virtue in revealing itself to the bodily eye with shining clearness. But, with this exception, the concept of the Beautiful always resolves itself into that of the Good. The primeval beauty is bodiless and colourless, to be likened with no particular, either material or spiritual. It belongs to no other as a quality.52 Corporeal beauty is only the lowest rung in the ladder of the beautiful: fair souls are higher; higher yet, fair virtues and sciences; but highest of all is that pure Idea of the Beautiful to which nothing akin to the phenomenon any longer cleaves.53 Though measure and harmony,54 purity55 and completeness56 are also set forth as characteristics of the Beautiful, these |508| are not peculiar to it; they themselves, and beauty itself, belong likewise to the Good.57 Virtue, too, is beauty and harmony:58 to Truth and Wisdom, also, the criterion of purity is to be applied.5 All that is Good is beautiful;60 the primeval Good is of unutterable beauty;61 the specific concept of beauty, however, is not what is here meant.
Besides the object with which Art is concerned, the mental activity from which it proceeds must also be considered. Plato has not overlooked this point, but what he says about it is still far removed from an exact investigation and precise definition of the nature of fancy. The source of all artistic and poetic creation is, according to his theory, a higher inspiration, and, thus far, art has the same origin as philosophy. But, while in the philosopher the enthusiastic fervour is purified by the discipline of Dialectic and developed into knowledge, the artist remains among misty envisagements and shadowy imaginations, destitute of any clear consciousness of his actions,62 and having no right concept of the objects which he presents.63 He allows himself to be guided even in his creations, not by regular and scientific methods, but by an uncertain and tentative empiricism.64 The consequence of this |509| unscientific procedure is the disjoining of kindred branches of art, which corresponds to the separation of the virtues,65 censured elsewhere, and arising from a similar cause. This seemed to Plato universally true of art, as he saw it in actual existence: in at least one passage, however, he hints that there might be a higher and more uniform art, based on clearer knowledge.66 But this perfect art would simply be applied philosophy; Plato derives ordinary art from unregulated enthusiasm, and thus he only states what it has in common with every other unphilosophic mental activity: he does not tell us wherein the specific essence of the artistic phantasy consists.
The distinguishing characteristic of art lies, according to Plato, in imitation67 or, since all human actions are in a higher sense an imitation of the Idea, the activity of the artist is distinguished from all |510| others in that it does not imitate the immaterial essence of things in the material reality, but only makes images of their phenomena.68 But what value can we attach to such imitation? In itself it is but a pastime intended to afford us. pleasure and recreation, not advantage or instruction;69 and this pastime, as it is generally treated, is far from being safe. Art, in order to please, flatters the tastes of mankind; more particularly those of the populace:70 that which it represents is in great part wrong and immoral. Poets and artists, being unscientific and restricted to the reproduction of contemporary opinion and thought,71 disseminate most unworthy notions of the gods, and principles and precedents most dangerous to morals.72 The sensuous multifariousness and wantonness by which they seek to please, enervate and corrupt men;73 the imitation of what is bad and unworthy, which in music and poetry, but especially in the drama, plays so prominent a part, will imperceptibly accustom both artists and the public to reprehensible practices and thoughts:74 and the imitation |511| of various characters will in itself be prejudicial to the purity and simplicity of the actor.75 Lastly, the effect of Tragedy depends on the excitement of our compassion and grief; that of Comedy on the excitement of laughter, and, ultimately, of joy at the misfortunes of others. The poets claim our sympathy for love, anger, fear, jealousy, etc. But all these are unworthy passions, which we do not approve in ourselves, and the representation of which ought not to afford us pleasure.76 To avoid these evils, artists must be subjected to a strict supervision; and, that art may be kept pure in its content, it must be treated as a means of education. Accordingly Plato demands that the verdict of competent judges, thoroughly versed in the subject, shall be obtained concerning all artistic representations.77 He will have the framing of myths and the exercise of art in general placed under the guidance of public authorities, — and all that is not in accordance with the moral aims of the State ejected.78 He forbids in the Republic all myths which relate |512| dishonourable things concerning the gods and heroes.79 He wholly banishes from the State dramatic poetry, and though he permits to Epic the imitation of the speeches of other persons as well as simple narration, it is only in cases where these speeches would serve as a moral exemplar.80 So that, as he says,81 nothing would remain of the whole Art of Poetry but hymns to the gods and praises of famous men. He will, moreover, permit only such music and metres as express a manly temper of mind in the various circumstances of life.82 Lastly, he asserts that the same principles hold good with regard to the plastic arts.83 He speaks in a similar manner in the Laws, where special attention is likewise paid to music. All poems, songs, melodies, and dances are to represent moral dispositions, and to aim at strengthening the conviction that the virtuous man alone is happy, the wicked man always miserable.84 For this reason the productions of all these arts are to be strictly watched over by the State,85 and all innovations prohibited.86 The merit of artistic representations is to be decided, not by the taste of the multitude, but by that of the best and most virtuous persons,87 — not by the masses who fill the seats in the theatre, but by selected |513| judges. The whole community is to be divided, according to age, into choirs, and theoretical instruction in the elements of music is to be combined with the practice of the art, in order that suitable metres and melodies may be chosen in each case.88 All artistic conceits are to be banished from musical teaching;89 no poem, dance, or measure is to be put forth without the consent of the authorities: and a selection of approved songs, melodies, and dances, some adapted for men and some for women, is to be compiled.90 Dramatic poetry is allowed as a means of education; comedy is to instruct us about evil things, what we should avoid; tragedy about fair things, what we should strive after. Still, there must be public surveillance in the matter: none but slaves and foreigners may be introduced into comedy, and no ridicule of the citizens is to be allowed.91
Plato has made no classification of the arts which in any way aspires to completeness. In treating of music, he distinguishes airs and melodies with rhythm92 from discourses and myths: then, with regard to the latter, he separates the contents from the form;93 and again he divides the form into narrative, imitative, and mixed.94 He elsewhere designates singing and dancing |514| as the two divisions of music, without farther pursuing the classification.95 The plastic arts are always dismissed with a passing mention.96 It is evident, therefore, that a theory of art did not lie within the scope of Plato’s design.
He places Rhetoric or Discourse among the arts,97 as it is practised with a view to please rather than to benefit or instruct. We have already seen98 how low his estimation was of ordinary rhetoricians and their devices; and what reproaches he therefore casts upon their art. He, however, proposes to give Rhetoric a higher aim. He requires from the orator dialectical training and scientific knowledge of the things on which he discourses, and of the human souls which he desires to influence: that so he may be able to guide the wills and opinions of his hearers with skill and design.99 He should place himself and his art in the service of God, and assist the true statesman in establishing the rule of right and morality.100 Rhetoric, as defined by Plato, is thus made an offshoot of Philosophy,101 pursuing the same moral ends. Yet they do not absolutely coincide. |515| The philosopher instructs his hearers by imparting truth, and guides them methodically to discover it; the rhetorician seeks only to persuade, and to work upon their wills and inclinations:102 and, as the majority of mankind is incapable of scientific knowledge, he can only rely on probabilities, and must not hesitate to deceive those whom he wishes to convince.103 Plato himself, in his dialogues, thus intermingles popular rhetorical discourses with scientific enquiries, and introduces myths in this manner with great effect.104 But the philosopher alone is in a position to employ Rhetoric rightly; he alone, or (what to Plato is the same thing) the true statesman, can decide on the application of this art. Rhetoric can only be regarded as an instrument by means of which the philosopher brings his principles to bear on the unphilosophic many. Little value attaches to its specific task,105 and when it loses sight of its connection |516| with Philosophy it sinks into a flattering, dilettante art.106
Plato institutes no particular enquiry into the rules of Rhetoric, nor is this to be expected, considering the subordinate place he assigns to it.
Endnotes
2^ >Cf. Symposium 211 E sq.; Theaetetus 176 B sq.; Republic x. 613 A; Phaedo 63 B-69 E, 79 E-81 A, 82 B sq., 83 D sq., 84 B, etc. Hence (v. p. 394 sq., 398 sq.) philosophy is the only way to the highest happiness after death.
5^ Laws x. 889 E-898 C (v. p. 342), xii. 966 D, 967 D; cf. Sophist 265 C sq.; Timaeus 27 E sq. Socrates had done the same (v. Pt. i. p. 144 sqq.), only more from the outside.
6^ Sophist 246 E sqq.; Phaedo 96 A sqq.; Philebus 28 D, 30 A sqq.; see p. 228 sq., 261 sq.
7^ Vide the Timaeus, particularly 28 C, 29 E, 34 A, 37 C, 41 A, 92 B, and supra p. 283, 160. In Politicus 269 E it is said that there can be only one God, and not two antagonistic divinities.
8^ See following note and Republic ii. 379 A, where the discussion on the rules to be observed in theological exposition opens with the words: οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον … οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω; so that this concept forms the highest standard for all statements about the gods.
9^ Timaeus 29 D (see p. 291, 182); cf. Phaedrus 247 A: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. Timaeus 37 A; see p. 283, 160; Republic ii. 379 B: Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. … Οὐδ’ ἄρα … ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος; when, therefore, evil befalls men ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ … λεκτέον ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἠργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι … κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν, κ.τ.λ. Theaetetus 176 C: θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. See also supra, p. 419, 91.
10^ Republic ii. 380 D sqq.; cf. Symposium 208 B.
11^ Republic ii. 381 B sq.; Laws, 900 C sq.
12^ Laws iv. 715 E, x. 901 C, 902 E; Timaeus 41 A, 68 D. The bounds of omnipotence, which Plato himself intimates, relate partly to that which is morally, and partly to that which is metaphysically impossible. It is impossible for God to wish to change (Republic ii. 381 C), it is impossible for evil to cease (Theaetetus 176 A), and from the doctrines of the formation of the world of matter it is clear that the divine creative activity is limited by the nature of the finite. Cf. p. 337 sqq., and Theophr. Metaph. p. 322, Brand. (Fragm. 12, 33 Wimm.)
13^ Laws x 902 e; Phaedo 97 C; Philebus 28 1) sqq., and the whole of the Timaeus.
15^ Laws iv. 716 A, x. 904 A sqq., 907 A; Theaetetus 176 C sqq.; Republic x. 613 A; cf. ii. 364 B, and other passages.
16^ x. 902 B sq.; Republic x. 613 A; Phaedo, 62 B, D, 63 B.
18^ Republic ii. 277 E sq.; Critias 109 B; Euthyphro, 6 B, 7 B sqq.; Laws, xii. 941 B.
21^ Laws x. 905 D sqq.; cf. Republic ii. 364 B.
22^ Timaeus 30 B, 44 C; Sophist 265 C sq.; Philebus 28 D sqq.; Laws iv. 709 B, x. 899 D sqq.; not to mention the teleological explanations of nature in the Timaeus. Cf. Laws iv. 716 C: God is the measure of all things. The expression πρόνοια (calculating care) seems to have become current, chiefly through the Socratic schools, as applied to the activity of the divinity both as creating and ruling the world, and corresponds with the Socratic teleology. Neither in Plato (who, acc. to Favorinus ap. Diog. iii. 24, introduced the expression θεοῦ πρόνοια), nor in Xenophon does the word stand by itself to signify the divine providence. In Mem. i. 4, 6 (where Krohn, Sokr. und Xenophon, 5 sq., objects that it is so used), the words προξοίας ἔργον mean not ‘work of the divine providence,’ but (as the προνοητικκὸν in iv. 3, 6) ‘something produced by provident consideration,’ work of a πρόνοια, not the πρόνοια.
23^ Phaedo 62 B sqq.; Laws x. 902 B sq., 906 A; cf. Politicus 271 D; Critias 109 B.
24^ Republic x. 612 E: only the just man is pleasing to God: τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν; Apparent evils may befall him, but τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων [613b] ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. — εἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου. Theaetetus 176 A sqq.; Laws, iv. 716 C sq.; Apology 41 C sq.
25^ See particularly the exhaustive discussions of Republic ix. 576 C-592 B, x. 612 A sqq., iv. 444 E sq.; cf. ii. 358 A-367 E. The whole Republic thus acquires the character of a magnificent Theodicee; cf. Laws, iv. 715 E sq., x. 903 B-905 C; cf. 899 D sq., and the quotation on p. 404, 37; and p. 444 sqq.
26^ On the origin and inevitableness of evil and wickedness cf. p. 337 sqq. pp. 423, 438 sq. p. 419 sq. p. 498, 12.
27^ Theaetetus 176 B sqq.; Republic x, 613 A (see p. 409, 6; 499, 24); Laws iv. 716 C sqq.
28^ See p. 367 sq. The earth is also called a θεὸς, Timaeus 40 B sq.; cf. Phaedrus 247 A.
31^ Timaeus 40 D sq. [τοῖς οὐ δυναμένοις λογίζεσθαι] Here we ought to read (as Susemihl, ii. 218, rightly observes) τοῖς ο ὐ δυναμένοις ταῦτά λογίζεσθαι. Republic viii. 546 A proves nothing on the other side. Plato passes the same judgment on augury from sacrifices (v. p. 432, 124).
32^ Laws x. 893 B sqq., where the conclusion is (898 C sqq.) that not only the universe but the individual stars must be animated.
33^ Philebus 30 C; see p. 266, 112, and p. 288, 172.
34^ See p. 498. It is obvious that this polemic, though nominally applied to the poets only, holds good of the popular religion as well.
35^ E.g. Symposium 190 B sqq.; Politicus 272 B; Phaedrus 252 C sqq.; Timaeus 42 E sq.
36^ Timaeus 40 D, and the Laws, xii. 948 B, speak in the same sense.
37^ Grote certainly (Plato, iii. 258 sqq., 189) has no eye for Plato’s deep irony, approaching almost to scorn. Grote says that Plato here declares himself incompetent (‘Here then Plato formally abnegates his own self-judging power, and subjects himself to orthodox authority’); and would at least leave the question undecided whether Plato is in earnest, or whether Martin is right in seeing an instance of irony here (Etudes, ii. 146).
38^ The main passages are: Symposium 202 E sqq.; Phaedo, 107 D, 108 B; Republic iii. 392 A, x. 617 E, 620 1); Politicus 271 D; Apology 27 C sq.; Phaedrus 246 E; Laws, iv. 713 C, 717 B, v. 738 D; Cratylus 397 D.
40^ According to Republic ii. 369 E even the guardians are to be educated by the myths, which are replaced later by scientific knowledge, in the case of the smaller portion of them only. The public culture is therefore intended to conform to Greek custom (see 473, 78). The Laws, in which the philosophic rulers of the Republic do not occur, consider the popular religion throughout as the moral basis of the State’s existence, as we shall see later on.
42^ Politicus 290 C sqq.: however much priests and soothsayers may pride themselves, they are, after all, merely servants of the State. In order to keep them in this position, the Laws, vi. 759 D, limit the duration of the priest’s office to one year.
44^ Vide besides the passages quoted p. 283, 2, Ed. Müller, Gesch. d. Theorie d. Kunst b. d. Alten, i. 242. Plato (Phaedrus 229 C sq.; Republic iii. 378 D) thinks these interpretations unprofitable and uncertain, and remarks with truth that the young take the myths not in their hidden meaning but literally.
45^ Republic ii. 376 E: the first means of education is music, i.e. speech: Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ’ ἕτερον; Ναί. Παιδευτέον δ’ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. The greater myths (377 D) are those about gods and heroes, μύθοι ψεῦδεῖς, which are to be censured above all.
46^ This supposition underlies Plato’s whole treatment of these subjects; cf. p. 502, 40. It is his decided conviction that philosophic knowledge must always be limited to a small minority; cf. pp. 469, 470 and Republic iv. 428 E, vi. 496 A sqq.
47^ An enquiry might perhaps be expected here into the relation of Platonism to Christianity. It is a subject much discussed both in ancient and modern times. There are the old fancies about Plato’s doctrine of the Trinity, a particular account of which is given by Martin, Etudes, ii. 50 sqq., and Brandis, ii. a. 350. The most important modern treatises are: Ackermann’s Das Christliche im Plato, etc., 1835, which does not go very deeply into the matter; Baur’s Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus. Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol. 1837, 3; Michaelis, Die Philosophie Platons in ihrer inneren Beziehung zur geoffenbarteu Wahrheit, 1859 sq. Other authorities are given in Ueberweg, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 127, 4 A. I do not regard this as the place to enter upon such a subject. If we listen to theologians, it often seems as if the Platonic philosophy could be only understood in the light of Christianity. They proceed to enquire about the Christian element in Platonism as if Christianity were one of the pre-suppositions of that Philosophy, not Platonism one of the presuppositions and sources of Christianity. And this was actually the idea of those Alexandrine fathers of the Church who first introduced the great conception of Plato’s agreement with Christianity. As the Hebrew prophets were made out to have spoken not in the spirit and from the history of their own times, but from Christian history and dogma miraculously imparted to them, so Plato was represented as having drawn on the sources of Christian revelation, partly the internal (the Logos), partly the external (the Old Testament). A strict historical consideration will reverse this relation, and enquire not as to the Christian element in Platonism, but the Platonic element in Christianity. These questions, however, concern the history not of Greek philosophy but of the Christian religion.
48^ Ruge, Platonische Aesthetik; E. Müller, Gesch. d. Theorie d. Kunst bei den Alten, i. 27-129, 228-251; Vischer, Aesthetik, i. 90 sqq., 98 sq., ii. 60, 359 sq.; Straeter, Stud. z. Gesch. cl. Aesth. i. H; die Idee des Schönen in d. Plat, Phil. Further details in Ueberweg, Grundr. i. 141, H A.
49^ I have said, p. 418, that I do not consider the Hippias Major or the Ion genuine. They would but slightly modify the above position; the Hippias aims at no positive result, and the Ion merely mentions poetic inspiration without any minute enquiry into it.
52^ Symposium 211 A E; cf. Republic v. 476 A sqq., 479 A, and supra, p. 240.
53^ Symposium 208 E sqq. (v. supra, p. 193 sq.); cf. Republic iii. 402 D.
54^ Philebus 66 E sqq., 66 B; Timaeus 87 C; cf. 31 B; Sophist 228 A; Politicus 284 A.
55^ Philebus 53 A; cf. 51 B, 63 B, 66 C.
56^ Timaeus 30 C; Philebus 66 B.
57^ Philebus 64 E sqq., 66 B, 60 B sq.
58^ See p. 445; Republic ix. 591 D.
60^ Timaeus 87 C; cf. Laws, ix. 859 D; Gorgias 474 C sqq., not to mention innumerable places in which καλὸς and ἀγαθὸς are synonymous.
62^ Phaedrus 245 A; Apology 22 B; Meno, 99 D; Laws, iv. 719 C (Ion, 533 D sqq.); cf. p. 191 sq., 176 sq.
63^ Republic x. 598 B-602 B; Laws, vii. 801 B; Symposium 209 D, where he expresses himself more favourably as to Homer and Hesiod. Plato is speaking according to popular opinion.
65^ Republic iii. 395 A; cf. Symposium 223 D; this is said of tragic and comic poetry; the Ion follows it out, 532 B sq., 534 B sq., with some exaggeration. Cf. quotation on p. 180.
66^ Symposium loc. cit. the narrator of the dialogue remembers that Socrates extorted from Agathon and Aristophanes the confession that τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ (this is to be emphasized in opposition to τριβὴ ἄτεχνος) τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. The knowledge of what is wrong is given with the knowledge of what is good and right, and the latter would be incomplete without the former (Republic iii. 409 D, vii. 520 C; Phaedo, 97 D; Laws, vii. 816 D; Hippias Minor 366 E): so he who can, as a tragic writer, depict men in their greatness, must also be able, as a comic writer, to depict their follies (for these are the subjects of comedy acc. to Philebus 48 A sqq.). The object of each kind of representation is to influence men’s hearts; tragic as well as comic effect, if it is to be attained artistically, will therefore presuppose a scientific knowledge of mankind (cf. Phaedrus 270 E sqq.), and this knowledge will fit its possessor equally for either capacity. Cf. Müller, loc. cit. 232 sqq.
67^ Republic ii. 373 B; Laws, ii. 668 A sqq., iv. 719 C; Phaedrus 248 E; Politicus 306 D; cf.
68^ Sophist 266 B sqq. (cf. 233 D sq.), where all imitative arts are comprehended under the name εἰδωλοποιική; but especially Republic x. 395 C-598 D. The productive arts (e.g. carpentry) copy the Ideas; the imitative arts in a stricter sense, such as painting and dramatic poetry, are φαντάσματος μίμητις; they do not produce anything real, but τοιοῦτον οιον τὸ ὂν ὂν δὲ οὒ, merely an εἴδωλον of the thing. Hence they are πόρρω ἄρα που τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τρίται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας, etc.; the poets are (600 E) μιμηταὶ εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, but do not grasp the ἀλήθεια of them. See further Cratylus 423 C sq.; Laws x. 889 C sq.
69^ Politicus 288 C; Republic x. 602 B, ii. 373 B; Laws, ii. 653 C, 655 D, 656 C; cf. Gorgias 462 C.
70^ Gorgias 501 D sqq.; Laws, ii. 659 A sqq.; Republic x. 603 A sq.
71^ See above and Timaeus 19 D.
72^ Republic ii. 377 E-iii. 392 C; Euthyphro 6 B, and supra, pp. 480, 498.
73^ Gorgias loc. cit.; Laws ii. 669 A sqq.; cf. vii. 812 D; Republic iii. 399 C sq.
74^ Republic iii. 395 C sqq., 398 D sq., 401 B; Laws, vii. 816 D.
75^ Republic iii. 394 E sqq., 396 A sqq.
76^ Republic x. 603 C-607 A, iii. 387 C sqq.; Philebus 47 D sqq.; Laws, vii. 800 C sq.
77^ Laws, ii. 668 C sqq.; cf. Republic x. 601 C sqq.; there are three arts, the χρησομένην, the ποιήσουσαν, the μιμησομένην. The man who uses a tool must know how it ought to be made, and the maker of the tool, to whom the commission is given, thereby gains a correct opinion about the tool, while the mere imitator who paints, e.g. a flute or a bridle, has neither of these kinds of knowledge. From this passage is easily derived the result (stated elsewhere more definitely) that imitation, so far as it is not mere amusement, but a means of education, has to follow the directions of the competent judge, i.e. the philosopher.
78^ Republic ii. 376 E sqq. (see p. 479), and in the Laws (see note 84). Republic ii. 377 B is a representative passage: πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν [μῦθον] ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ’ ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον. Myths of the first kind are then to be introduced generally.
79^ Republic ii. 376 E-iii. 392 E.
80^ iii. 392 C-398 B, x. 595 A-608 B. In these discussions Plato has to do principally with Homer, and opens the controversy, x. 595 B, with words similar to Aristotle’s Eth. N. i. 4 in beginning his polemic against Plato himself: φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν ... ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, etc.
82^ Republic iii. 398 C-401 A, where particulars are given about the respective harmonies and metres.
84^ Republic ii. 653 A sqq., 660 E sqq., vii. 800 B sqq., 814 D sqq.
85^ Republic ii. 656 C, 671 D, vii. 800 A, 801 C sq., 813 A.
86^ Republic ii. 656 D sqq., vii. 797 A-800 B.
88^ Republic ii. 664 B sqq., 667 B-671 A, vii. 812 B.
90^ Republic vii. 800 A, 801 D, 802 A sqq.; cf. 81 ID sqq.
91^ Republic vii. 816 D sqq., xi. 935 D sqq.
92^ Republic ii. 398 B sq., 399 E.
93^ λόγοι and λέξις loc. cit. Republic 392 C.
94^ Ibid. 392 D-394 C; cf. x. 595 A. Imitative poetry is divided into comedy and tragedy, and under the latter epos is included (Symposium 223 D; Republic iii. 394 C, x. 595 B, 607 A; Laws, vii. 816 D sqq.). A kind of definition of tragedy is given in Phaedrus 268 D.
95^ Laws, ii. 654 B, 672 E sqq.
96^ As Republic ii. 373 B, iii. 401 B, x. 596 B sqq., 601 C, 603 A, v. 47 D; Politicus 288 C and elsewhere.
97b^ Gorgias 501 D sqq.; cf. Phaedrus 259 E sqq.
98^ P. 189 sq., with which further cf. Phaedrus 266 D sqq., 272 D sqq.
99^ Phaedrus 259 E-266 C, 269 E| 274 B. Rhetoric is here treated from the point of view of its psychical influence; it is (261 A, 271 B) ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων [an art which leads the soul by means of words].
100^ Phaedrus 273 E sq.; Gorgias 480 B sq., 504 D sq., 527 C; Politicus 304 A sqq.
101^ For only he who knows the φύσις τοῦ ὅλου [nature of the whole man] is able to judge of and treat that of the soul rightly, and it is only from philosophy that the orator can create the ὑψηλόνουν τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ τελεσιουργὸν [effectiveness in all directions], which he requires, Phaedrus 269 E sqq.
102^ Its province is (Politicus 304 C) τὸ πειστικὸν οὖν ἀποδώσομεν ἐπιστήμῃ πλήθους τε καὶ ὄχλου διὰ μυθολογίας ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ διδαχῆς, — it is (note 4) a leading of souls: πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ (the soul) ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ (Phaedrus 271 A).
103^ This is assumed in the Phaedrus; in 261 D sqq., 273 D, the necessity of dialectic for the orator is pointed out by the remark that he who is μέλλων ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, must know in what things are like and unlike. This no one can know unless he knows ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων. The εἰκὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς arises δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, but he who knows the truth can most easily find what is like the truth. This in itself might be said from the hostile point of view; but the Politicus, loc. cit., assumes that the true art of statesmanship makes use of rhetoric (the art of unscientific persuasion) under certain circumstances, and in the Republic (see p. 503) Plato declares the ‘lies,’ i.e. the myths, to be an indispensable means of education, especially for youth.
104^ Cf. Hirzel, Ueber das Rhetorische und seine Bedeutung bei Plato (Lpz. 1871), who, however, goes rather too far in identifying the rhetorical and mythical element.
105^ As intimated by the Phaedrus, 273 E sq.
106^ See p. 189 sq. and Phaedrus 260 E.
Chapter XIII. The Later Form of Platonic Doctrine — The Laws
We have hitherto confined ourselves to those sources which most clearly show us the Platonic system in its original purity. Is this, however, its one and only form, or did it undergo a later remodelling at the hands of its author? In support of the second of these theories two testimonies may be cited: the statements of Aristotle with regard to Plato’s doctrine, and the treatise called the Laws. We are told by Aristotle that Plato, in the discourses which Aristotle heard from him, took a very different view of the main tenets of his system from that contained in his works. He had at first extended the sphere of Ideas to all that is an object of thought; he subsequently restricted it to natural objects.1 In order to express the combination in Ideas of Unity and Plurality, he designated Ideas as numbers, and he made the distinction between these Ideal numbers and mathematical numbers to consist in this: that the former differ from one another in kind, and, therefore, cannot be reckoned together; while the latter are alike in kind and therefore there is no difficulty in so |518| reckoning them. Among Ideal numbers there exists a definite logical succession, but among mathematical numbers there is none.2 He also taught that Ideas arise out of two elements,3 the One and the Unlimited. The Unlimited he more precisely described as the Great-and-Small; and, so far as numbers result from it, as indefinite duality.4 The One he identified with the Good, |519| or the highest Idea.5 Intermediate between the Ideas and material things he placed the sphere of mathematics.6 From numbers, in their combination with the Great-and-Small, he derived magnitudes;7 the line from the number two, the plane from the number three, the solid from the number four;8 and here again he |520| distinguished Ideal from mathematical magnitudes, in making the former arise out of Ideal, and the latter out of mathematical numbers.9 But, in the discourses which Aristotle heard, Plato does not seem to have entered much into Physics,10 though he constantly reduces particular phenomena either to the One and numbers, or to the Unlimited, or to both.11 Nor does |521| he exactly explain how this Unlimited, or Great-and-Small, — which is in the Ideas as in all things, — is related to corporeal Matter. Aristotle remarks on the omission, and it is easy to see from this how he himself arrived at the actual identification of the Unlimited and Matter, which cannot with justice be ascribed to Plato, even in his later life.12 The few further particulars that have been handed down to us respecting these oral discourses are of little importance;13 but the statement that he added to the four elements Ether, as the first of the five bodies,14 |522| deserves attention, since, if true, it shows a departure from his original doctrine, and an approximation to the Pythagoreans.
The practical tendency of the Laws contrasts at first sight very strikingly with the abstract character of the enquiries we have just been considering. Yet there are certain common traits by which we can discover in both Plato’s advanced age. We find in each, for example, a greater amount of dogmatism, a decline of dialectical power and versatility, a leaning to the Pythagorean doctrines, a predilection for mathematical symbols. The Republic makes Philosophy the groundwork of rational political life, and, presupposing philosophic rulers, plans the State purely from the Idea; the Laws seek to show us how far, and through what means, the State may be adequate to its task without this presupposition. It is not denied that the institutions of the Republic are greatly superior; but, while Plato at first never doubted the practicability of these institutions, and placed in them all his hopes for the welfare of mankind; while in his pattern State the philosopher alone was allowed to take part in the government,15 in the Laws we are told16 that among gods or the sons of gods such a State might indeed |523| exist, and that in no other could the ideal of the State be represented, but that in this dialogue we must be satisfied with the second best.17 The author has convinced himself that laws must be adapted to the nature of the country and people:18 he only wishes to propound such as might possibly be brought into operation by his countrymen and contemporaries. Accordingly we find in this work little or no mention of the fundamental doctrines of the Platonic system, or of the philosophic training of the rulers, (rod or Reason is, indeed, still to reign in the State; Law (νόμος) is expressly defined as the distribution of mind or Reason (νοῦδιανομή);19 the supreme end of the State is still Virtue, and that happiness of the citizens which is conditional on virtue.20 But this rule of reason and of virtue is not now apprehended as the rule of philosophers; the wisdom which is to guide the State is not conceived as scientific knowledge. The theory of Ideas, with which all the institutions of the Republic are ultimately connected, is only once mentioned in the Laws; and even then it is left doubtful whether the Platonic Ideas, as distinguished from the Socratic concepts, are meant. The dialectical knowledge of Ideas, which in the Republic is the goal of all intellectual training, and the indispensable condition of |524| participation in the government, is now reduced to the first elements of the scientific method:21 there is no longer question of a life-long education to Philosophy, such as the earlier dialogue demands. The Republic hopes for the realization of its State when rulers become philosophers; the Laws, when they become upright and prudent. Where the former speaks of Philosophy, the latter substitutes morality and practical wisdom:22 as |525| to morality and wisdom being only attainable through Philosophy, nothing definite is said.23 But in proportion as the philosophic basis of political life disappears, the religious basis becomes more prominent. There is a solemnity and devoutness in the very style and tone of the Laws; and throughout, the gods play a most important part.24 This trait has a still greater influence on the contents of the dialogue. The whole| constitution is made to depend on religion. Even in the choice of a site for the new city the first thing is to make sure that oracles and daemons do not inhabit it. The work of legislation is to be begun by the invocation of the gods: the direction of it, both general and particular, is to be confided to them. All good that is to be found in political life is their gift: the highest end of all endeavour is to become like them, the best means of happiness is to honour them. Every part of the country is to be consecrated to some god, hero, or daemon: tutelary deities are to preside over the different classes of the citizens. Sacrifices, feasts and sacred choruses are to be the most important business of the citizens all their life long. The transgressor of the laws, whether of petty laws or great, sins directly against the gods. The settlement of religious institutions is a weighty and difficult matter: the violation of these institutions the most dreadful of all |526| crimes.25 Considerable importance is ascribed to the daemons and heroes; the former especially are reverenced next to the gods, as the lords and masters of men and their helpers amidst the ills of life.26 In the Laws as in the Republic there is a demand for a purification, if a less thorough one,27 of the popular faith from all that is unworthy in it and dangerous to morals;28 and while religious belief is grounded on law and tradition,29 and blasphemous doctrines are threatened with heavy penalties,30 there is yet to be added to this belief a conviction based upon intelligence. To this end, the existence of the gods, their care for men, and their incorruptible justice, are demonstrated in detail.31 Mathematics are then brought into connection with theology, in a way very characteristic of the Laws, and of its intermediate position between the ordinary and the philosophic standpoint. In the scientific |527| exposition of his metaphysics, Plato had approximated considerably to the Pythagoreans; but in tho Laws, Mathematics altogether take the place of Philosophy. He is not satisfied, even now, with the ordinary education by means of music and gymnastic; the higher dialectical education he purposely sets aside; nothing, therefore, remains but to close with that which ought properly to be a preparatory stage of Philosophy, — a mediatising between Opinion and dialectical Thought, — viz. mathematical science. In this we must now seek for that perfecting of ordinary morality which in the original Platonic State had been effected by Philosophy.
There are two things, according to the Laws,32 which afford a firm foundation for the fear of God, and alone make a man capable of filling a public office, and of entering into the guild of the more highly cultivated. The one is that he should be convinced of the superiority of the soul over the body. The other, that he should recognise the reason that directs the heavenly bodies, should acquire the necessary musical and mathematical knowledge, and should apply it to the harmonious formation of his character. Instead of pure Philosophy, we have here the mathematics which, in their combination with religion, music, and ethics, are peculiar to the Pythagoreans. Mathematics, we are assured, are not only of the greatest use in life and in all the arts, but they also arouse the understandings make the unteachable |528| docile, and the dull inventive.33 They are especially valuable to religion, for they teach us to recognise the Divine wisdom in the ordering of the stars, and prevent our blaspheming the heavenly gods by false assertions concerning their courses.34 Hence arises the principle35 that the whole economy of our lives, even to the smallest particulars, must be precisely and symmetrically determined by number and measure. Hence the emphasis with which citizens of the State are enjoined to honour similarity and equality, and sameness and agreement, in number and in all that is fair and good.36 Hence the value that is set on a classification of the citizens as perfect and accurate as it can be made.37 Hence, too, the preference for arithmetical enumerations, by which this work is distinguished above all Plato’s other works.38 There can be no doubt that we are now on a different level from that of the Republic;39 the only question is |529| whether Plato had himself abandoned his earlier point of view, or had merely exchanged it, in regard to his readers, for another that was more generally comprehensible.
As the ethics of the Laws are no longer, like those of the Republic, founded on Philosophy, they must necessarily assume an altered form. The Laws, indeed, still recognise four chief virtues,40 but the concept and mutual relation of these virtues is by no means the same. The requirement of a strictly philosophic education being now abandoned, there appears in the place of scientific cognition, practical good sense or understanding, which, in itself, presupposes no higher knowledge. Instead of intellectual wisdom, the Laws speak more vaguely, and rather with reference to action, of prudential wisdom, or sagacity (φρόνησις = phronesis); and in this we can only recognise ordinary virtue. Prudence or sagacity consists in harmonising all inclinations and aversions with reason.41 This, according to Plato, is also the essence of temperance or self-control (σοφροσύνη = sophrosyne); which here so entirely coincides with wisdom, that it is even said to include it in itself, |530| to be that which makes us like Grod, and from which all other excellences derive their value.42 Courage, on the contrary, is decidedly depreciated in the Laws. It is represented as the least and worst part of virtue, a merely natural quality which is not necessarily combined with wisdom, and is shared with children and with animals:43 legislation must, therefore, be directed to the education of the citizens in temperance rather than courage.44 In all these details it is clear that the ordinary notion of virtue is alone presupposed.45 That deeper conception which makes virtue to consist in an internal relation between the parts of the soul is wanting, and must be wanting, because the tripartite division of the soul is itself passed over in silence.46 Justice, the essence of which the Republic had sought in the harmony of the parts of the soul, is here more popularly designated as a mixture of the other virtues;47 this |531| only conveys an uncertain hint that it is the virtue which comprehends them all. This dialogue treats solely of the virtue which is possible without philosophic culture, and apprehends that virtue simply as it presents itself to common observation.
The same holds good of the main content of the Laws, the outline of the constitution. The philosophic absolutism of the Republic is in principle given up; its very first condition, a special class of philosophers, trained and perpetuated by regular scientific instruction, is absent. Of the three ranks in the Republic, the Laws in fact recognise only the second.48 The first, as before remarked, does not exist; the third is excluded from the community of citizens, for trade and agriculture are to be carried on by means of foreigners and slaves. But, as we shall presently find, the citizens are to receive essentially the same education, and are in the same stage of culture, as that assigned in the Republic to the warriors. The problem of the Laws, therefore, is to make the best of this element, to discover what constitution and manner of life are most adapted to it. It is clear that this constitution must differ considerably from that of the Republic, even though the latter may still remain the ideal which is constantly to be kept in view, and is to be imitated as nearly as possible.
Among these inevitable alterations we find, in the first place, that particular legislation which Plato had |532| before repudiated49 becomes a necessity in such a state as we are now considering. The perfect statesman, indeed (this is reiterated in the Laws,50 should have no law set over him; for knowledge can never be the servant of another, but must everywhere take the command. This perfect statesman, however, is nowhere to be found; hence the attempt of the Laws to seek out the best possible substitute in the State which is without him. Here, then, we have the very contingency which Plato had foreseen in the Politicus: we must choose the second best alternative, law and order, which cannot, indeed, provide for all cases, though they can for the greater number.51 The law must fill the place of the true ruler. While, therefore, in the Republic, Plato had entered very slightly into the details of legislation, he now enlarges greatly upon them. All the circumstances of life, down to the most trivial, are regulated by definite enactments.52 Nothing is more urgently insisted on than obedience to the laws, of which the magistrates are merely the ministers or servants;53 against nothing are we more earnestly warned than innovations in the existing institutions.54 Where true knowledge exists, laws are troublesome and superfluous; where true knowledge is wanting, it becomes necessary that the legislation should be as precise and rigid as possible. Yet, even upon this supposition, |533| the principle of knowledge is to be so far recognised that the citizens are not to obey the laws mechanically, but from a consciousness of their necessity.55 If men are destitute of philosophic knowledge, they can at least act from right opinion. Hence those special preambles to the laws,56 which would be unsuitable for actual legislation,57 but may easily be accounted for in this work, from its intermediate position between the ordinary and the ideal State, the problem it sets itself, and the stage of culture it presupposes in its citizens.
If we enquire further into the constitution of the State, we shall see that an aristocracy of the wise, such as Plato at first demanded, is here impossible, for the reason already given. A class of philosophers, able, by their superior knowledge, to direct the commonwealth from a higher point of view, does not exist in the State of the Laws. This State is restricted to ordinary virtue, and right opinion the basis of that virtue. Ordinary virtue consists in a plurality of particular activities, and has no clear consciousness |534| of the internal unity and interdependence of these.58 The highest that it can attain is a just mean, which results from the harmonious combination of all the moral qualities.59 The state which is limited to this kind of virtue, instead of the uniform guidance of all its elements by sovereign knowledge, must be content with such a mingling and blending of those elements as will guard against transgression on the right hand or on the left. In the Laws the ultimate goal of ethics is the union of courage and temperance; and the highest problem of politics is the union of order and freedom. In both cases, however, the end is attained, not by conceptual knowledge, but by the practical skill or tact which supplements and controls tendencies that are opposite, and in themselves one-sided, by means of each other. The main point of view in the constitution of the Laws is the right apportionment of political power, the limitation of the different authorities each by each.60 It is, in fact, a mixed constitution, and may be set out in detail as follows.61 The essential conditions of all sound political life are Unity and Freedom.62 Unity is brought about by monarchical, Freedom by democratic, institutions. Monarchy and democracy are therefore the fundamental political forms: the perfection of a commonwealth63 consists |535| in their being properly blended.64 If either of these elements gains absolute ascendancy (as monarchy among the Persians, or democracy among the Athenians), if one part of the nation has unlimited power, then, instead of the common weal, the advantage of the rulers will be sought as the highest end, freedom and unity will perish; the state will be unworthy of its name.65 In reality, however, as Aristotle observes,66 the institutions which the Laws combine with democracy are not so much monarchical as oligarchical. For example, the character of a government is made to depend principally on its laws concerning the education and appointment of magistrates. We are told that in such appointments the aristocratic form of election must be combined with the democratic form of the lot. This, however, is avowedly only a concession required by the obvious necessities of the case. The higher equality, political justice proper, consists in assigning the greatest share of honour and power to the wisest and best. But as to carry out this principle uncompromisingly would be very irritating to the mass of the people, the legislators are compelled to unite with the higher equality, common equality, by which all share alike. The lot must therefore be superadded to election; for here everyone is on a par, and the result is left to chance; yet for this very reason, the use of the lot is to be limited as much as |536| possible.67 The criterion of wealth68c too is brought to bear upon the matter; class elections69 are to be combined with the general election, and in these the higher and richer ranks are allowed several unmistakable advantages.70 Thus there are three essentially different political principles which, this work attempts to reconcile: the preference of merit, the privilege of property, the equal rights of all. Aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy are to be united to form a mixed government.71
With regard to the exercise and distribution of public authority, all legislation, except that which concerns the alteration of existing laws, is placed in the hands of thirty-seven guardians of the law, whose |537| further duty it is to classify the citizens according to their amount of property.72 When the laws require to be changed, there must be a unanimous agreement of the magistrates, the people, and the oracle.73 Civil causes that cannot be settled by arbitration are to be decided in the lower courts by tribunals formed of neighbours, and popular tribunals elected by lot; and in the higher courts, by a supreme tribunal chosen with public observances by a collective body of official persons. All graver offences are to be referred to this tribunal; but crimes against the State are to be brought before the whole people.74 The supreme authority in the government is the council,75 which has a number of civil functionaries76 under and |538| beside it. The popular assembly, which in Athens finally appropriated all the power to itself, is scarcely mentioned; its whole activity is confined to elections, and judgments on state-crimes. This is an important limitation of the democratic element; but, on the other hand, this element reappears strongly in the principle that all civil officers, before entering on their duties, are to have their legal qualifications tested,77 and on leaving office are to give an account of their administration; a special court is appointed to receive these statements, the members being chosen by the people in repeated general elections.78 Plato in this follows the customs of his country: indeed, the pattern of the existing states of Greece throughout underlies the whole political organism of his constitution. There is, however, as close an approach to the type of the Republic as the difference of pre-suppositions allows, in two other ordinances of a more specific kind. A functionary, declared to be the highest officer in the State, and therefore selected with the greatest care,79 is appointed to preside over instruction and education, and to supervise all music and poetry, in which duties he is to be allowed the assistance of subordinates.80 And while education is thus provided for, express means are devised for the maintenance of a high standard of public opinion, first among the rulers, and through them among the |539| community at large. A council81 is to be formed, consisting of the most tried and proved guardians, to be the anchor of the State,82 and, like the Synhedria among the Pythagoreans,83 to be the supreme authority in the ordering of the commonwealth. The members of this council must be distinguished above all the other citizens for that higher culture which has already been mentioned;84 they are to possess not merely true opinions, but real intelligence.85 Here we see plainly a substitute for the philosophic rulers of the Republic.86 We are also told87 that it can only be determined in the course of their education what these elected ones are to learn, and how much time they are to devote to each subject. This would seem to imply that after all they cannot attain to ethical and political wisdom without a more comprehensive scientific training, and consequently that the State of the Laws, should its actualization be attempted, must again tend towards the philosophic State of the Republic. There are other indications of a similar nature.88 But as the rest of the government |540| is in no way based upon this council of the wise, and as the council itself is not incorporated into the organism of the State by any definite official sphere of action, there is a certain ambiguity and uncertainty about the whole scheme.
As in the constitution, so in social regulations, the Laws seek to mediate between the theories of the Republic and ordinary conditions. Community of goods is abandoned as impracticable;89 but in order to approach it as nearly as possible, and to guard on the one hand against poverty, and on the other against inordinate wealth, both being generally incompatible with virtue,90 complete equality of landed property on the Spartan model is introduced. The number of citizens is fixed at 5,040: should there be any danger of exceeding this number, the increase of children is to be restricted; otherwise it is to be encouraged. The emigration of colonists and the admission of foreigners are to serve the same end.91 Among these 5,040 citizens, the land is to be divided into equal parts, which are to descend inalienably from father to sons; in case of a man having no sons, he must adopt some.92 A fixed proportion, never to be exceeded, is established in the case of moveable property. According to the amount which they possess of such property, the citizens are divided into four classes.93 Lastly, with a |541| view to nullifying some of the chief inducements to the amassing of riches and to covetousness, the law of Lycurgus prohibiting marriage dowries is resorted to;94 all lending money upon usury is forbidden; as in Sparta, the citizens are to possess neither gold nor silver, but money peculiar to the country, which will not pass current elsewhere. Trade and commerce are to be exclusively carried on by metics or freedmen, who are allowed only a temporary settlement in the State.95 Marriage is not abolished by the Laws, any more than private property; but its strict supervision by the State is represented as altogether indispensable. The age during which marriages may take place is accurately fixed; celibacy is threatened with fines and disgrace; in marriage compacts, care is to be taken that the two characters supplement each other. With regard to the conduct of married people, especially in the matter of children, there are not only detailed prescripts, but a special magistrate to see that they are obeyed. Divorce is to be reserved by the authorities for cases of childlessness, incurable discord, or grave offences against children. Second marriage is discouraged, if there are children by the first; otherwise it is enjoined:96 unchastity is strictly prohibited.97 As in the Republic, the greatest attention is bestowed upon education. The care of the State for the training |542| of its citizens begins at their entrance into life, or even before. As soon as the age of the children will permit, they are to be received, as in Sparta, into educational establishments.98 The principle of public education is to be so rigidly carried out, that parents are not even to be allowed to devote their child to a particular branch of study for a longer or shorter time than the school arrangements prescribe.99 The subjects for instruction are the usual music and gymnastic, to which, however, a certain amount of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy is superadded. The main principles of education are essentially the same as in the Republic.100 There is the same demand that women shall receive an education identical with that of men, even in warlike exercises.101 The regulations as to the ordinary life of the citizens are as nearly as possible alike. Though the family and private property are maintained, domestic life is in great part done away with by the publicity of education, and by the common meals, which are a universal institution for both sexes.102 The women are still to take part in public employments and in war.103 Excluded from all commercial activity, and leaving even agriculture to their slaves, the citizens are to devote themselves |543| entirely to the State and to their own improvement.104 Simplicity, temperance, and hardiness are to be insured not only by education, but by strict rules of life,105 and laws against luxury.106 Trade and commerce are carefully supervised: precautions are taken by means of heavy penalties and thorough public surveillance107 fraud and overreaching. Beggars are not tolerated.108 That no disturbing elements may intrude into the State, from its very foundation, its purity is jealously to be guarded.109 That no foreign admixture may afterwards alter its peculiar character, all kinds of restrictions are imposed upon the intercourse of strangers with the inhabitants; travels into other countries are only permitted to men of mature age for public or educational purposes, and returned travellers are to be prevented from introducing injurious customs and principles.110 Similarly the citizens are to be preserved from moral infection by supervision of the arts, as has already been shown..111
If, then, we take into account all the features that distinguish the State of the Republic from that of the Laws, we cannot help seeing that there is not merely here and there a difference, but that the two States are drawn from wholly distinct points of view. The difference is not, indeed, of a kind to imply any radical alteration in philosophic principles. It is avowed in |544| the Laws, sometimes by slight indications, sometimes more directly, that the institutions of the Republic are the best; that the perfect polity must be founded on Philosophy, and that even the State of the Laws can only exist by virtue of scientific intelligence in the ruling authorities. But the author’s faith in the practical realization of his ideal, or, rather, his faith in mankind, on whose virtue and wisdom this realization depends, is deeply shaken. Not men, he says, but only gods and sons of gods, would conform themselves to such institutions.112 Only they would be able to endure the unlimited power which the Republic and the Politicus place in the rulers. Human nature is much too weak to recognise what is best and remain true in practice to this recognition.113 Wherever Plato turns his gaze, he finds so much wrong and perversity that he is inclined to pass the bitterest judgments on mankind.114 Human things appear115 to him poor and worthless, and man himself scarcely more than a plaything of the gods.116 He sees, indeed, so great an amount of imperfection and evil in the world, that (unless there is some error in the original text of this passage of the Laws), departing from his earlier expositions and contradicting the spirit of his |545| whole theory,117 he can only explain it on the assumption that there is at work, beside the good and the divine soul, a soul that is evil and opposed to the divine. As all activity results from the soul, wrong and perverted activities must be traced to an evil and perverse soul;118 and, because evil is so much more |546| common in the world than good, he regards the assistance of the gods indispensable for conflict with it.119 A philosopher who held such an opinion of the world and of men might well become perplexed as to the practicability of his ideal, and even give up the hope that a whole people would ever submit to the rule of Philosophy: it cannot therefore surprise us that he should attempt to save by a compromise, at least a portion of the former design, with a view to its |547| realization. Considered in this aspect, the value of the Laws is not to be lightly estimated. They not only display in their details comprehensive knowledge, thorough acquaintance with political questions, reflection, and ripeness of judgment, but in their main outlines are carried out with consistency and ability. Their purpose is to mediate between the ideal State of the Republic and actual conditions: to show what might be attained, even without the rule of Philosophy and of philosophers, on the presupposition of ordinary morality and education, if only there existed practical wisdom and goodwill. For this reason they keep as much as possible to given circumstances, employing for the constitution and social regulations sometimes Athenian, but principally Spartan, models, and for jurisprudence chiefly the Attic laws.120 At the same time they seek to maintain the ideal of the State of philosophers in such a manner that the merit of the new designs shall be measured by its standards to make the actual approximate to the perfect State as nearly as men and circumstances will allow, and at least to prepare the way for a still closer approximation.121 This design is the key, as we have already pointed out, to the most prominent peculiarities of the |548| Laws. Our judgment as to the genuineness of the work122 will, therefore, mainly depend on our being able to ascribe to Plato in the last decade of his life 123 an over-clouding of his original idealism, a doubt of the possibility of his State of philosophers, a bitterness in his view of the world and of human nature, — such as the Laws presuppose. As to particular defects which are to be found in the dialogue,124 some of them are readily accounted for,125 others126 may be explained by the |549| infirmities of age, and by the circumstance that the author did not himself put the final touches to his work. Editors 127 and even transcribers128 may well be held responsible here and there.129 We may, on similar |550| grounds, in some instances excuse, and in others explain, the defects of form in the Laws: the awkward, and occasionally obscure and overcharged expressions, the want of dialectical versatility and conversational movement, the solemnity of the tone, the various small exaggerations, the many reminiscences of earlier works. If we conceive the Laws as written by Plato in his old age, when he could no longer give artistic completeness to the work, and suppose that one of his disciples in editing it may have passed over much crudity, carelessness, and repetition, — may have ventured upon certain additions, and unskillfully supplied certain gaps, — these peculiarities are at once accounted for. The chief question to determine is whether or not the general standpoint of the Laws is |551| consistent with the theory of its Platonic origin? and this may well be answered in the affirmative, if we take into consideration the influence which years and the experiences of a long life usually have, even on the most powerful minds; — and also the extent to which Plato’s confidence in the realization of his ideal State must have been shaken by the then condition of Greece, and especially by the failure of his Sicilian enterprise. The Laws are, after all, no farther removed from the Republic than the second part of Goethe’s ‘Faust’ is from the first; scarcely farther indeed than the ‘Wanderjahre’ from the ‘Lehrjahre’ of the Wilhelm Meister; and if, in the one case, we can follow the transition from the earlier to the later period, and the gradual advance of the poet’s age, more perfectly than in the case of Plato, — for, with the exception of the Laws, there is no probability that we possess any work of his last twenty years, — in the other we have the statements of Aristotle to prove that considerable changes did take place during those years in Plato’s manner of teaching, and that in his Metaphysics especially he made very important concessions to Pythagoreanism, to which the Laws approximate much more closely than the Republic. Since then the contents of this book are too important and betray too much of the Platonic spirit to be ascribed to any disciple of Plato that we know of; since such matured political wisdom, such accurate knowledge of Greek laws and institutions as we there find are quite worthy of the philosopher in his old age; since, finally, the express testimony of Aristotle can hardly be set aside; we have every ground |552| for believing that this treatise was composed by Plato, but published by another — Philippus of Opus — after Plato’s death; and this origin explains many defects which the author would have removed had he himself completed his work. But its contents must in all essential points be considered as genuine, and it thus forms the only direct source of information as to the Platonic Philosophy in its latest period. We learn, indeed, nothing from the Laws respecting the speculative bases of that philosophy, but the whole tenor of the work is in harmony with what Aristotle tells us of Plato’s oral discourses, and with all that is distinctive in the thought of the Older Academy.
Endnotes
2^See p. 254 sqq.; 279, 146. The assertion of Philoponus, De An. C, 2 m. that all Ideas are decads, is rightly rejected by Brandis, ii. a. 318.
3^ Aristotle says that he used the word στοιχεῖον to signify these, Metaphysics xiv. 1, 1087 b. 12: ττὰς ἀρχὰς ἃς στοιχεῖα καλοῦσιν οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόασιν. See also De An. i. 2, 404 b. 25 (see 331, 103) and the quotation, p. 369, 14.
4^ Cf. besides the evidences given, p. 300, 16; pp. 306, 321, 327 sq., p. 279, 145, my Plat, Stud. 217 sqq. and Susemihl, Genet. Entw. ii. 509 sqq., 532 sqq. I cannot however agree with Susemihl in his rejection, p. 533 sq., of the statements about the indefinite dyad, which Alexander derived from the Aristotelian treatise on the Good (Alex, ad Metaph. i. 6, 987 b. 33 and i. 9, 990 b. 17; Schol. 551 a. 31 sqq.; 567 b. 31 sqq. Cf. Simpl. Phys. 104 b.; Schol. 362 a. 7). (This treatise Susemihl with Rose declares to be spurious.) Alexander says that, as the Ideas are numbers, the principles of numbers are also the principles of the Ideas. These principles are the monad and the dyad; the latter because it is the first non-unit (πρώτη παρὰ τὸ ἓν), and contains in itself the Many-and-Few. Plato further assigned the ἴσονv to unity, and the ἄνισον to ὑπεροχὴ and ἔλλειψις, because all inequality exists between two terms, a great and a small, a ὑπερέχον and an ἐλλεῖπον. Hence he called the dyad indefinite, because neither the ὑπερέχον nor the ὑπερεχόμενον as such is definite (ὡρισμένξέ), but indefinite and unlimited. But if this indefinite dyad is limited by the unit, it becomes the number two. This is the first in which the double and the half occur. The double and the half are definite kinds of the ὑπερέχον and ὑπερεχόμενον, which can only spring from these latter by being limited by the unit, the principle of all determination and limitation. The number two (ἡ δυὰς ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς) has therefore the unit and the Great-and-Small for its principles. Susemihl objects to this exposition on the ground that tho mathematical number two is thus derived immediately from the unit and the definite dyad; and that mathematical numbers (the Ideas being left out of consideration) are explained to be the first elements of things, next to the unit and the infinite. I cannot, however, find this in Alexander. He says, indeed, that Plato, according to Aristotle, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τ’ Άγαθοῦ made the unit and the dyad ἀρχὰς τῶν τε ἀριθμῶν καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων. But he does not say that these numbers are meant to be mathematical numbers; on the contrary, if their principles are intended to be the principles of all things, we should rather have to understand the numbers which are identical with the Ideas, viz. the Ideal numbers. Of these Aristotle says, Metaphysics i. 6, 987 b. 18, 37: ‘because the Ideas are the causes of everything else, Plato considered their elements to be the elements of things,’ and ‘Plato made the material principle a dyad, because numbers’ (in our text the reading is ἔξω τῶν πρώτων, which however is a gloss, cf. p. 329, 98) ‘can conveniently be derived from this.’ This view removes the scruples in my Plat. Stud. p. 222.
5^ See p. 284 sq.; cf. also Aristotle Metaphysics xii. 10, 1075 a. 3-1 and Eth. Eud. i. 8, 1218 a. 24, where the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of the Good is met by the objection: παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν (the argument, however, which is cited for the position that the unit καθ’ αὐτὸ is the Good, is doubtful), ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται (sc. τοῦ ἑνός).
6^ See the quotation, p. 256, 100 and Metaphysics i. 8, end; i. 9, 991 b. 27; Plat. Stud. 225 sq.
8^ Aristotle De Anima i. 2; see 331, 103; Metaphysics xiv. 3, 1090 b. 21 (cf. Plat. Stud. 237 sq.): ποιοῦσι γὰρ [οἱ τὰς ἰδέας τιθεμένοις] τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ᾽ ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν: διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθέν. vii. 11, 1036 b. 12: (τινὲς, the Pythagoreans) ἀνάγουσι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν τῶν δύο εἶναί φασιν. καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς. Alex, ad Metaphysics i. 6 (see vol. i. 325, 2); Pseudo-Alex, ad xiii. 9 (ibid. 349, 4). Beside this derivation of spatial magnitude, is a second, according to which the line was reduced to the Long-and-Short, the superficies to the Broad-and-Narrow, the solid to the Deep-and-Shallow (or the High-and-Low βαθὺ καὶ ταπεινόν), as kinds of the Great-and-Small (Aristotle Metaphysics i. 9, 992 a. 10; and likewise ace. to Alex, ad loc. in the treatise περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Metaphysics xiii. 9, 1085 a. 7; xiv. 2, 1089 b. 11. De An. loc. cit.). But how these two explanations stand in detail, whether the Long-and-Short is meant to arise from the combination of the Great-and-Small with the dyad, the Broad-and-Narrow from its combination with the triad, the Deep-and-Shallow from its combination with the quadruple, and then out of these the line, superficies, and solid, or whether, inversely, the line was derived from the combination of the dyad with the Long-and-Short, the superficies from the combination of the triad with the Broad-and-Narrow, etc., cannot be determined either from Aristotle or from his interpreters. Susemihl’s conjectures (ii. 544) on Plato’s construction of spatial magnitude are doubtful. Aristotle says, Metaphysics i. 9, 902 a. 20, that Plato did not admit the point in his deduction, because he asserted that the point was only a geometrical hypothesis. Instead of the point he said ‘beginning of the line’; and this led him to the assertion of indivisible lines. I must concede to Schwegler and Bonitz ad loc, and Brandis, ii. a. 313, that this assertion is actually attributed to him; it is not clearly more strange than the supposition of smallest superficies in the elementary theories of the Timaeus. Alex, ad loc, knew it in Plato from the present passage only.
9^ Metaphysics i. 9, 992 b. 13 sqq.; xiii. 6, 1080 b. 23 sq.
10^ See pp. 74, 329; Plat. Stud. 266 sq., and cf. Theophrastus’ argument, Metaphysics p. 312, Brand (Fragm. xii. 12, Wimm.) against those who suppose the ἓν and the δυὰς ἀόριστος· τοὺς γὰρ ἀριθμοὺς γεννήσαντες καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ τὰ σώματα σχεδὸν τἆλλα παραλείπουσι πλὴν ὅσον ἐφαπτόμενοι καὶ τοσοῦτο μόνον δηλοῦντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, οἷον τόπος καὶ κενὸν καὶ ἄπειρον (cf. the Pythagorean theory, Pt. i. 376 sq.; 3 A), τὰ δ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς οἷον ψυχὴ καὶ ἄλλ’ ἄττα χρόνον δ’ ἃμα (time, however, originates from both at once, from the indefinite dyad and the unit), καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ ἓτερα δὴ πλείω· τοῦ δ’ οὐρανὸν περὶ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔτι ποιοῦνται μνείαν. These expressions can only refer to Plato: for Theophrastus continues, ‘Speusippus and the rest, with the exception of Xenocrates and perhaps Histiaeus, give the same account. Plato, however, takes the derived μέχρι τῶν εἰρημένων, οἱ δὲ (Speusippus and the rest) τῶν αρχῶνμόνον.’
11^ Cf. preceding note, and Eudemus apud Simpl. Phys. 98 b. in. (Schol. 360 a. 8; Eud. Fragm. Ed. Sp. Nr. 27): Πλάτων δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἀνώμαλον καὶ ὅσα τούτπις ἐπὶ ταύτὸ φέρει τὴν κίνησιν λέγει … τὸ δ’ ἀόριστον καλῶς ἐπὶ τὴν κίνησιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιφέρουσιν. We may compare the mention made by Aristotle himself, in the passage here paraphrased by Eudemus, Phys. iii. 2, 201 b. 20, of the assertion (ἔνιοι φάσκονες): δῆλον ὅτι κινήσεται τὰ εἴδη, and the objection to the Platonic doctrine of Ideas in Metaphysics i. 9, 992 b. 7: εἰ μὲν ἔσται ταῦτα κίνησις (if this — the Great-and-Small — is to be motion), δῆλον ὅτι κινήςεται τὰ εἴδη. Cf. the unregulated motion of the so-called matter in the Timaeus (see pp. 301; 303, 20), and particularly Timaeus 57 E (supra, 379, 35). The derivation of the soul from the unlimited can only be brought into harmony with the principle that the soul is the cause of all motion (see p. 3-44) if, by the motion which originates from the unlimited, is meant merely the mutability peculiar to sensible things, the change of Becoming and perishing. This is found elsewhere; cf. p. 352, 143.
13^ Besides the instances adduced, p. 331, 103; p. 397, 23, we find as belonging to these discourses a definition of man in Aristotle, Anal. Post, ii. 5, 92 a. 1 (cf. Top. vi. 10, 148 a. 15), similar to that in the Politicus, 266 A sqq.; Part. Anim. i. 2, 642 b. 10 sqq., a classification of birds from the διαιρέσεις (see 46, 5); Gen. et corr. ii. 3, 330, b. 15 (see supra, loc. cit.), a classification of the elements from the same treatise; Top. vi. 2, 140 a. 3, some Platonic expressions. Diogenes, iii. 80, avowedly after Aristotle, probably also out of the ‘classifications’ (cf. v. 23), gives the classification of Goods into spiritual, bodily, and external, quoted bv Aristotle Eth. N. i. 8, 1098 b. 12; cf. Plato Republic ix. 591 B sqq.; Laws, v. 728 C sqq.; but especially Laws v. 743 E.
14^ To prove that Plato assumed five ἁπλᾶ σώματα corresponding to the five regular solids, Simplicius, in three passages (Phys. 268 a. n.; Schol. 427 a. 15; De Caelo, 8 b. 16; 41 a. 1; Karst. Schol. 470 a. 26; 474 a. 11), quotes from Xenocrates’ treatise, περὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίου, the words: ‘τὰ μὲν οὖν ζῷα οὕτω πάλιν διῃρεῖτο, εἰς ἰδέας τε καὶ μέρη, πάντα τρόπον διαιρῶν, ἕως εἰς ταπάντων στοιχεῖα ὰφίκετο τῶν ζῷων, ἃ δὴ πέντε σχήματα καὶ σώματα ὠνόμαζεν, εἰς αιθέρα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέςα.’ The evidence is so definite, particularly in the statement that Plato called the five elements πέντε σχήματα καὶ σώματα, that we are forced to attribute this deviation from his earlier doctrine (mentioned p. 371 sq.) to Plato himself, and not to his scholars; on whom see chapters xv. and xvi. (Xenocrates, Epinomis).
16^ V. 739 D sq., with which cf. Republic ix. 692 B, vii. 807 B.
17^ Against Steinhart’s attempt to invalidate this explanation, and represent the change in Plato’s political point of view as less than it really is, cf. Susemihl, ii. 619 sqq.
19^ IV. 713 A, E (cf. 715 E sqq.): ὅσων ἂν πόλεων μὴ θεὸς ἀλλά τις ἄρχῃ θνητός, οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις: a remodelling of the celebrated expression of the Republic (see note 22).
21^ The only reminiscence in the Laws of the scientific demands of the Republic is in the magistracy conspicuous above the general mass of the people for its higher knowledge, which is to form the depositary of the wisdom of the state, xii. 961 A sqq.; xi. 951 C sqq. (see p. 538 sq.). From the members of this magistracy it is required that they should be able to give an account of the object of the state and the foundations of the Laws (962 A sq.; 966 B; cf. 951 B sq.) to πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν (965 C); that they should know not only the individual virtues, but the common essence of virtue, that they should generally be able to understand and to teach the true nature of the good and the beautiful. But unmistakeable as is the reference to philosophy as the necessary completion of the political praxis, the treatise before us does not go beyond these elementary indications. Its object is not to describe the actual State of philosophers; and though from our general knowledge of Platonic doctrine we cannot doubt that Plato, as the author of the Laws, meant by the μία ἰδέα what he otherwise calls the εἶδος, or Idea, the reader is not obliged, either by this expression or by the connection in which it occurs, to understand more than the simple concept. The Ideas are here touched upon only on their logical side, so far as they coincide with the Socratic concepts; there is not a word in reference to their distinctive metaphysical determination, nor to their self-existence, their objective reality. I, therefore, maintain the correctness of my assertion (in the second edition of the present work), as against Susemihl and others (Susemihl, ii. 576 sqq.; cf. Steinhart, vii. 359), that there is no mention of the theory of Ideas in the Laws. The theory of Ideas as such is not mentioned there. To avoid any misunderstanding, however, I have altered the wording of the above.
22^ With the passage in the Laws, iv. 712 C sqq., compare Republic v. 473 C sqq., e.g. in the Laws: ὅταν εἰς 712a ταὐτὸν τῷ φρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφρονεῖν ἡ μεγίστη δύναμις ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ συμπέσῃ, τότε πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ νόμων τῶν τοιούτων φύεται γένεσις, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ μή ποτε γένηται; in the Republic: ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν … καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, … οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ταῖς πόλεσιν; cf. p.467.
23^ Even from the passage already quoted, xii. 965 A sqq., we can only get, with the help of the Republic, a very indefinite conclusion.
25^ Cf. Plat. Stud. p. 46; Laws, v. 747 E; iv. 712 B; xi. 934 C; ii. 653 C; 665 A; iii. 691 D sqq.; iv. 715 E sqq.; xii. 941 A sq.; vii. 799 A sqq.; viii. 835 E; 848 D; v. 729 E sq.; 738 D; xii. 946 B sqq.; 953 E; viii. 842 E sq.; xi. 917 D; 920 D sqq.; x. 909 E; ix. 854 A; x. 884 A. Further references, p. 473.
26^ See iv. 717 B; v. 738 D; 747 E; vi. 771 D; vii. 801 E; 818 C; viii. 848 D; ix. 853 C; 877 A; x. 906 A; xi. 914 B.
27^ See p. 463 sq. I cannot attribute any weight to the distinction between the visible gods (the stars) and those who are worshipped in images, xi. 930 E sq. The words καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί, x. 904 A, in the connection in which they stand, give no suitable meaning, and appear to be a gloss. We cannot appeal to this passage to prove that Plato in the Laws treats the popular gods merely as symbols of the real gods.
28^ Susemihl, ii. 588, with reference to vii. 804 A sq.; xi. 930 E sq.; ix. 870 D sq.; 872 D sqq.; and elsewhere.
29^ As ix. 927 A with regard to the belief in immortality.
30^ x. 907 D sqq.; see p. 473.
31^ x. 885 B-907 D; see p. 463 sqq.
34^ vii. 821 A sqq.; xii. 967 D sq. It is a mistake to suppose that an enquiry into the Being of God is forbidden in the first of these passages (Cic. N. D. i. 12, .30; Clemens, Strom, v. 585 B, etc.; cf. Ast ad loc). Plato is finding fault with the prevalent prejudice against Meteorosophy; cf. Krische, Forschungen, i. 187 sq.
37^ v. 737 E sq.; cf. 745 B; vi. 756 B; 771 A sqq.
38^ For proofs, cf. Plat. Stud. 48.
39^ Susemihl, ii. 591 sqq., is quite right in referring to kindred expressions in other writings; but the quantitative relation in which the mathematical element stands to the other elements is different in this place. Philosophy proper, Dialectics (to which Mathematics is elsewhere subordinated), receives a not very definite consideration at the end of the whole treatise: v. p. 811, 1. In the rest of the exposition it withdraws, and mathematics takes its place. If, on the other hand, the accurate classification of the citizen society, the pedantry (σμικρολογια, v. 746 E) noticed by Plato himself, of determining everything according to number and proportion, be intended to serve practical ends, it cannot be mistaken that, as opposed to the quantitative equality to be obtained in this way, the qualitative differences of men and their relations are inadequate.
40^ i. 631 C: of divine Goods, the first is φρόνησις, the second the σώφρων ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἐκ δὲ τούτων μετ᾽ ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη, τέταρτον δὲ ἀνδρεία. Cf. 632 E; xii. 963 C; cf. x. 906 B.
41^ iii. 689 A sqq. The greatest ignorance is the διαφωνία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν; the main point in φρόνησις is the συμφωνία in this respect. The man in whom this is found, is to be called wise (σοφὸς, σοφία), however wanting he may be in other knowledge. Cf. 688 A: the highest virtue is φρόνησις δ᾽ εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ᾽ ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης.
42^ iv. 710 A; 716 C; iii. 696 B sqq.
43^ i. 630 E sq.; xii. 963 E; cf. i. 630 C, D; 631 C; 667 A and supra, p. 451, 46. We find a similar statement (iv. 710 A) as to σωφροσύνη, but only in so far as it is treated as a mere natural disposition; from this δηώδης σωφροσύνη, the inclination to temperance innate even in children and animals, σωφροσύνη in a higher sense, including in itself knowledge, is distinguished. The expressions as to courage are not thus modified: they mostly relate to courage as one of the four cardinal virtues, which it is not when regarded as a mere natural disposition. In spite of Susemihl’s opposition (ii. 615 sq.), I cannot withdraw the view expressed here, however strange it may seem to him.
44^ See the first two books, from 633 C onwards.
45^ Cf. also v. 733 E sq. and Plat. Stud. 35.
46^ Even in iii. 689 A; ix. 863 B, E, this is hardly intimated. The dull argumentation, i. 626 D sqq., seems to be directed not against that doctrine itself, but only against the conclusion that there must be an internal strife in the soul if a man is to speak of a victory over himself.
47^ See note 40, and p. 476 sq.
48^ Cf. Hermann De vestigiis institutorum veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis, Marb. 1836, p. 9.
49^ See p. 468, 25 and p. 472, 40.
51^ Laws, loc. cit.; cf. Politicus 297 D; 300 A sqq.; supra, p. 468, 25, 26.
52^ Some particular points are necessarily passed over even by the Laws, viii. 843 E; 846 B.
53^ E.g. iv. 715 B sqq.; v. 729 D; vi. 762 E.
54^ Cf. vii. 797 A sqq.; ii. 656 C sqq.; xii. 949 E; vi. 772 C.
56^ See iv. 719 A-723 D, where they are defended as the only suitable way of introducing laws to free men. Plato expressly remarks (722 B, E) that no law-giver has published such introductions to his laws; and, indeed, to do so would not be at all in the spirit of ancient legislation. That spirit is quite foreign to the Socratico-Platonic principle, of action being only valuable when it proceeds from free personal conviction. Hence, Hermann (loc. cit. p. 21; Plat. 706, following Bentley and Heyne) rightly rejects later proœmia to the Laws of Zaleukus and Charon das (Cic. Legg. ii. 6, 14 sq.: Stob. Floril. 44, 20, 40), however genuine in appearance.
57^ Posidonius, ap. Seneca ep. 94, 38, censures them.
60^ Cf. iii. 691 C sqq., where (693 B) it is expressly observed that this demand coincides with the one elsewhere mentioned, viz. that legislation should aspire to virtue and knowledge (see p. 465 sq.).
61^ iii. 693 D sqq.; 701 D sq.
62^ ἐλευθέρα τε καὶ φίλία μετὰ φρόνησις.
63^ As in Sparta, where they succeed best, but still not sufficiently.
64^ Cf. vi. 756 E: μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν.
65^ iv. 712 E; 714 B; 715 B; 701 E; 697 D; 693 A sq.; viii. 832 B sq.
66^ Politicus ii. 6, 1266 a. 1 sqq.
67^ vi. 756 E-758 A; 759 B; 768 B; cf. iii. 690 B sq.
69^ According to four property-classes; see v. 744 C sq.; vi. 754 D sq., and Hermann, loc. cit. 36.
70^ Equally many are to be chosen out of all the property-classes, while the higher classes will, as a rule, be smaller; again, the higher classes are to be obliged to participate in the whole election, whereas among the lower classes this is only the case with a part. See next note and Aristotle loc. cit.
71^ Cf. the directions as to the election of the different magistrates, vi. 753 A-768 E. We may take as example the rules about the βουλὴ, 756 B sqq. This magistracy is to consist of 360 members, a fourth part of whom belongs to each of the four property classes. In order to determine these, a list of candidates out of each of the four classes is obtained by a general election of the people. In this election, however, only the members of the first two classes are absolutely bound to participate, while the members of the third class are obliged to choose only the candidates out of the three first, and those of the fourth only out of the two first. From each list of candidates thus 180 men for each class are marked out by a general election, in which every one is obliged to take part under penalty. Half of these are chosen by lot for actual entrance into the βουλὴ, after a preliminary examination in the legal qualifications. These are then divided into twelve sections (called Prytanies, vi. 755 E; 760 A; 766 B; xii. 953 C), each of which has to attend to the business of government for one month.
72^ vi. 770 A sqq.; 754 D. These guardians are chosen by 100 electors being appointed by a double general voting, and these latter choosing the 37 out of themselves. The guardians may not be less than 50 nor more than 70 years old; vi. 753 B; 755 A.
74^ vi. 766 D sqq.; ix. 855 C; 856 E; 871 D; 877 B. Of the further determinations concerning administrative and penal justice, three are especially to be noticed: the abolition of the αὐτωμοσια (i.e. the affidavits of the two parties as to their evidence), because it necessarily leads to false oaths and to the depreciation of the oath (xii. 948 B sqq.); the division of wrongs into such as are done designedly, such as are done undesignedly, and such as are done under the influence of passion (ix. 860 C-862 C; 866 D sqq.); the abolition of the confiscation of property, of complete ἀτιμία and of all other penalties which extend to posterity (ix. 855 A, C; 856 C).
76^ Priests, temple-keepers, and interpreters, the first chosen from the elder citizens by lot, but only for a period of one year, vi. 759 A sqq.; Agronomi, 60 in number, who form the country police, and employ a part of the young men in maintaining order, fortification, road-making, and other generally useful works, and at the same time exercise them for the defence of the country (760 A sqq.); Astynomi and Agoranomi, who are occupied with the city police, public works, etc., 763 C sqq.; Strategi, Hipparchs, Taxiarchs, Pylarchs, chosen out of those who are capable of bearing arms; the lower places are occupied by the Strategi, 755 B sqq.
77^ See on this δοιιμασία, vi. 753 E; 754 D; 755 D; 756 E; 759 D; 760 A; 767 B, etc.
78^ xii. 945 B sqq.; cf. vi. 761 E; 774 B; xi. 881 E.
79^ vi. 765 D sqq.; cf. vii. 801 B; 808 E; 813 B; xi. 936 A.
80^vi. 764 C sqq.; vii. 813 C sqq.
81^xii. 960 B-968 E; 951 C sqq.
82^ἄγκυραν πάσης τῆς πόλεως, 961 C.
84^See note 21; and pp. 526, 527.
86^Cf. too the ordinance requiring that a man shall be 50 years old to participate in the council, and that, together with the members proper, younger men are to be chosen as their assistants (xii. 951 C; 961 A; 964 D sq.; 946 A; vi. 755 A; cf. 765 D and supra, p. 480, 69), besides the name φύλαιες, and the remark that they correspond to the element of reason in man, xii. 962 C; 964 B sqq.; cf. supra, 474, 44.
88^Especially xii. 951 B sq.: all laws are incomplete and of uncertain stability so long as they appeal only to custom and not to judgment (γνώμη). They, therefore, who are led to this judgment by a nobler nature ought to be sought out everywhere, even from without; for such contemplative study (θεωρία) is quite indispensable.
92^ Ibid. 730 E-741 D; xi. 923 C. In 745 C sq., we find scrupulous care for the equal value of the portions of land; hence the division of each estate into a nearer and a more remote half.
93^ 744 B sqq.; cf. supra, note 69.
94^ v. 742 C; vi. 774 C sq. (where there is only a slight modification). Somewhat similar is xi. 944 D.
95^ v. 741 E sqq.; vii. 806 D; viii. 846 D-850 D; 842 D; xi. 915 B; 919 D sqq.; 921 C.
96^ vi. 771 E; 772 D-776 B; 779 D; 783 D-785 B; iv. 721 A sqq.; xi. 930 B; ix. 868 C.
97^ See p. 456, 62 and xi. 930 D.
98^ From the age of four onwards the children are to be kept under inspection in infant schools, vii. 793 E sq.
100^ The whole seventh book comes under this head. The mathematical sciences are treated, 809 C sq., 817 E sqq. Hunting is discussed by way of appendix, 822 D sqq.; cf. p. 479, 497 sq., 511 sq.
101^ vii. 793 D sqq.; 804 D-806 D.
102^ vi. 780 D sqq.; vii. 806 E; cf. viii. 842 B; 847 E sq.; Hermann, loc. cit. 28 sq.
103^ vi. 785 B; 784 A sq.; vii. 805 C sqq.; 806 E; 794 A sq., etc.
104^ vii. 806 D-807 B; viii. 842 D; 846 D; 847 A; xi. 919 D sq.
105^ E.g. vii. 806 D; 807 D sqq.; ii. 666 A sq.; 674 A sq.
106^ Cf. viii. 847 B; vi. 775 A sq.; xii. 955 E sq.; 958 D sqq.
107^ xi. 915 D-918A; 920 B sq.; 921 A-D.
109^ v. 735 C sqq.; cf. supra, p. 468, 23.
112^ v. 739 D sq.; see p. 522.
113^ ix. 874 E sqq.; see p. 531.
114^ E.g. v. 727 A; 728 B; 731 D sqq.; vi. 773 D; vii. 797 A; cf. Plat. Stud. p. 75.
115^ vii. 803 B: ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, κ.τ.λ. cf. also v. 728 D sq.
116^ i. 644 D; vii. 803 C; 804 B; x. 903 D, with which compare the quotation from Heraclitus, vol. i. 536; i. 587, 6, 3rd edit. In the Laws he even does not hesitate to call his own inquiries mere play: i. 636 C; iii. 685 A; 688 B; 690 D; x. 885 C; Plat. Stud. 73.
117^ The earlier writings and the Timaeus know nothing of an evil World-soul, but derive everything bad and incomplete exclusively from the nature of the corporeal element (see 338, 115). In Politicus 269 E the opinion, which does not differ from the supposition of the Laws, viz. that there are two antagonistic divinities which move the world, is expressly contradicted. It is hard to see how an evil World-soul could be brought into harmony with such a system as Plato’s. Is it to spring from tho Idea, from the combination of which with space the Timaeus derives its World-soul? But in that case it could not possibly be evil, nor at strife with the divine soul of the universe. Or again, is it meant to be originally innate in matter (as Martin and Ueberweg maintain, following Tennemann, Plato, iii. 175 sqq.)? But matter as such is without motive power (see p. 345), or rather it is not at all. Only the Idea is real. Or finally, is it meant that the World-soul, good in itself, afterwards becomes evil (Stallbaum, see p. 338 sq.)? Plato’s conception is clearly not this, for in the Laws he speaks of two juxtaposed souls. a good and an evil, and not of two successive conditions of one and the same soul. How could the soul of the universe, the most divine of all become things, the source of all reason and order, prove untrue to its nature and determination?
118^ x. 896 C sqq.; 898 C; 904 A sq. As to the attempt to remove these theories from the Laws, cf. my Plat. Stud. p. 43. These attempts may be made in two ways: either (1) by admitting that the Laws do actually suppose an evil as well as a good soul, but referring this evil soul not to the whole world, but merely to the evil that is in mankind; or (2) by acknowledging that an evil World-soul is spoken of here, but denying that the author of the Laws meant actually to assert the existence of such a soul. His statements are then explained as something posited merely provisionally and by way of hypothesis, and vanishing in the process of development. Fries, Gesch. der Phil. i. 336, as well as Thiersch and Dilthey, adopt the first supposition, and Bitter (Gott. Anz. 1840, 177), Brandis (Gr.-röm. Phil, ii. a. 566). Stallbaum (Plat. Opp. x. a. CLVIII. sq.), Suckow (Form der Plat. Sehr. 139 sq.), and (virtually) Steinhart agree with the second, which was introduced by Böckh (Steinhart, PI. WW. vii. a. 315, where the two souls are referred to the double motion of the soul, the regulated and unregulated, in the life of nature); still I cannot consider either of them admissible as long as passages such as the following are not accounted for — x. 896 D. sq.: ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι; Τί μήν; Μίαν ἢ πλείους; Πλείους: ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῷν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι. 898 C: τὴν οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν. The author himself does, it is true, decide for the first horn of this dilemma (897 B sq.); but it does not follow that he considers the evil World-soul as nothing actual. It certainly exists; but on account of the superiority of the good it cannot rule the universe. That this doctrine is actually propounded in the Laws is acknowledged by Hermann (Plat. 552), Michelet (Jahrbb. fur Wissensch. Kritik, 1839, Dzbr. p. 862),Vögeli (Uebers. der Gess. Zur. 1842, Pt. ii. p. xiii.), Susemihl (Genet. Entw. ii. 598 sq.). If it once be admitted that evil just as much as good must be caused by the soul (898 D), that the universe (οὐρανὸς) is full of evil and perversion (906 A), and (as is incontestably Plato’s opinion, see p. 358 sq.; 385 sq.; Laws, 898 C), that reason only and divine completeness can be ascribed to the soul, which moves the structure of the universe — the conclusion at once presents itself, that the evil and incomplete must spring from another soul, which rules in the world together with the former. The Laws thus only advance a step further than Plato’s original doctrine. This doctrine derived the bad and evil from matter (see 338 sqq.; 422 sq.; 440): now it is observed that every motion, even faulty motion, must be occasioned by the soul. We could accept the supposition of an evil World-soul as quite consistent, if it did not stand in contradiction with other determinations of Plato’s system.
120^ The detailed account of this, so far as is possible at the present day, is given by Hermann in the above-mentioned dissertation and its contemporary supplement: ‘Juris domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris Graeciae inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio.’
121^ Cf. especially p. 530, and in general Aristotle Politics ii. G, 1265 a. 1: τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μικρὸν περιάγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν (that of the Republic).
122^ With reference to the discussions as to the genuineness of tho Laws, occasioned by Ast’s attacks and my Platonic Studies, compare, together with the remarks, p. 100 sqq., Steinhart, Plat. WW. vii. a. 90 sqq.; Susemihl, Genet. Entw. 562 sq. The believers in their spuriousness have been, besides Suckow (see p. 50, 13; p. 108, 44), Strümpell, Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. i. 457, and Ribbing, Plat. Ideenl. ii. 150 sqq. Ueberweg (see 109, 45) and Schaarschmidt (Samml. d. plat. Sehr. 94, 148. 1, etc.) do not extend their doubts to this treatise, and Steinhart and Susemihl (who often corrects the former in certain points) prove its original Platonic source in a detailed discussion. I withdrew my earlier doubts in the first edition of the present work.
123^ That the Laws cannot belong to any earlier period is rendered probable (besides the quotations on pp. 141, 142; p. 32, 68) by the passage, i. 638 A. The subjugation of the Locrians by the Syracusans mentioned here can scarcely (as Böckh remarks, following Bentley, Plat. Min. 73) refer to anything but the despotism of Dionysius the younger, in Locri. after his first banishment from Syracuse, which is recorded in Strabo, I. i. 8, p. 259; Plutarch prase, ger. reip. 28, 7, p. 821; Athenasus, xii. 541 C. Not much is proved against this by ii. 659 B.
124^ Plat. Stud. 32 sq.; 38, 108 sq.
125^ As the θεία μοίρα, i. 642, on which cf. p. 176, and the expressions as to παιδεραστία, cf. p. 456. The frequent praise of the Spartan constitution, which, however, is counterbalanced by open censure of its one-sidedness, finds its justification in the supposed situation; the remarkable determination, ix. 873 E, corresponds to an old Attic regulation (a similar thing exists at the present day in England); the contradiction between iii. 682 E and 685 E can be removed by a correct explanation of the former passage. Ix. 855 C, according to the correct reading, and in order to avoid a contradiction with 877 C, 868 A, must be interpreted as follows: ‘No one, not even the exile, shall be entirely deprived of his rank as a citizen.’ This determination has its value, because the Laws are acquainted with banishment for a short period (ix. 865 E sq.; 867 C sq.; 868 C sqq.) and because complete ἀτιμία brought its consequences on the children. Finally, although the case supposed (iv. 709 E sqq.) and expressly desired might strike us as strange, viz. that a tyrant endowed with all possible good qualities should undertake the realization of the Platonic proposals, still in its connection this is not without congruity. The meaning is, not that the tyrant as such could be the true ruler, but that a tyranny can be most quickly and easily changed into a good constitution, if a chief, as Plato might have imagined to himself the younger Dionysius (cf. 368, 2), endowed with good natural talents, young, and hence an uncorrupted heir to such a single rulership, submitted himself to the guidance of a wise lawgiver. Such a case was supposed in Republic vi. 499 B, cf. v. 473 D. Even the τυραννουμένη ψυχὴ (710 A) can be justified from this point of view: the soul of the tyrant is a τυραννουμένη, in so far as it is itself bound by its position, but, just as the πόλις τυραννουμένη, it is to be set free through the influence of the lawgiver.
126^ To these belongs the much boasted invention that drunkenness (for it is this that is being discussed, and not mere drinking banquets, i. 637 D; 638 C; 640 D; 045 D; 646 B; ii. 071 D sq.) is to be applied as a means of education and training (i. 635 B| 650; ii. 671 A sqq.). This is subsequently falsified (ii. 666 A sq.), when it. is said that this means is only admissible in the case of mature men. There is also a contradiction between vi. 772 D, where the 25th year is given as the earliest period for marriage in men, and iv. 721 B, vi. 785 B, where the 30th year is given. On the other hand it is not correct that (vii. 818 A, xii. 957 A) unfulfilled promises occur, which point to an incomplete form of the work (Hermann, Plat. 708); the first passage refers to xii. 967 D sqq., the second to 962 D. sq.
127^ See p. 142. 122. Proclus (as Suckow, p. 152, points out from the Προλεγόμενα τ. Πλάτωνοςφιλοσ. c. 25) believed that the Laws were not quite finished by Plato.
128^ The present text of the Laws is not good. In many places Hermann, Susemihl (Jahrb. f. Phil. lxxxiii. 135 sqq., 693 sqq.), and Peipers (Qusest. crit. de Plat. leg. Berl. 1863) have endeavoured to improve it, partly by conjecture and partly by MSS.
129^ In this way, as I have remarked in my treatise on Platonic anachronisms (Abh. d. Berl. Akad. 1873; Philos.-hist. El. p. 97), the two offending passages may be easily got rid of, as also the striking and purposeless anachronism with regard to Epimenides (details about which are given, loc. cit. 95 sq.; Plat. Stud. iii.), and the expressions about the evil World-soul, mentioned p. 544 eq. The first would he removed without changing a single word and merely by omissions, if we read i. 642 D sq.: τῇδε γὰρ ἴσως ἀκήκοας ὡς Ἐπιμενίδης γέγονεν ἀνὴρ θεῖος, ὃς ἦν ἡμῖν οἰκεῖος, ἐλθὼν δὲ … παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείαν, θυσίας τε ἐθύσατό τινας ἃς ὁ θεὸς ἀνεῖλεν: … τότ᾽ οὖν ἐξενώθησαν ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ. The explanation about the evil World-soul might by an inconsiderable change of the words be taken out of the paragraph in which it stands, and the connection would distinctly gain. If, after the words τί μήν (896 E), we were to continue (898 D): ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην κ.τ.λ., no one would notice the slightest loss; neither in what follows is there any reference to the supposition of a double soul, nor is there anything pointing to it in what precedes. Plato does not say one word to signify that the κίνησις ἐν πολλοῖς, mentioned 893 C sq., is the irregular motion proceeding from the bad soul (Steinhart, loc. cit. 315 sq.), nor do we need to derive (with Susemihl, ii. 600) the whole of the corporeal motions besides the circular motion from it. In the Timaeus, he is acquainted with many other motions as well as the circular one of reason, without assuming a double soul (p. 360, 166, where the passage from the Laws is of doubtful cogency by the side of those just quoted). To reject the section 896 E (μίαν-) to 898 D (ποῖοξ;) would distinctly strengthen the cogency of the argument for the divinity of the world and stars. Possibly the whole discussion is due to an editors’s insertion.
Chapter XIV. The Older Academy. Speusippus
Plato’s long continued instructions had assembled in the Academy a numerous circle of hearers, men of various ages, who were attracted by his fame, often from distant countries; and so far as an individual may be said to have contributed to that result, Athens owes it to him, more than to anyone, that even after the loss of her political ascendancy, she still remained the centre of all the philosophic aspirations of Greece. Among the disciples of Plato that are known to us,1 |554| we find many more foreigners than Athenians: the greater number belong to that Eastern portion of the |555| Greek world which since the Persian War had fallen chiefly under the influence of Athens. In the Western regions, so far as these were at all ripe for philosophy, Pythagoreanism, then in its first and most flourishing |556| period, most probably hindered the spread of Platonism, despite the close relation between the two systems. The external gathering point of the Platonists was that garden near the Academy2 which descended by inheritance from Plato to Speusippus,3 and afterwards in regular order to each successive head of the School: the spirit of community was maintained by the social meals instituted by Plato.4 The direction of the Society was, as a general rule, passed on by the dying or retiring leader to one of his disciples; but though this recommendation was almost always respected, the community appears to have reserved to itself the right of final election.5 |557| Plato’s immediate successor was his sister’s son, Speusippus.6 He was followed after eight years by |558| Xenocrates,7 a man who from his attachment to Plato8 might have been expected to be a faithful interpreter |559| of the traditions of the School, whose earnestness, strength, and purity of character9 won for him universal veneration,10 but whose melancholy cast of mind and acrimonious nature11 qualified him far more for the dogmatic establishment and mystical obscuration of Plato’s doctrine than for its dialectical development. |560| Besides these two, there are mentioned among Plato’s personal disciples Heraclides of Pontus,12 who, however, seems to have been more of a learned man than a philosopher,13 and is often claimed for other schools;14 |561| Philippus of Opus, a distinguished mathematician and astronomer, editor of the Laws, and probably author of the Epinomis;15 and Hestigeus of Perinthus.16 The |562| celebrated astronomer, Eudoxus of Cnidos,17 had also |563| attended Plato’s lectures,18 and occupied himself, in addition to his own particular science, with enquiries of a more general kind.19 Of these enquiries we know very |564| little, and that little is directly opposed to genuine Platonism. Xenocrates was followed, as head of the Academy, by Polemo,20 whom he had converted from a disorderly life to serious purpose and moral rectitude, by the influence of his personal character and discourses.21 The successor of Polemo was his scholar and friend Crates,22 whose eminent fellow-disciple Crantor23 |565| had previously died. Next to Crates came Arcesilaus; with him the Academy entered on a new phase of scientific development, which must be considered later on.
The members of the Older Academy professed to maintain Plato’s doctrine generally unaltered;24 but they chiefly adhered to its later form. In pursuing his enquiries into numbers and their elements, they approximated very closely to the Pythagoreans, so that their metaphysics became an abstruse dogmatism25 with a large admixture of arithmetical and theological mysticism. At the period when Plato’s metaphysics showed Pythagorean tendencies, we find that his Ethics were of the more popular kind described in the Laws; and this was also the |566| case with the philosophers of the Academy. Unlike their master, they seem to have neglected the severer enquiries of Dialectic; nor did they (except in the direction of astronomy and mathematics) pay much attention to the investigation of natural science, already discouraged by him. We know, however, so little about these men that it is often impossible to combine, even by probable conjecture, the scattered fragments of their doctrines that have come down to us into any connected whole.
Plato’s nephew, Speusippus,26 though greatly inferior to Aristotle in philosophic genius, seems to have resembled him in his desire for definiteness and experimental completeness of knowledge. Being convinced of the interdependence of all knowledge, he was of opinion that it is impossible to possess a satisfactory knowledge of anything without the knowledge of all things besides: for to know what a thing is, we must know wherein it is distinguished from other things, and to know this, we must know how these other things are constituted.27 He therefore sought to gain a basis |567| for enquiry by means of a comparative survey of the different spheres of the Actual.28 And while thus attributing greater worth to experience than Plato had done, his theory of knowledge softened the abrupt opposition which Plato had assued between the sensible |568| and rational perception, by interposing a Third between them. ‘The Immaterial,’ said Speusippus, ‘is known by means of scientific thought — the Material, by scientific perception’; under this he included observation guided by understanding.29 In proportion, however, as he directed his attention to the Particular of experience he departed from that Unity of the highest principles, which Plato had striven to obtain. Plato, according to the later view of his system, had shown the One and the Great-and-Small to be the most universal elements in all things; and at the same time had left the essential difference between the Sensible and the Ideal unexplained, and seemingly unregarded. Speusippus saw the necessity of more accurately determining and discriminating these two principles. Plato had identified the One with the Good and the divine Reason.30 Speusippus distinguished the three concepts from one another.31 The Good, he believed, could not stand as the ground of all Being, at the beginning of |569| Being, but only as the goal and completion of Being, at the end of the chain, as we see in the case of individuals: they begin with imperfection and only attain to perfection32 in the course of their development. And the One cannot coincide with the Good, otherwise the Many must coincide with the Evil; and according to this, Good and Evil must be first causes as well as the One and the Many.33 Although, therefore, he admitted that the One was akin to the Good, and its most essential constituent,34 yet he separated them so as to make the One a principle and the Good its result.35 As a third element, |570| distinct from the One and the Good, came the efficient cause or Reason;36 but this he combined with the Platonic World-soul, and the Pythagorean central fire; for he supposed the world to be ruled by animate power, having its seat in the centre and in the circumference, and extending itself throughout the whole space of the universe.37 Plato’s Ideal principle is thus resolved by Speusippus into three principles, which are analogous to Aristotle’s formal, efficient, and final causes, but are far from having the precise determination and the universal significance of these. The second |571| principle, Plato’s Great-and-Small, he described, in contrast to the One, as Plurality,38 thus connecting it with the Pythagorean categories.39 From Unity and Plurality, however, he derived numbers only; for the explanation of everything else, he set up several other principles,40 related to the former, and yet distinct from |572| them,41just as he had supposed the Good as related to the One, but not identical with it. Thus he obtained a plurality of spheres, united not by the identity, but by the similarity of their ultimate causes.42 That uniform |573| interdependence of the whole universe, which Plato and Aristotle so strongly maintained, was, as Aristotle says, broken up by Speusippus.
The highest sphere in this series is that of numbers. These, with Speusippus, occupy the place of Ideas, which he entirely abandons. Numbers are, according to him, the First of all that exists; and though he denies the distinction between mathematical and Ideal numbers, yet he separates them, in their existence, from sensible objects, as Plato separates his Ideas;43 and he gives the same reason for this procedure that Plato gave for his: namely, that no knowledge would be possible if there were not a nature exalted above the sensible.44 But |574| the relation of the One to numbers involved him in a |575| difficulty; for in order to separate the One, as first cause, from the Derived, he found himself obliged to distinguish it by the name of the ‘First One’ from the unities contained in numbers; so that, as Aristotle observes, at this point, at any rate, he reverted to the separation of Ideal and mathematical number.45
In the same way he assumed magnitudes to exist as specific substances, above and beyond sensible things; but the Platonic distinction of mathematical and Ideal magnitudes46 was of course not allowed by Speusippus. Mathematical numbers are the First, mathematical magnitudes the Second.47 Like the Pythagoreans, he attempted to prove various analogies between them;48 and in the same Pythagorean strain, |576| he praises the perfection of the number ten, as shown partly in its arithmetical properties, and partly, in that its elements, the first four numbers, underlie all geometrical proportions.49> Plato, in his later period, certainly made greater concessions to the Pythagorean theory of numbers than was consistent with the spirit of his system; but in his successor this tendency preponderated to such an extent that in his metaphysics he would be altogether a Pythagorean, did not the separation of numbers from things (a remnant of the doctrine of Ideas) constitute a very essential difference between true Pythagoreism and his adaptation of it.
Speusippus seems to have paid little attention to natural science. Theophrastus censures him for neglecting, like most of the Platonists, to pursue his derivation of the Particular from Primary Causes far enough; and for the superficial and disjointed manner in which he brings his principles to bear on all things beyond the sphere of numbers and mathematical quantities.50 His writings (as far as we can judge |577| from their titles51) consist, in addition to those already mentioned, of descriptive rather than investigatory works:52 they include books on Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics, Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric.53 Of the Physics of Speusippus tradition has preserved very little. Aristotle may perhaps be alluding to him when he accuses the Platonists of making Space, as the sphere of mathematical and corporeal magnitudes, begin simultaneously with these.54 We are told that he |578| defined Time as Quantity in motion;55 that he adhered to the mathematical derivation of the elements; assuming, however, with Philolaus, five elements,56 instead of Plato’s four: that he declared not only the higher, but the irrational part also, of the soul to be immortal,57 — a divergence from Plato,58 which may have been occasioned by the difficulties resulting from the opposite theory, in regard to the doctrine of Metempsychosis; for it can scarcely be doubted that so great an admirer of Pythagoras was an upholder of that doctrine. These scanty notices contain all that we really know about the Physics of Speusippus, and |579| anything else that may here and there be gathered on this subject is far less interesting or important.
Our information is likewise very meagre concerning his Ethics, though Speusippus devoted many of his writings to the subject;59 but we may take for granted that his principles were generally those of Plato.60 No trace, however, is discernible of the peculiar theory of virtue, and the idealistic scheme of politics which we find in the Platonic state. It is said that he sought the Highest Good or Happiness in the perfection of natural activities and conditions: this perfection being chiefly effected by virtue, which was thus declared by Speusippus, as by Plato, to be the most essential condition of happiness.61 He allowed, however, a certain value to health, freedom from troubles, and even to external goods:62 but he would not admit Pleasure to be a good,63 still less the inference that it |580| must be so if Pain be an Evil. There is an opposition, he said, not only between the Evil and the Good, but between one evil thing and another; just as the Greater is opposed not only to the Equal, but also to the Less.64 Another argument of his is mentioned, by which he sought to prove that law deserves respect, and that the wise man ought not to withdraw himself from its rule.65 Though it is impossible to gain a connected idea of the Ethics of Speusippus from such fragments as these, we can at least perceive that they coincided in the main with the principles of the Older Academy.66
Endnotes
1^ The wide propagation of the Platonic school is attested, amongst other evidences, by the large number of those who are called personal pupils of Plato. I give in what follows an alphabetical list of them, in which those who have been already cited, p. 30, 64, or who are to be cited with more detail immediately, are only named; about the rest I add more particulars. The register of Academics in Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. iii. 159 sqq., Bari, has many deficiencies, and makes the mistake of representing as Platonists all who have any connection whatever with Plato, even to his slaves. (1) Amyntas of Heraclea, as he is called in the catalogue of Academic philosophers (‘Ind. Herenl.’), edited by Spengel, Philol. Supplement-bl. ii. 535 sqq. and Bücheler, in the Griefswalder Ind. Schol. for 1869-70, from the second collection of the Volumina Herculanensia, i. 162 sqq.; Diogenes iii. 46, calls him Amycius, Aelian. V. H. iii. 10 and Proclus in Eucl. 19 (p. 67, Fried.) Amycius. The former reckons him among the more eminent Platonists, the latter among the mathematicians of merit. (2) The Locrian, Aristides, who is called Plato’s ἑταῖρος [disciple] by Plutarch Timol. 6. (3) Aristonymus, see above. (4) Aristotle, (5) Athenaeus of Cyzicus (apud Proclus loc. cit. according to the corrected reading). (6) Bryso, if the contemporary comedian, Ephippus, is right in assigning him to the Academy, apud Athen, xi. 509 C; it is not clear how this Bryso is related to Bryso the Heracleote (see Pt. i. 206, 4), to Bryso the mathematician (Ep. Plat. xiii. 360 C), whose failure to square the circle is frequently mentioned by Aristotle (Anal. post, i. 9, beginn.; Soph. Elench. ii. 171 b. 16; 172 a. 3; cf. the commentators, Schol. in Arist. 211 b. sq.; 306 b. 24 sqq.; 45 sqq.; Waitz Arist. Org. ii. 324), and, finally, to the Sophist of the same name mentioned by Aristotle, Hist. Anim. vi. 5; 563 a. 7; ix. 11; 615 a. 9; Rhet. iii. 2; 1405 b. 9. (7) Chaero of Pellene; see p. 31 and Ind. Here, ii. 7, where, as in Athenaeus, probably on the authority of Hermippus, it is stated that he set himself up for a tyrant. (8) Chio and (9) Leonides (loc. cit. and Ind. Here. 6, 13). (10) Delius, see above. (11) Demetrius of Amphipolis (Diogenes 46). (12) The mathematician Dinostratus, brother of Menaechmus (Proclus in Eucl. loc. cit.). (13) Dion, see above. (14) Erastus and (15) Coriscus of Scepsis (Diogenes 46; Stob. Floril. vii. 53; Epinomis Plato vi.; Strabo, xiii. 1, 54; p. 603). The latter calls them both Socratics; but as he at the same time adds that Coriscus was the father of Neleus, who inherited the library of Theophrastus, they can only have been so called as having been pupils of some Socratic. (Cf. Böckh, Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad. 1853; Hist.-phil. Kl. p. 139.) (16) Evaeon of Lampsacus; v. supra. (l7) Eudemus of Cyprus, the friend of Aristotle; cf. vol. ii. b. 9; i. 45 sq. 2nd edit. (18) Eudoxus, see infra. (19) Euphraeus, see above. (20) Helicon, the astronomer, of Cyzicus (Plut. Dio, 19, gen.; Socr. 7, p. 579; Epist. Plat. xiii. 360 C; Philostr. v. Apoll, i. 35, 1). (21) Heraclides Ponticus, see infra. (22) Heraclides of Aenos; see above and Ind. Here. 6, 15 sq. (23) Hermias, Prince of Atarneus; see above and Pt. ii. b. 16 sq. 2nd edit. (24) Hermodorus of Syracuse, well known as a mathematician, a biographer of Plato, and a buyer of Platonic writings; Diogenes Proœm. 2, 6; ii. 1 06; iii. 6; Ind. Here. 6, 6 sq.; Cic. ad Att. xiii. 21. Suidas, Λόγοισιν, ii. a. 601; Bernh. Simpl. Phys. 54 b. o.; 56 b. o.; Ps. Plutarch De nobil. p. 627; cf. my treatise De Hermodoro, 17 sqq. and supra, p. 14, 26; p. 242, 47; p. 277, 138. (25) Hestiseus, see below. (26) Hippothales of Athens (Diogenes 46). (27) Leo of Syzantium, see supra and Müller, Fragm. Hist, gr. ii. 328. (28) The mathematician Menaechmus, the pupil of Eudoxus and Plato: Theo. Astron. c. 41 . p. 27, a (on the authority of Dercyllides): Proclus in Euclid. 19 w.; 21, o.; 22 m.; 31 o.; 68 w. (p. 67, 72, 78, 111, Friedl.) in Plato, Timaeus 149 C; Eratosth. ap. Eutoc. in Archimedes de sph. et Cyl. p. 21 sq.; Martin, on Theo’s Astron. p. 58 sqq., who is quite right in identifying him with the Platonist Μάναιχμος of Suidas and Eudocia. (29) Menedemus, the Pyrrhaean, see supra and Ind. Here. 6, 2; 7, 2; according to the latter passage Menedemus was held in such respect by his fellow-scholars, that in the election of a successor to Speusippus he, together with Heraclides, was only a few votes behind Xenocrates. (30) The soothsayer Miltas of Thessaly (Plutarch Dio, 22). (31) Pamphilus, perhaps of Samos, where he heard Epicurus; Cic. N. D. i. 26, 72. (32) Philippus of Opus, see infra, probably the same person as Philippus the Medmaean. (33) Phormio, see above. (34) Python of Aenos, see above, and Ind. Here. 6, 15 sq. (35) Speusippus, see below. (36) Theaetetus the Athenian: Plato, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, cf. Pt. i. 198; and supra 18, 31; Proclus in Eucl. 19 w.; 20 o. (p. 66 sq. Fr.). Suidas. Θεαίτ distinguishes from him a philosopher of the same name of Heraclea in Pontus, calling the former a pupil of Socrates, the latter an ἀκροατὴς Πλάτωνος [Platonic auditor]. But at the same time he asserts that the Socratic taught in Heraclea; he calls him an astronomer, and says that he was the first to write on the five regular solids, whereas, according to Proclus, the mathematician (in which character Plato depicts his Theaetetus) is not distinct from the Platonist. The Theaetetus of Plato becomes acquainted with Socrates only a few weeks before his death, and so far, even if this trait is meant to be historical, could scarcely have been called a scholar of Socrates. Everything, therefore, seems to support the supposition that Suidas made the one Theaetetus into two, by referring two notices, of which the one called him a Socratic and the other a Platonist, to two distinct persons. Still the question might be raised whether Theaetetus did actually come into connection with Socrates, or whether he was only represented in that connection by Plato in order that a part might be given to him in the dialogues mentioned. The same may be the case with (37) the younger Socrates (Pt. i. p. 198): he seems to have been a pupil of Plato’s; whether he was known to Socrates must remain undecided. (38) Theodectes of Phaselis, the well-known rhetorician and tragic poet, who, according to Suidas, Θεοδ., together with Isocrates, heard both Plato and Aristotle, and was often quoted by the latter (see the index). More particulars about him are to be found in the passages pointed out by Bernhardy ad Suid. sub voce: cf. also Plutarch Alex. 17, end. (39) The mathematician Theudius of Magnesia (Proclus 19 u.). (40) Timolaus of Cyzicus: see above, p. 366. (41) Timonides tho Leucadian (Plutarch Bio. 22, 30, 31, 35; Diogenes iv. 5, cf. p. 840), the companion and historian of Dio, seems, like Eudemus, to have belonged to the Platonic school. (42) Xenocrates will bo spoken of later on. Several persons whose connection with Plato is uncertain, or who, at any rate, could not be considered his scholars, were mentioned, p. 30: e.g. Calippus, Clearchus, Chabrias, Timotheus, Phocion, the orators Hyperides, Lycurgus, Aeschines, Demosthenes. Two women, Axiothea of Phlius and Lasthenia of Mantinea, are said to have frequented Plato’s discourses. Diogenes iii. 46, iv. 2; Athen. vii. 279 c. xii. 546 d. Clemens Strom. iv. 523 A; Themist. Orat. xxiii. 295 c.
2^ See above, p. 25, 49, p. 24, 48.
3^ This is clear, not so much from express information (for even in Plato’s will, apud Diogenes iii. 42, the garden is not disposed of), as from the indubitable fact that it was in the possession of Xenocrates, Polemo, and their successors downwards up to the sixth century of the Christian era; cf. Plutarch De Exil. c. 10. p. 603, where by the ‘Academy’ in which Plato, Xenocrates, and Polemo dwelt, we can only understand Plato’s garden. Diogenes iv. 6, 19, 39; Xenocrates, Polemo, Arcesilaus lived in the garden. Damasc. v. Isid. 158 (more at length ap. Suidas Πλάτων, ii. b. 297 B): the produce of the garden in his time formed only the smallest portion of the revenues of Plato’s successors. The Museum, also erected by Plato, in which Speusippus exhibited pictures of the Graces (Diogenes iv. 1, 19), perhaps stood in the garden. Speusippus himself, however, does not seem to have lived there: cf. Plutarch loc. cit. with Diogenes iv. 3. Together with the Museum, seats for the lectures are mentioned (ἐξέδρα) (Diogenes 19), which, however, acc. to Cic. Pin. v. 1, 2, Diogenes iv. 63, were in the Academic Gymnasium. The analogy of the Peripatetic and Epicurean school, to be mentioned later on, confirms the above. More details are given apud Zumpf ‘On the continuance of the philosophical schools in Athens,’ Abb. der Berl. Akademie, 1 842, phil. hist. Kl. p. 32 [8] sqq.
4^ See p. 28, 59. According to Athen, i. 3 sq.v. 186, b. Speusippus and Xenocrates, and then Aristotle, composed special table laws for these meetings. They had a school discipline (Diogenes v. 4), to which, among other things, belonged the regulation that every ten days one of the scholars should be appointed ἄρχων [archon = leader].
5^ The usual course, doubtless, was for the scholarch, before his death, to appoint his successor; this was done e. g. by Speusippus apud Diogenes iv. 3, and ibid. 60 we read that Lacydes was the first who resigned the school to another during his lifetime. Arcesilaus received it (ibid. 32) after the death of Crates ἐκχωρήσαντος αὐτῷ Σωκρατίδου τινός. Still, this supposes an election or, at least, the consent of the whole body, even if this retirement was voluntary. If the outgoing scholarch appointed his successor, this appointment required the consent of those who were to be under him. The Herculanean catalogue, at least, asserts (cf. note 1, ‘Menedemus’) that after the death of Speusippus Xenocrates was carried by only a few votes against Heraclides and Menedemus. Among the Peripatetics we find, as well as the ordinary succession by bequest (as Theophrastus according to A. Gell. xiii. 5, and doubtless also the later heads), an election of his successor ordered by Lyeo (Diogenes v. 70). Zumpf, loc. cit. 30 sq.
6^ Fischer, De Speusippi Vita, Rast. 1845. Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, son of Eurymedon (who is. doubtless, not the same as the Eurymedon mentioned in Plato’s will, ap. Diogenes iii. 43, and next after Speusippus amongst the executors), and Potone (Diogenes iii. 4, iv. 1; Cic. N. D. i. 13, 32, etc.), seems to have been some 20 years younger than Plato. We can hardly assume less difference in their ages, if Plato was the eldest child of his parents. Speusippus’ mother would thus be younger than Plato, which, however, is uncertain (cf. p. 3, 3, end, 44, 111). Again, the difference cannot be much greater, because Speusippus (acc. to Diogenes iv. 14, 3, 1; Ind. Hereul. vi. 5, v. a.), died Ol. 110, 2 (339 b.c. acc. to Ens. Chron. Ol. 110, 3), after attaining a considerable age (γηραιὸς). Amnionitis also, V. Arist. p. 11, West; cf. Hermipp. apud Diogenes V. 2, says that in 335. when Aristotle came to Athens, he was no longer alive. His reported poverty is not proved by the pseudo-Chio Epist. 10. Educated under the influence of Plato (Plutarch adul. et am. c. 32, p. 71; similarly frat. am. c. 21, p. 491), he gave himself up to his philosophical instruction; according to Diogenes iv. 2 he also availed himself of that of Isocrates. When Dion came to Athens a very close connection was formed between him and Speusippus, who supported Dion’s plans both in Sicily, whither he had accompanied Plato in his last journey, and also later on (Plutarch Dio, 17, 22 — see above, p. 34, 73, 75; cf. c. 35, and Diogenes iv. 5, where Fischer p. 16, and Müller fragm. hist. gr. ii. 33 correctly read Τιμωνίδης instead of Σιμωνίδης. Epist. Socrat. 36, p. 44. It is, however, incredible that the letter was genuine out of which Plutarch De Adul. c. 29, p. 70, quotes a passage. Speusippus held the office of teacher in the Academy only eight years (Diogenes iv. 1, Ind. Here. loc. cit.); having become paralysed by illness, he appointed Xenocrates to be his successor, and, as it is reported, voluntarily put an end to his life (Diogenes iv. 3; Galen, hist. phil. c. 2, p. 226; Themist. or. xxi. 255, B; also Stob. Floril. 119, 17, which, however, is not consistent with his self-murder). The mention by Diogenes iv. 4 (professedly from Plutarch’s Sulla and Lysander, where, however, it does not occur), of the unavoidable φθειρίασις, depends entirely upon a confusion. In his younger years Speusippus is said to have lived somewhat licentiously; but Plato, without much exhortation, merely by the force of example, brought him to better courses (Plutarch adul. et am. c. 32, p. 71, frat. am. c. 21, p. 491). The reproaches heaped upon him in later times (apud Diogenes iv. 1 sq.; Athen, vii. 279 e. xii. 546; d. Philostr. V. Apollon. c. 35, p. 43; Suidas, Αἰσχίνης, ii. b. 64; Beruh. Epist. Socrat. 36, p. 44; Tertull. Apologet. 46) spring from such impure sources that no stain can thus accrue to his character. The calumny, e.g., of his deadly enemy Dionysius (ap. Diogenes and Athen.) seems to have no other foundation than the fact that he was an intimate friend of Lasthenia, and that he started a collection to pay off the debts of a friend (there is nothing about paying for his tuition). Tho inordinate love of pleasure, with which he is charged, would hardly agree with his ethical principles. On other points see Fischer, p. 29 sq. Plutarch Dio, 17 praises his amiability, Antigonus (see 363, 3) the temperance of his meals in the Academy. His reported marriage we must leave undecided. His writings (to be mentioned later on) are said to have been bought by Aristotle for three talents; Diogenes iv. 5, Gell. N. A. iii. 17, 3.
7^ Van de Wynpersse, De Xenocrate Chalcedonio, Leyd. 1823. The mother city of Xenocrates is Chalcedon (Cic. Acad. i. 4, 17; Diogenes iv. 6; Strabo, xii. 4, 9, p. 566; Stob. Ecl. i. 62; Athen. xii. 530, d. etc.; Καρχηδόνθος in Clem. cohort. 44, A; Strom. v. 590, C. Euseb. pr. ev. xiii. 13, 53, and in the MSS. of Diogenes and Aelian, V. H. ii. 41, xiii. 31, is a mistake; cf. Krische Forsch. 318, 2, Wynpersse, p. 5; ibid. 9 on the name of his father; Agathenor). He received the headship of the school Ol. 110, 2; he died, according to Diogenes iv. 14, 16, after holding it for 25 years, consequently in Ol. 116, 3 (B.C. 31-4/3) at the age of 82 years (Lucian, Macrob. 20, puts it at 84, Censorin. Di. nat. 15, 2, at 81); so that he was born Ol. 96, 1 (39-6/5 B.C.). As a young man, he came to Athens, where he is said to have been at first the pupil of Aeschines (Hegesander apud Athen, xi. 507, c.: cf. however the remarks Pt. i. 204, 3; supra, 36, 85), but soon passed over to Plato. Henceforward he remained the constant and absolute follower of his teacher, and accompanied him in his last Sicilian voyage (Diogenes iv. 6, 11; Aelian xiv. 9; cf. Valer. Max. iv. 1, ext. 2; Aelian iii. 19 would bear upon the subject if the fact were true). After Plato’s death he went with Aristotle to Atarneus, at the invitation of Hermias (Strabo, xiii. 1, 57, p. 610); we do not know whether he passed from here to Athens or to his native town. It is perhaps a misunderstanding to suppose (Themist. or. xxi. 255, 13) that Speusippus caused him to come from Chalcedon in order that he might hand over the school to him; cf. Diogenes iv. 3. While he was at the head of the Academy the Athenian magistrates once had him sold as a slave because he could not pay the protection-tax levied on metics, but he was released by Demetrius Phalereus (Diogenes iv. 14, cf. Pint. Flamin. 12, vit. x. orat. vii. 16, p. 842). He is said to have rejected the offer of full Athenian citizenship from repugnance to the prevailing state of affairs (Plutarch Phoc. c. 29, Ind. Here. 8). He died of an accidental wound (Diogenes 11). On his pictures see Wynpersse, 53 sqq.
9^ We have many traits recorded of Xenocrates’ earnestness, austerity, contentedness, integrity, love of truth, and conscientiousness; see Diogenes iv. 7-9, ii. 19; Cic. ad Att. i. 16; pro Balbo, 5, 12; Tusc. v. 32, 91; Off. i. 30, 109; Valer. Max. ii. 10, ext. 2; iv. 3, cxt. 3; fii. 2, ext.6 (where, however, others mention Simonides; Wynpersse 44); Plutarch Alex. virt. c. 12, p. 333; Sto. rep. 20, 6, p. 1043; Stob. Floril. 5, 118, 17, 2.3; Themist. or. ii. 26 A; xxi. 252 A; Athen, xii. 530 d.; Hesych. and Suidas, Ξενοκράτης. His mildness even towards animals is noticed, Diogenes 10, Aelian. V. H. xiii. 31. The story (Diogenes 8; Athen, x. 437, b.; Ml. V. H. ii. 41; Ind. Here. 8, 9, v. u.; Wynpersse, 16, sqq.) about Xenocrates winning a drinking prize is, according to Greek notions, not at all at variance with his moderation, but is to be judged according to the well-known Socratic precedent (see Pt. i. p. 63 sq.). The golden chaplet which he won on this occasion he gave away.
10^ See on the recognition which Xenocrates found in Athens, and the consideration which was shown him by Alexander and other princes, Diogenes 7, 8, 9, ii.; Plutarch Phocion, c. 27, vit. pud. c. ii. p. 533; adv. Col. 32, 9, p. 1126; Ind. Here. 7, 10 sqq., and other passages quoted in the previous note, The narrative about Polemo (see below) corroborates the impression produced by his personality; Diogenes 6.
11^ Cf. Cic. Off. i. 30, 109; Plutarch De Audiendo, c. 18, p. 47; conjug. praee. c. 28, p. 141; vit. pud. c. ii. p. 533; Amator. 23, 13, p. 769; Diogenes 6, where are the well-known expressions of Plato: Ξενοκράτης θῦε ταῖς χάρισιν, and about Xenocrates and Aristotle: ἐφ’ οἷον ἵππον οἷον ὄνον ἀλείφω, and τᾷ μὲν μύωπος δεῖ τῶ δὲ χαλινοῦ. The latter, however, is told of others; see Diogenes v. 39; Cic. De Orat, iii. 9, 36; Wynpersse, p. 13.
12^ On the life and writings of Heraclides cf. Diogenes v. 86 sqq.; Roulez, De vita, et scriptis Heraclidae P. in the Annales Acad. Lovan. viii. 1824; Deswert, De Heraclide P., Löwen, 1830: Müller, Fragm. hist. gr. ii. 197 sqq.; Krische Forsch. 325 sq. Born at Heraclea in Pontus (Strabo, xii. 3, 1, p. 541; Diogenes 86, Suidas Heraclides), wealthy, and of an illustrious house (Diogenes Suidas loc. cit.), he came to Athens, where he seems to hare been introduced into the Platonic school by Speusippus (Diogenes 86). If it is true that on his last Sicilian voyage (361 B.C.) Plato transferred to him the headship of the school (Suidas see p. 34, 73), he can scarcely have been younger than Xenocrates; and as he could speak of the founding of Alexandria (Pint. Alex. c. 26), he must have lived beyond Ol. 112, 2 (B.C. 330). According to Demetrius, apud Diogenes 89, he liberated his native city by killing a tyrant. This, however, scarcely fits in with the history of Heraclea; for it cannot refer to the murder of Clearchus (Roulez, p. 11,sq.). Perhaps Demetrius confused him with the Thracian of the same name (supra, 30, 64). According to the Ind. Here. 7, 6 sq., after the death of Speusippus. when Xenocrates was chosen head of the school (i.e. b.c. 339), he returned home and established a school of his own (ἕτερον περίπατον καὶ διατριβὴν κατέστησατο). The stories about his death, apud Diogenes 89-91, Suidas sub voce, Ind. Here. 9, sq., which are in all other respects improbable, and remind us of the similar myths about Empedocles (see vol. i. 605 sq.), say that it occurred there.
13^ His comprehensive knowledge is obvious not only from the width of his literary activity and the remnants of his works, extending as they do to all parts of science then known — metaphysics, physics, ethics, politics, music, rhetoric, history, and geography (see Diogenes v. 86 sqq.; further information apud Roulez, 18 sqq.; 52 sqq.; Müller, loc. cit.), but from the frequent mention of him in the ancients. Cicero calls him (Tusc. v. 3, 8) doctus imprimis; (Divin. i. 23, 46) doctus vir; Plutarch borrows from him many pieces of information, and adv. Col. 14, 2; p. 1115 (cf. n. p. suav. viv. 2, 2, p. 1086), represents him as one of the most important philosophers of the Academic and Peripatetic school. On the other hand, Plutarch also calls him, Camill. 22, μυθώδης καὶ πλασματίας, Timaeus ap. Diogenes viii. 72 παραδοξολόγος, the Epicurean in Cic. N. D. i. 13, 34 says: puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, and several instances of his uncritical credulity are also known to us; cf. Diogenes viii. 67, 72; Io. Lydus, De Mens. iv. 29, p. 181; Cic. Divin. i. 23, 46; Athen, xii. 521 e. We shall find that his contributions to philosophy were unimportant; but as a physicist, owing to his doctrine of the revolution of the earth round an axis, he takes no inconsiderable position; and if the quotation, p. 34, 73 (‘Menedemus’), is correct, not only his fellow-pupils, but Plato himself must have made much of him. His writings, with regard to which Diogenes v. 92, perhaps wrongly, charges him with plagiarism, were composed at least partly in the form of dialogues; cf. Diogenes 86; Cic ad Att. xiii. 19; ad Quintum fr. iii. 5; Proclus in Parmenides i. end; vol. iv. 54. His manner of exposition is rightly praised by Diogenes, 88 sq.
14^ Diogenes represents him among the Peripatetics, after having himself called him a Platonist, v. 86; Stobaeus also treats him as a Peripatetic, Ecl. i. 580; cf. 634; Cicero, however (Divin. i. 23, 46; N. D. i. 13, 34; Tusc. v. 3, 8; Legg. iii. 6, 14); Strabo (xii. 3, 1, p. 541); and Suidas Heraclide. place him under the Platonic school. Proclus in Timaeus 281 E, cannot intend to contradict what he himself said p. 28 C; either the words are to be understood differently or the text to be altered. That Heraclides was a pupil of Plato is indubitable, and is confirmed among other things by his editing the Platonic discourses on the Good (Simpl. Phys. 104 b.; see p. 362, 2), and by the fact (Proclus in Timaeus 28 C), that Plato caused him to collect the poems of Antimachus in Colophon. (Cf. Krieche, 325 sq.; Böckh d. Kosm. Syst. d. Plat. 129 sq.) That he subsequently went over to the Peripatetic school seems improbable from what we know of his philosophy; that he heard Aristotle (Sotion ap. Diogenes 86) is unlikely, because of the relative ages of the two, and because he left Athens before Aristotle’s return. His views confirm our opinion of a connection with the Pythagoreans (Diogenes loc. cit.). He himself, in the fragment ap. Porphyry, in Ptolem. Harm, p. 213 sqq. (apud Roulez, p. 101), quotes a passage from Archytas.
15^ Philippus of Opus was, according to Suidas Φιλόσοπος (before this word the lemma Φίλιππος Όπούντιος has undoubtedly fallen out; cf. Bernhardy ad loc, Suckow, Form d. plat. Sehr. 149 f.), a pupil of Socrates and Plato. Really, however, he was only the pupil of the latter; as we see from the further statement: ὢν δὲ κατὰ Φίλιππον τὸν Μακεδόνα. He divided Plato’s Laws into twelve books; the thirteenth he seems to have added himself. In harmony with the latter statement Diogenes iii. 37 says: ἔνιοί τε φασὶν ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς Νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι. Proclus follows the same supposition when (in the quotation of the Προλεγ. τ. Πλάτ. φιλοσ. c. 25; Plat. Opp. ed. Herm, vi. 218) he proves the spuriousness of the Epinomis by showing that Plato could not possibly have had time for its composition, as death prevented him from τοὺς νόμοτς δθορθώσασθαι. Philippus is not, however, expressly mentioned. Among the twenty-three written treatises which Suidas cites as belonging to Philippus, there are six moral treatises, a work on the Gods in two books, treatises about the Opuntian Locrians, about Plato,etc., and eleven mathematical, astronomical, and meteorological works. As an astronomer (σχολάσας τοῖς μετεώροις) Philippus is mentioned, not merely by Suidas, but had made himself an important reputation in this department; cf. Plutarch n. p. suav. v. sec. Epic. ii. 2, p. 1093; Hipparch. in Aratus Phaen. i. 6; Geminus, Isag. in Ar. Phoen. c. 6, p. 47 Halma; Ptolem. Φάσεις ἀπλανῶν, who often cites his ἐπισημάσια together with those of Calippus, Euctemon, etc.; Plin. H. nat. xviii. 31, 312; Vitruv. De Archit. ix. 7; Stob. Ekl. i. 558; Joh. Lyd. Pe mens. iv. 13; Alex. Aphr. in Meteorol. 118 a. (Arist. Meteorol. ed. Ideler, ii. 127), who tells us about his explanation of the rainbow. As Böckh has shown (Sonnenkreise d. Alten, 34 sqq.) by a comparison of all the statements about him and his writings, ‘Philippus the Medmaean’ (from Medama in Bruttium) is not distinct from him. This Philippus is mentioned by Steph. Byz. (De Urb. Μέδμαι), and apud Proclus in Eucl. 19, and p. 67 fr. (where Μεδμαῖος is to be substituted for Μεταῖος or Mενδαῖος), in a catalogue of the mathematicians of the Platonic school who succeeded the Opuntian Philippus; it may be that Philippus was born at Opus, and afterwards lived in Medama, a Locrian colony, or vice versa. We must suppose that there was only one well-known astronomer of this name, because most of the passages which mention the astronomer Philippus designate him simply by this name, without finding it necessary to add ‘the Opuntian’ in order to distinguish him from any other of the same name. When e. g. Alexander loc. cit. says simply: Φίλιππος ὁ ἑταῖρος Πλάτωνος, there can be no doubt that he did not know two Platonic scholars of this name.
16^ Hestiaeus is mentioned as a Platonist by Diogenes, iii. 46, as the editor of the Platonic discourses on the good by Simpl. Phys. 104 b. cf. supra, p. 26, 53; his own investigations are referred to by Theophrastus, Metaphysics p. 313 (Fragm. 12, 13 Wimm.); Stob. Ecl. i. 250; Exc. e Floril. Jo. Damasc. 17, 12 (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 174).
17^ Ideler on Eudoxus, Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad. v. J. 1828; Hist, phil. Kl. p. 189 sqq. v. J. 1830, p. 49 sqq. Eudoxus’ native town is unanimously called Cnidos, and his father, ap. Diogenes viii. 86, Aeschines. The year of his birth and death is not known; Eusebius’ statement in the Chronicon, that he flourished Ol. 89, 3, makes him much too old. It is true that he brought over letters of recommendation from Agesilaus to Nectanabis of Egypt (Diogenes 87), and if Nectanabis II. is intended, this journey must have happened between Ol. 104, 3, and 107, 3 (362 and 350 B.C.); if Nectanabis I., not before Ol. 101, 2 (374 B.C.). Aelian V. H. vii. 17 represents him as visiting Sicily somewhat later than Plato, and consequently after 367 B.C.(see p. 32, 67). With this agrees the statement of Apollodorus ap. Diogenes 90, who makes him flourish Ol. 103, 1 (367 B.C.). (The words must refer to him; the preceding clause εὑρίσκομεν — ὁμοίως is either spurious or more probably to be rejected altogether as a gloss.) His age is given in Diogenes viii. 90, 91 as fifty-three years. According to Aristotle Eth. N. x. 2 beginn, i. 12, 1101 b.28; Metaphysics xii. 8, 1073 b. 17 sqq., i. 9, 991 a. 17, xiii. 5, 1079 b. 21, he could not have been living at the time these treatises were composed. Poor as he was, he obtained, through his friends, the means for his educational travels (Diogenes 86 sq.). Besides Plato (see following note), Archytas and the Sicilian physician Philistio are mentioned as his teachers (Diogenes 86); in Egypt, the priest Chonuphis is said to have introduced him to the knowledge of his caste (Diogenes 90, Plutarch Is. et Os. c. 10, p. 354; Clemens Strom, i. 303 D; Philostr. v. Soph. i. 1, makes him extend his travels still farther). Strabo (see 22, 43) gives the duration of his residence there as thirteen years, which is just as incredible as Strabo’s other statement that he was in company with Plato; Diogenes 87 speaks only of one year and four months. The statements of Diodorus, i. 98, Seneca, Qu. Nat. vii. 3, 2, as to the results of his Egyptian travels, are certainly much exaggerated (cf. Ideler, 1828, 204 sq.). Afterwards, he studied in Cyzicus (Diogenes 87, who adds some improbable details, Philostr. loc. cit., cf. Ideler, 1830, 53); later on he lived in high honour in his native city, to which he gave laws (Diogenes 88; Plutarch adv. Col. 32, 9, p. 1126; cf. Theod. cur. gr. aff. ix. 12, p. 124); his observatory was shown for a long time (Strabo, ii. 5, 14, p. 119, xvii. 1, 30, p. 807). His character is praised by Aristotle Eth. N. x. 2 beginn. On his writings and discoveries as a mathematician and astronomer see Ideler loc. cit.
18^ According to Sotion apud Diogenes 86, the fame of the Socratic schools brought him to Athens, where, however, he only stayed two months. Cicero, Divin. ii. 42, 87; Republic i. 14, 22, calls him Platonis auditor; Strabo, xiv. 2, 15, p. 656, and Proclus in Eucl. i. 19 (67 Friedl.), his ἑταῖρος; Plutarch adv. Col. 32, 9, p. 1126, his συνήθης together with Aristotle; Philostr. v. Soph. i. 1, says: Εὔδοξος τοὺς ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ λόγους ἱκανῶς ἐκφροντίσας; Alex. Aphrod. ad. Metaph. i. 9, 991 a. 14: Εὔδοξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων, Asclep. ibid. Πλάτων, ἀκροατὴς Πλάτωνος. Cf. Sosigenes apud Schol. in Arist. 498 a. 45, perhaps on the authority of Eudemus. The unhistorical statements in Plutarch. gen. Socr. 7, p. 579 Republic Plato xiii. 360 c), and the more probable statements, v. Marc. 14, qu. conviv. viii. 2, i. 7, p. 718, presuppose a close connection of the two. Diogenes counts Eudoxus among the Pythagoreans; so, too, Iamblicus in Nicom. Arithm. p. 11.
19^ This is presupposed in the statement ap. Diogenes that the physician Chrysippus heard from him τά τε περὶ θεῶν καὶ κόσμπυ καὶ τῶν μετεωρολογουμένων. Eudocia, sub voce, makes of this treatises περὶ θεῶν, and the like.
20^ Polemo of Athens succeeded his teacher, Ol. 116, 3 (314/3 B.C.), see 840, 1, and died, according to Euseb. Chronicon, Ol. 127, 3 (270 B.C.), at a good old age, as Diogenes says iv. 20. With this agrees the statement that Arcesilaus, who died at seventy-five, Ol. 134, 4 (241 B.C.), Diogenes 44, 71, and who was consequently born 316 B.C., lived in friendship with Crantor (who died before Polemo) and with Polemo himself (Diogenes iv. 22, 27, 29 sq.). The statement that Arcesilaus flourished in Ol. 120, i.e. 300 B.C. (Diogenes 45, following Apollodor.), cannot be brought into agreement with this, but is of no importance, standing as it does in such direct contradiction with the most certain fundamental points, that we must suppose that there is either a confusion or a mistake in writing.
21^ The event is well known and frequently mentioned; see Diogenes iv. 16 sq.; Ind. Hercul. 13 (which follows the same source as Diogenes, viz. Antigonus the Carystian); Plutarch de aclulat. c. 32, p. 71; Lucian, Aceus. c. 16 sq.; Epictet. Dissert, iii. 1, 14, iv. 11, 30; Origen c. Cels. i. 64, iii. 67; Themist. orat. xxvi. 303 D; Horace, Sat. ii. 3, 253 sqq.; Valer. Max. vi. 9, ext. 1: Augustine, epist. 154, 2 c; Julian, i. 12, 35. In Diogenes iv. 17 sqq. (Ind. Here. loc. cit.) we get instances of the grave dignity, the immovable firmness, and the noble tranquillity for which Polemo afterwards became distinguished. Otherwise we know nothing about his life.
22^ The Athenian Crates lived in the most intimate friendly relationship with Polemo, as did Crantor and Arcesilaus afterwards (Diogenes iv. 17, 21 sqq.; Ind. Here. 15, 16, v. in sqq.). He seems not to have held the office of head of the school for long, as his predecessor died in the year 270 B.C., and his successor, whose revolutionary activity must have lasted some time, died in 241 B.C., v. supra. According to Diogenes 23, he left behind him not only philosophical writings and treatises on comedy, but popular and diplomatic orations. He cannot have remained aloof from politics.
23^ Kayser, De Crantore Academico, Heidelb. 1841. Crantor was born at Soli, in Sicily, where he is said to have soon attracted attention. Thence he came to Athens, where he frequented the school of Xenocrates, together with Polemo (Diogenes iv. 24; Ind. Here. 16, 1 sqq.); he cannot, therefore, have been more than a year younger than Polemo. Nevertheless, after Xenocrates’ death, he refused the invitation to establish a school of his own, and continued to listen to the discourses of his admired friend (Diogenes 24 sq. 17). With Arcesilaus, whom he won over for the Academy, he lived in the most confidential connection, and left him a considerable property (Diogenes 28 sq. 24 sq.; Numen. ap. Euseb. praep. Ev. xiv. G, 3). He died before Polemo, apparently at a good old age (Diogenes 27, 25), but the year of his death cannot be fixed more definitely. His writings, altogether of moderate extent (30,000 lines, says Diogenes 24), are lost, except a few fragments (collected by Kayser, p. 12 sqq.), which, however, still enable us to recognise his choice diction (Diogenes 27) and pleasing fullness of style. The most celebrated of them was his small treatise πέρι πένθους (Cic. Acad. ii. 44, 136; Diogenes 27), which was copied by Cicero in his Consolatio, and, in some points, in the Tusculans, and by Plutarch in his Consolatio ad Apollonium: ef. Kayser, 34 sqq., who gives the views of Wyttenbach and others on this subject.
24^ That they actually did so is asserted by Cicero, following Antiochus (see Acad. i. 4, 14, cf. 12, 43; Fin. v. 3, 7, 8, 6, 16); Acad. i. 9, 34 (on Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, Crantor): diligenter ea, quae a superioribus acceperant, tuebantur; cf. Diogenes iv. 1, of Speusippus. On the contrary, Numen. ap. Euseb. praec. Ev. xiv. 5, 1 sqq., and Euseb. himself, ibid. 4, 14: πολλαχῆ παραλύοντες τὰ δὲ στεβλοῦντες, οὐκ ἐνέμειναν τῇ πρώτῃ διαδοχῇ, which Numenius strongly blames. Which was right will be seen immediately.
25^ The Academician apud Cic. Acad. i. 4, 17, sq. designates the dogmatic formulation of the system as a departure from the Socratic manner common to Aristotle and the contemporary Platonists.
26^ Cf. on his doctrine Brandis, Gr.-röm. Phil. ii. b. 1, p. 6 sqq. On the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine of numbers, Rhein. Mus., v. Niebuhr and Brandis, ii. 4; Ritter, ii. 524 sqq.; Ravaisson, Speusippi de primis rerum principiis placita, Par. 1838; Krische, Forschungen, i. 247 sqq.
27^ Arist. Anal. Post. ii. 13, 97 a. 6: οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὁριζόμενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπαντα εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα. καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασί τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εἰδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εἰδότα ἕκαστον· ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι· οὗ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὗ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου. By τινὲς we are to understand Speusippus, according to the commentators in loc., Philoponus, Themistius, i. 92, 15 sq., Sp., and an anonymous writer who appeals to Eudemus (Schol. in Arist. 298 a. 11-25). Whether Themistius has preserved Speusippus’ own words is uncertain. Writers so little trustworthy as Philoponus and the later Eustratius in Post. Anal. 50 a. o. b. o., cannot be depended on for the statement that Speusippus used the dictum in order to invalidate conceptual definition and division. Such eristic views are ascribed to Speusippus by no ancient authority: ὅροι and διαιρέσεις are expressly attributed to him, rightly or wrongly. (Diogenes iv. 5: the διαιρέσεις may be those spoken of above, 46, 5, whereas our Pseudo-Platonic definitions are too poor, and contain too much that is Peripatetic, to suit Speusippus.) Such views, in fact, are utterly at variance with his whole scientific attitude: he is dogmatic, and even in the little we know of him, by no means deficient either in definitions or divisions. Of the latter we shall have instances presently; for the former, cf. Plutarch plat. qu. viii. 4, 3, p. 1007, where a definition of Time is given.
28^ To this belongs that enquiry concerning names which Simplicius mentions in Categ. (Schol. in Arist. 43 b. 19 a. 31, 41 b. 30; and 7 β, 9 α, δ Basil). (Names are divided into ταὐτώνυμα and ἑτερώνυμα: on the one side, ὁμώνυμα and συώνυμα; and on the other ἑτερώνυμα, πολώνυμα, and παρώνυμα.) Cf. Diogenes iv. 2: Οὗτος πρῶτος, καθά φησι Διόδωρος, … ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐθεάσατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνῳκείωσε καθ’ ὅσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἀλλήλοις. This can hardly refer to anything but a comparative survey; the essential connexion of the sciences had been already propounded by Plato, and with far greater completeness than by Speusippus; for Speusippus posited different principles for the different spheres of Being. A comparative survey of natural history was contained in the ten books of the Ὅμοια, or, according to the fuller title given in Diogenes 5: Διάλογοι τῶν περὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ὁμοίων (the preceding διάλογοι is justly questioned by Krische, Forsch. 253, for the reason that a work of this kind could hardly be written in the dialogic form: perhaps διάλογαὶ is the right reading. Diogenes connects with it one or two other similar works: Διαιρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια ὑποθέσεις. In this treatise, as we see from the fragments in Athenaeus, {Deipnosophistae: C. B. Gulick, trans. Harvard University Press, 1927-1941} Speusippus examined the various kinds of plants and animals, classing together those that are related, and separating the unlike. Cf. Athenaeus iii. 86 c.: ‘Speusippus, in the second book of Similars, says that periwinkles, purple-shell, twisted snails, and conchs resemble each other.’ … Again, ‘Speusippus enumerates in order the conchs, scallops, mussels, pinnas, and razor-fish, by themselves, and in another class, the oysters and limpets.’ Again, 105 b.: ‘Speusippus, in the second book of Similars, says that among the soft-shell crustaceans the crayfish, lobster, nympha, bear-crab, common crab, and pagurus crab are alike.’ iv. 133 b.: ‘Now the cercopê is an animal like a cicada, or titigonion, as Speusippus describes them in the second book of his Similars.’ vii. 303 d.: ‘Speusippus says that the braize, the Erythrinus, and the liver-fish are similar.’ ix. 369 a.: ‘Speusippus, in the second book of Similars, says that radish, turnip, rape-turnip, and nose-smart are similar.’ Similarly, vii. 300 c, 301 c, 327 c, 308 d., 313 a., 319 b., 323 a., 329 sq.
29^ Sextus, Math. Vii. 145 {Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos vii 145–146 (Bury trans., 1935 pp. 80, 81)}: ‘Speusippus said that, since of things some are perceptible and others intelligible, the criterion of the intelligible ones is the scientific account, and that of the perceptible ones is the scientific perception. Scientific perception he understood to be that which partakes of the truth in accordance with the account. For just as the fingers of the flautist or harpist have an artistic actuality, yet one that is not completed in them in the first instance, but perfected on the basis of discipline conforming to reasoning, and as the perception of the musician has an actuality that can grasp what is in tune and what is out of tune, and this is not self-grown but comes about on the basis of reasoning, so also the scientific perception partakes of its scientific practice as naturally derived from the account, leading to the unerring discrimination of the subjects.’ We must not, however, infer from these passages that Speusippus understood by αἴσθησις ἐπιςτημονικὴ an immediate, primarily aesthetic perception (Brandis, ii. b. 1, p. 9), though, like Aristotle, he distinguished, in the sphere of thinking knowledge, between the immediate knowledge of principles and the mediate knowledge of that which is derived from them.
33^ Metaphysics, xii. 7, 1072 b. 30: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων (an argument belonging, doubtless, to Speusippus only, and not to the Pythagoreans) οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. (The other reading adopted by Themistius and Philoponus, which substitutes Λεύκιππος for Σπεύσιππος, is rightly rejected by Krische, Forsch. 250, 1.) This theory of Speusippus is also referred to in Metaphysics xiv. 5 (at the beginning): οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ᾽ ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε ἀεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτό. Further, in chapter 4, 1091 a., 29 sqq., as to how the first Causes are related to the Good, πότερόν ἐστί τι ἐκείνων … αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ὑστερογενῆ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεολόγων (the ancient Cosmogonies) οικεν ὁμολογεῖσθαι τῶν νῦν τισίν, (Speusippus) οἳ οὔ φασιν, ἀλλὰ προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι.
34^ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, xiv. 4, 1091 b. 30: If the One is conceived as the Good, the second principle (Plurality or the Great-and| Small) must be identified with the Bad-in-itself. διόπερ ὁ μὲν (Pseudo-Alexander, following, no doubt, Alexander, here mentions Speusippus; and it is clear from what we have said above that no one else can be intended) ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἑνὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἡ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι. And in xii. 10, 1075 a. 36, after the Platonic theory of the identity of the One and the Good has been opposed by the same arguments as in xiv. 4: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.
35^ Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N, i. 4, 1096 b. 5: πιθανώτερον δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθῦ), τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν (they did not hold the One to be the Good itself, but placed it, in the table of contraries (vide vol. i. 302), beside the Good and Perfect) οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. In Metaphysics, xiv. 4, 1091 b. 14 (τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι: οὐσίαν μέντοι τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ᾤοντο εἶναι μάλιστα), the words οὐσίαν, κ.τ.λ., are also to be taken in this connection. In spite of the arguments of Bonitz (see his remarks on this passage), I cannot give up the possibility (Plat. Stud. 277) that some words, such, perhaps, as οἱ δὲ τούτο μέν ἔφευγον, have been lost from their immediate context.
36^ Cf. the passages already quoted. According to Metaphysics, xiv. 5 (vide supra, note 33), Speusippus would not even allow that the Original One was existent; for he supposed that its union with the Many was the cause that first produced a Being. In support of this opinion he might have appealed to Plato, Parmenides 141 E.
37^ Vide p. 286, 167. Cf. Metaphysics vii. 2, 1028 b. 19. Plato has three substances — the Idea, the Mathematical principle, and sensuous things: Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας, ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς. The commentators paraphrase this passage, as Brandis remarks, on no other authority than their own; and it is very improbable that the addition of Asclepius (Schol. in Aristotle 740 a. 16, 741 a. o.) to the Aristotelian examples, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην οὐσίαν νοῦ καὶ ἄλλην ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ., which is not to be found in Alexander (740 b. 18), rests on any historical tradition. The separation of divine Reason from the One is involved in the theorem mentioned above — the Best cannot be the First. Anaxagoras, who maintained that Reason is original, was contrasted by Aristotle with Speusippus, in regard to this doctrine (Metaphysics xiv. 4, 1091 b. 8 sqq.; cf. a. 33 sqq.), as Ravaisson truly observes (p. 17).
38^ Cf. Cicero, N. D. i, 13, 32 (according to Philodemus): Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem Deorum. Minucius Felix repeats this; Octav. 10. Cf. Theophrastus, Metaphysics, 322 (Fr. 12, 32, Wimm.): Σπεύσιππος σμάνιόν τι τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν. τὰ δ’ ἄκρα καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν (perhaps this ought to be read: χώραν τὰ δ’ ἄκρα ἑκατέρωθεν, the extreme ends on both sides, the circumference of the globe in its two halves). That this τιμίον, dwelling in the centre and in the circumference, is the Deity as World-soul, is clear from the analogy of the central fire, to which the same place was assigned as to the τιμίον (vide vol. i. 357 sq.); and from the Timaeus, 36 E. This account of the soul Speusippus took literally, and combined it with the doctrine of the central fire. With this view of the World-soul (vide supra 355, 154) we should connect the statement of Iamblichus (Stob. Ecl. i. 862; cf. Diogenes iii. 67), that he conceived the soul as ἐν ἰδέᾳ τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ [‘the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions’]: to him, as to other philosophers, the soul is that which is everywhere present, and fills all space. Ravaisson’s proposal (p. 40 sq.) to substitute ἀδιαστάτου for διαστατοῦ is, therefore, inadmissible. His conjecture (p. 18 sq.) that Aristotle is referring to Speusippus when he says that νοῦς cannot be merely δυνάμις, but must be ἐνέργεια (Metaphysics xii. 6, 9, 1071 b. 17 sqq. 1074 b. 19, 28), also appears quite unfounded; Speusippus certainly made a distinction between the first, imperfect Being and νοῦς. But for the same reason Frische is wrong in asserting (p. 256) that he regarded the divine Reason as the primal oppositionless cause. In that case the theory to τὸ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι (vide notes 33 and 37) could not be ascribed to him. Speusippus held that Reason, like the World-soul of the Timaeus, was primarily derived or created. Lastly, I cannot agree with Ravaisson (p. 21) or Brandis, ii. b. 1, 14, in referring the passage in Cicero to the Original One, to which Speusippus would seem to have attributed specific activity. This description appears far more applicable to the World-soul spoken of by Theophrastus, which cannot coincide with the One. The quotations in note 37 are sufficient to prove that the One was not conceived by Speusippus as an animate nature.
40^ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics xiv. 4, and Pseudo-Alexander on this passage (vide supra, note 34), and also in c. 5, 1092 a. 35: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ ἓν ὁ μὲν τῷ πλήθει ὡς ἐναντίον τίθησιν,; and C 1, 1087 b. (cf. Z 27, 30): οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑνὶ [τῷ ἴσῳ] τὸ ἄνισον, ὡς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οὖσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ τὸ πλῆθος. Here Pseudo-Alexander refers only to the Pythagoreans, but Aristotle evidently alludes to Speusippus, for he continues: γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος, τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν. It is clear from what follows that he is concerned with the Platonists, for he expressly says that this determination was chosen because Plato’s Great-and-Small relates too exclusively to that which is in Space. Cf. also Metaphysics xiii. 9, 1085 a. 31 (vide infra, note 42), 6, 4 sqq.; xii. 10, 1075 b. 32, and probably the beginning of x.; xiv. 1, 1087 b. 30 sqq. According to Damascius, De Princip. p. 3 (οὐ γὰρ ἓν ὡς ἐλάχιστον καθάπερ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν), we might suppose that Speusippus had also denoted the One as the Least. But from Aristotle, Metaphysics xiv. 1, 1087 b. 30 sqq., we find that this cannot have been the case. Damascius, most likely, made a false deduction from that passage.
41^ Metaphysics vii. 2; vide supra, note 37. Following this precedent, and in agreement with Ravaisson (p. 37), Brandis (p. 10), Schwegler, and Bonitz (see their comments on the passage), we may consider Metaphysics xii. 10, 1075 b. 37, as applying to Speusippus, and not, as Pseudo-Alexander thinks, to the Pythagoreans. The words are: οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς. In that case we must also regard Metaphysics xiv. 3, 1090 b. 13, as a reference to him: ἔτι δὲ ἐπιζητήσειεν ἄν τις μὴ λίαν εὐχερὴς ὢν περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ παντὸς καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ μηθὲν συμβάλλεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον (μὴ ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθὲν ἧττον τὰ μεγέθη ἔσται τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον εἶναι φαμένοις, καὶ τούτων μὴ ὄντων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ αἰσθητά: οὐκ ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία). Cf. Schwegler in loc.
42^ Metaphysics iii. 9. Aristotle asks how spatial magnitudes are to be explained on the presupposition of Plato’s theory of numbers; and having discussed the derivation of the line from the Long-and-Short (vide supra, p. 519, 8), and the like, he proceeds (1085 a. 31), οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ μεγέθη γεννῶσιν ἐκ τοιαύτης ὕλης, ἕτεροι δὲ ἐκ τῆς στιγμῆς (ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐχ ἓν ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τὸ ἕν) καὶ ἄλλης ὕλης οἵας τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πλήθους. The fundamental opposition of the One and Plurality, from which this derivation starts, shows that it belongs to Speusippus.
44^ Aristotle often mentions the theory that mathematical numbers and magnitudes alone, with the exception of Ideas, exist apart from the Sensible. In Metaphysics xiii. 1, he specifies three opinions on this point: 1) The philosophers who discriminated the Ideas from mathematical numbers; 2) those who declared them to be the same; and 3) those who only allowed the existence of mathematical numbers (ἕτεροι δέ τινες τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον οὐσίας εἶναί φασι), either as undivided from the Sensible, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες (the Pythagoreans, not, as Susemihl thinks, Genet. Entw. ii. 520, 668, some Platonist unknown to us. The theory that mathematical number is the only number, and that it is not separated from the objects of sense, is adduced, c. 8, 1083 b. 8 sqq.; xiv. 3, 1090 a. 20 sqq., 30 sqq.; i. 6, 987 b. 27 sqq.; Physics, iii. 4, 203 a. 6, as; i distinctive doctrine of the Pythagoreans; Aristotle never attributes it to a Platonist), or κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οὕτω τινές). He then combats the two latter theories (c. 2); the second at p. 1076 b. 11 sqq. Aristotle also distinguishes (Metaphysics xiii. 6, 1080 b. 11) three different views among those who held numbers to be οὐσίαι χωρισταί; it is manifest, from the opening of the chapter, that he is speaking only of these, οἱ μὲν οὖν, he says, ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, … καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν: οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων, κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. (cf. Z 25 sqq.) καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ᾽ ἕνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον, and so forth; ἄλλος δέ τις τὸν πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἕνα εἶναι, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον εἶναι. (Further details presently.) The doctrine mentioned in the second passage is referred to in xiv. 2, at the end, where Aristotle opposes two theories: τῶ ἰδέας τιθεμένῳ and τῶ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον οὐκ οἰομένῳ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἐνούσας δυσχερείας ὁρᾶν περὶ τὰς ἰδέας … ποιοῦντι δὲ ἀριθμὸν τὸν μαθηματικόν. Of the latter he then says, οὐθενὸς γὰρ οὔτε φησὶν ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς αὐτήν τινα λέγει καθ᾽ αὑτὴν φύσιν οὖσαν, οὔτε φαίνεται ὢν αἴτιος (for neither does he who assumes this number maintain that it is the cause of anything, since he represents it as a self-subsistent essence; nor does it show itself to be so; the αὐτὸν εἶναι has to be completed by the αἴτιος that follows. See also xiv. 3, 1090 a. 20 sqq. The Pythagoreans held things to be themselves numbers, because they thought they discovered in them many numerical determinations: τοῖς δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐνδέχεται λέγειν κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο. Aristotle continues, in opposition to this view, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ μαθηματικά, and he repeats, in regard to its basis, οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες (that is to say, τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν) ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά. Cf. xiii. 9, 1086 a. 2: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἴδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν. From these he afterwards discriminates, οἱ δὲ τὰ εἴδη βουλόμενοι ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ποιεῖν and ὁ πρῶτος θέμενος τὰ εἴδη εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμοὺς τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ εἶναι. As to the philosophers who are to be credited with this doctrine, commentators are so undecided and contradictory (cf. Ravaisson, p. 29; Schwegler loc. cit.; Bonitz, Arist. Metaphysics ii. 544 sq.), that it is easy to see they are theorising on the basis of the passages in Aristotle, without any real knowledge of the matter. But we may, at any rate, gather from what has been quoted, that Aristotle is here concerned not with Pythagoreans (as Pseudo-Alexander believes, p. 1076 b. 19), but with Platonists. He describes the adherents of the doctrine in question clearly as such; for he says they were led to it by the difficulties of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas. He observes that they differ from the Pythagoreans in assuming numbers and magnitudes to exist apart from things (as Plato did with regard to his Ideas); and they make use of the same argument that Plato brought forward for the separation of Ideas from things (supra, p. 225 sq., p. 231 sq.), namely, that there could be no knowledge if the object of knowledge were not exalted above the Sensible (ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο, Metaphysics xiv. 3; vide supra). What Platonist it was who thus departed from the Ideas, and assumed transcendental and hypostasized numbers in their place we may infer from Metaphysics xii. 10, 1075 b. 37; xiv. 3, 1090 b. 13. We found that (on account of the parallel passage quoted in note 41) this passage could, only relate to Speusippus; so that the words οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν, and τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον εἶναι φαμένοις, must also point to him. We are reminded of him too in Metaphysics xiii. 8, 1083 a. 21, where a distinction is drawn between those who held Ideas to be numbers and ὅσοι ἰδέας μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὔτε ἁπλῶς οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμούς τινας οὔσας, τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς πρώτους τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν; and in xiv. 4, 1091 b. 22, where it is said that the identification of the One with the Good is beset with difficulties: στοιχεῖον ἀριθμῶν, ἀδύνατον. συμβαίνει γὰρ πολλὴ δυσχέρεια — ἣν ἔνιοι φεύγοντες ἀπειρήκασιν, οἱ τὸ ἓν μὲν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρώτην καὶ στοιχεῖον, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ. In this latter place especially (according to the proof given on p. 508) the reference to Speusippus is unmistakable. In the same manner the allusion to him in Z 32, διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἑνὶ, clearly refers to Z 22 sqq. Ravaisson rightly appeals (p. 30) to Metaphysics vii. 2, 1028 b. 21, 24, to show that Speusippus did not identify numbers with Ideas. Susemihl, loc. cit., agrees in this view of Speusippus’ doctrine; but thinks that the reference to him in xiii. 5, 1076 b. 11 sq. extends to Plato and Xenocrates as well. From c. 1, 1076 a. 22, compared with Z 32, it is, however, clear that Aristotle is only dealing with those who τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον οὐσίας εἶναί φασιν.
45^ Vide the quotations from Metaphysics xiv. 3, in the preceding note. Another argument, seemingly employed by Speusippus, is to be found in Metaphysics xiv. 3, 1090 b. 5 sqq.: cf. vii. 2, 1028 b. 15; iii. 5.
46^ Metaphysics xiii. 8, 1083 a. 20 sqq.
47^ Metaphysics xiii. 8, 1083 a. 20 sqq.
48^ Metaphysics xiii. 6, 1080 b. 23 (according to the quotation on p. 573): ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεά. xiv. 3, 1090 a. 35: οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες (τὸν ἀριθμὸν) … εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.
49^ In his work on the Pythagorean numbers according to Iamblichus, Theol. Arith. p. 62, he treats minutely περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γραμμικῶν (the numbers resulting from geometric proportions) πολυγωνίων τε καὶ παντοίων τῶν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ἐπιπέδων ἅμα καὶ στεῶν. We must here bear in mind that in the Greek mathematics of the Pythagoreans, arithmetic was wont to be expressed geometrically; we hear of plane and solid numbers, of quadratic, cubic, oblong, gnomonic, circular numbers, and so on. In the same treatise Speusippus (loc. cit. p. 63) attempts to prove that the number ten is contained in geometrical entities and figures: he finds, for example, one in the point; two in the line; three in the triangle, as the simplest plane; four in the pyramid, as the simplest cube: cf. vol. i. 349 sq. and supra, p. 331, 103, and p. 519, 8.
50^ Vide the fragment in the Theol. Arithm. loc. cit. and the extracts from it in the preceding note, Further details presently.
51^ Metaphysics p. 312 (Fr. 12, 11 Wimm.): νῦν δ’ οἵ γε πολλοὶ (of the Pythagoreans) μέχρι τινὸς ἐλθόντες καταπαύονται καθάπερ καὶ οἱ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ποιοῦντες the Platonists (and more particularly Plato, p. 519, 10).
52^ Diogenes iv. 4 sq. In this catalogue several of his known works are missing. Whether they are altogether omitted, or are quoted under other titles, we do not know. Among these are: the treatise on Pythagorean numbers (vide note 49), unless this is included in the Μαθηματικὸς (Proclus says, Eucl. 22, vide 77 Fr., that Speusippus called all geometrical propositions θεωρήματα); the treatise πρὸς Κλεοφῶντα (vide note 66), which perhaps may be identical with the πρὸς νομοθεσίας of Diogenes; περὶ φιλοσοφων (Diogenes ix. 23; cf. the (φιλοσοφος, iv. 4); and the Platonic discourses on the Good (Simplicius, Phys. 32 b. m. These can hardly be the ‘one book’ περὶ φιλοσοφίας which Diogenes describes). With regard to the Πλάτωνος περίδειπνον (vide p. 1, 1) Fischer, in his life of Speusippus, 38, conjectures that it may be the same as the Eulogy of Plato (p. 1, 1); since this might have assumed the form of a discourse at Plato’s funeral feast (or perhaps several such discourses), and the statements of Apuleius about Plato, which we derive from Speusippus, may have been taken from it. Among these, however, we can only reckon with certainty the quotations, p. 6, 5; and p. 44, 111. In Plutarch, Quaest. con v. Proem. 3, p. 612, we perhaps have a reference to this work. It is also possible that, as Hermann and Steinhart suppose (vide supra, p. 1, 1), the title περίδειπνον was incorrectly bestowed upon Speusippus’s treatise.
54^ I include the treatise περὶ ψυχῆς with the metaphysical works, as it seems to have been chiefly concerned with the World-soul (supra, note 38).
55^ Metaphysics iv. 5, 1092 a. 17: ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι … καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν μὲν ὅτι ποὺ ἔσται, τί δέ ἐστιν ὁ τόπος μή. As this observation is immediately preceded by a criticism on a doctrine of Speusippus, Ravaisson (44) and Brandis (ii. b. 1, 18) suppose that it refers to him. But there is no real connection between the two passages: Bonitz therefore thinks it may belong elsewhere — perhaps to Metaphysics xiii. 8, 9.
56^ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ποσὸν (Plutarch Plat, qu. viii. 4, 3, s. 1007). This definition leaves it uncertain whether the quantity of motion (properly, in the sphere of motion) is meant, or quantity which is in a state of motion (the motion of something contained in space).
57^ In the treatise on Pythagorean numbers, according to Theol. Arithm. p. 62, he writes, περὶ τῶν πέντε σχημάτων, ἃ τοῖς κοσμικοῖς ἀποδίδοται τε στοιχείοις, ίδιότητος αὐτῶν (this αὐτῶν should be omitted, or ίδιότητος τε αὐτῶν substituted) πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ κοινότητος ἀναλογίας τὲ καὶ ἀνακολουθίας (ἀκολουθίας or ἀντακολουθίας). Even were it possible, it is certainly not probable, that the words ἃ τοῖς κοσμικοῖς ἀποδίδοται τε στοιχείοις are merely a comment of Iamblichus. It appears, then, from this passage that Speusippus made the fire regular figures correspond with the five elements, thus departing from the original doctrine of Plato, like Xenocrates and the author of the Epinomis; and that, in agreement with Philolaus and the later form of Platonism, he considered Ether to be a fifth element (supra, p. 372, 21; 521, 14; and vol. i. 350 sq.).
58^ Olympiodorus, Commentary on the Phaedo. p. 98, Ludwig Finckh: trans.
60^ In Diogenes’ catalogue the treatises περὶ πλούτου,περὶ ἡδονῆς, δικαιοσύνης, περὶ φιλίας, πολίτης, περὶ νομοθεσίας, the Ἀρίστιππον, and probably other dialogues, relate to this subject.
61^ Cicero’s observation (vide note 24), which seems to refer chiefly to morality, is not binding upon us, as it originates with the Eclectic Antiochus. following whom Cicero maintained the perfect agreement of the older Peripatetics with Aristotle (De orat. iii. 18, 67; Acad. i. 4, 17 sq.; ii. 5, 15; Fin. iv. 2, 5, v. 3, 7, 8, 21; Legg. i. 13, 38; Offic. iii. 4, 20: cf. Krische, Forsch. 248 sq.). Similarly. Diogenes iv. 1, ἔμεινε μεν ἐπι αυτων Πλάτωνι δογμάτων, taken literally, would prove too much.
62^ Vide Clement, Stromata 418 D: "Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, says that happiness is a perfect state in those who conduct themselves in accordance with nature, or the state of the good: for which condition all men have a desire, but the good only attained to quietude; consequently the virtues are the authors of happiness." Cf. Cicero, Tusc. v. 10, 30: he regarded poverty, disgrace, and the like as evils, but taught that the wise man was always happy.
63^ Vide preceding note, and Plutarch Comm. not. 13, 1, p. 1065: οἱ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπευσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελὲς [who accuse Xenocrates and Speusippus for not reckoning health indifferent and riches useless.] Cicero, however, Legg. i. 13, 38, numbers them both among those who held that only the Laudable-in-itself was a magnum bonum. According to Cic. Tusc. v. 1 3, 39, and Seneca, Epist. 85, 18 sq. (vide infra, chap. xx. n. 71), they both maintained that virtue is of itself sufficient to give happiness, but added that happiness, to be perfect, requires other goods.
64^ Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, iv. vii. 14, beginning (Eustratius in Eth. Nic. 166 b. m. cannot be considered an original source); pain is an Evil, therefore pleasure must be a Good. ὡς γὰρ [5] Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, (that is to say, as follows) οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. Cf. x. 2, 1173 a, 5; vii. 12, 1152, b. 8; Gellius, K A. ix. 5, 4: Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia (this, doubtless, is an exaggeration) voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse, quod utriusque medium foret. It does not appear a legitimate inference from Eth. N. x. 2 that Speusippus in this discussion of pleasure was opposing Eudoxus (Krische, 249, 1; Brandis, 14, 36). As he wrote upon Aristippus, it is much more likely that he had the Cynic philosopher in view.
65^ A similar distinction, not, however, entirely coincident with the above, is employed by Plato with regard to the same question; vide Republic ix. 584 D sqq.
66^ Clement, Stromata, ii. 367 A: "Speusippus, in the first book against Cleophon, seems to write like Plato on this wise: ‘For if royalty be a good thing, and the wise man the only king and ruler, the law, which is right reason, is good’; which is the case." This argument, which was similarly employed by the Stoics’ (cf. Stobaeus, Ecl. ii. 190, 208), is probably directed against the Cynic contempt for law (Pt. i. 277, 3), and Speusippus, in the words "which is right reason," is indirectly referring to the opposite presupposition. The maxim that the wise man only is a ruler has not been handed down to us by express tradition as belonging to the Cynics, but it greatly resembles much that we do know of them, and it has an obvious connection with the Socratic doctrine. It is, therefore, very probable that the Stoics may have borrowed it from the Cynics (vide part i. p. 276 and p. 141, 1).
Chapter XV. The Older Academy. Xenocrates
Xenocrates resembled Speusippus in his strong predilection for Pythagoreanism1 and his high estimation of mathematics,2 and he developed the tendencies of Plato’s later works to an even greater extent than his predecessor. While arriving at a higher degree of systematic completeness, he did not, however, venture to abandon the original ground-work of Platonism so entirely as Speusippus had done in regard to Ideas: he was therefore in many respects a more genuine Platonist. As he was much longer at the head of the Platonic school, and was besides a very prolific writer,3 |582| we may justly consider him as the principal representative of the Old Academy.4 Unfortunately his doctrine is too imperfectly known to enable us to reproduce even its main characteristics with accuracy. We must therefore content ourselves with piecing together the traditions we possess, filling up the lacunae by such probable conjectures as we may.
Of the three divisions of Philosophy, which had already been employed by Plato, but were first expressly recognised by Xenocrates,5 Logic or Dialectic (the name is uncertain) must have included in the first place the theory of cognition, and the propaedeutic part of reasoning, to which he devoted numerous writings;6 secondarily, probably, discussions on genus and species, and the highest contradictories:7 while enquiries concerning ultimate principles8 might come under the head of Physics.9 That which is most distinctive in Xenocrates is his Theory of Knowledge. Plato divided knowledge first of all into the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of sense, subdividing the former into the higher dialectical, and the lower |583| mathematical cognition;10 and the latter into notion or envisagement (Vorstellung) and perception (Wahrnehmung). Xenocrates reckoned only three stages: Thought, Perception, and Envisagement. Thought, he said, is concerned with all that is beyond the heavens; Perception with the things in the heavens; Envisagement with the heavens themselves; for though they are beheld with the bodily eye in astronomy, they become the object of thought. The thinking-cognition guarantees knowledge; the sensible cognition is also true, but not to the same extent; in envisagement truth and falsehood are equally to be found.11 Accordingly, while Plato separated philosophic from mathematical thought, even that of pure mathematics, Xenocrates included both in his notion of knowledge, |584| and the object of both in his notion of the super-celestial;12 while Plato admitted no truth at all in the perception of sense, as distinct from thought, Xenocrates conceded to it a lesser amount of truth. According to Sextus, he treated this subject in a most confused manner, sometimes restricting envisagement to a definite sphere, sometimes speaking of it in an entirely general sense.13 Of his Logic we only know that (perhaps in opposition to Aristotle) he endeavoured to reduce all other categories to the Platonic distinction14 of the Absolute and the Relative.15 In the conception of his highest metaphysical principles, Xenocrates followed Plato; except that he made more constant use of arithmetical designations, and at the same time connected them more closely with theology. He declared Unity and Duality — Duality meaning here indeterminate Duality — to be the primary Causes; the former he identified with the Straight, the latter with the Crooked. He also called Unity the first or male divinity, the Father, Zeus, and Reason; Duality the female divinity, and the mother of the gods.16 Numbers, he said, resulted from the union of |585| these two;17 and he seems to have defined the relation of numbers to Ideas in such a manner that he neither, |586| like Plato, discriminated Ideas, as Ideal numbers, from mathematical numbers; nor, like Speusippus, abandoned the Ideas; but rather identified mathematical number itself with the Idea.18 Similarly with regard |587| to magnitudes, he desired to do away with the distinction of Ideal and mathematical without really abolishing either the one or the other.19 In the derivation of magnitudes he seems to have followed Plato:20 while endeavouring to reduce them to their primary elements, he arrived at the theory — which Plato had already approached,21 — that all figures ultimately originate out of the smallest, and consequently indivisible, lines.22 Thus he appears to have assumed in each |588| species of magnitudes an indivisible element; otherwise, he thought, the Ideas of the line, the triangle, etc., would not be the first in their kind: their parts would precede themselves.23 |589| Xenocrates derived the soul also from the two first |590| causes.24 In his appendix to the Timaeus he calls it a self-moved number:25 for the combination of unity with indefinite duality gives rise in the first place to number: when to this is added, in the Same and the Other, the first cause of permanence and of change, |591| there is imparted to number the faculty of rest and of motion.26 Whether the reason which Aristotle quotes27 for this definition may really be ascribed to Xenocrates is somewhat doubtful; and it is equally uncertain how far, like Plato in the Laws, he expressly connected the belief in a Divine Providence28 with the doctrine of the soul.
This doctrine Xenocrates seems to have applied in his Cosmology,29 by seeking to prove30 in the different parts of the world a graduated scale of animate life; and, in each individual soul, a specific combination of the highest principles of Unity and Duality.31 Thus we are told that he not only attributed a Divine nature to the heavens and the stars, and in this sense spoke of eight Olympian gods,32 but that he |592| acknowledged the Elements as Divine powers, and, like Prodicus,33 gave them the names of gods.34 This points to the notion that the soul permeates all parts of the cosmos and works in them all; a theory which is involved in his assertion35 that even the beasts have in them some instinct of the Divine.36 The part of the soul that rules in the heavens he seems to have denoted as the higher Zeus;37 the part that is at work |593| on the earth and in the terrestrial atmosphere, as the lower Zeus. But as in this inferior sphere evil is found side by side with good, and harm with beneficence, Xenocrates considers the world to be ruled not only by gods, but by daemons, who are intermediate between the divine perfection and human imperfection.38 In harmony with the popular faith, he makes two classes of daemons (a materialising exaggeration of the double World-soul in the Laws), the good and the bad. The bad might be propitiated with certain religious services, which Xenocrates does not connect with the worship of the good.39 He agrees, however, with some other |594| philosophers40 in describing the soul of man as his daemon.41 How far he combined the rest of the Greek divinities with his system we do not know.42
In regard to the material constituents of the universe Xenocrates carried out the same theory of a graduated scale of perfection. This appears in his view of the elements, in the derivation of which he seems to have resembled Plato, except that he made them originate, not immediately from planes, but, primarily from atoms,43 and, like Philolaus, reckoned |595| aether as a fifth primary Element.44 He included the higher elements (which Plato had also connected45) under the name of the Rare or Subtle, as opposed to the lowest element, which he denominated the Dense. This latter, he said, is sometimes in greater proportion, sometimes in less, and unites itself variously with the other elements. The stars and the sun consist of fire and the first density; the moon of her own atmosphere and the second density; the earth, of fire, water, and the third density.46 He guarded himself, however, against the assertion of a beginning of the world in time; and he viewed the Timaeus, and its account of the creation of the soul and of the universe, not as giving a chronological statement, but as showing the different constituents of the universe and of the soul in their reciprocal relations.47 A definition of Time which inclines to |596| the Platonic theory,48 and a system of Astronomy not very well authenticated,49 are all that remain to us of the Physics of Xenocrates, except the following psychological theorems: — that the soul is a purely spiritual essence50 and can exist apart from the body;51 that Reason originates from without (that is, from a previous state of existence52), and that even the irrational part of the soul is immortal.53 Whether Xenocrates extended the |597| souls of animals is not mentioned, but, as he ascribed to them a consciousness of God,54 this is at least probable. He forbade the eating of flesh, — not because he saw in beasts something akin to man, but, for the opposite reason, lest the irrationality of animal souls might thereby gain an influence over us.55 He seems to have considered the head to be the seat of reason, and the irrational part of the soul to be diffused, throughout the whole body.56
Xenocrates, as may be imagined, bestowed special attention on ethics;57 the importance of his personal instruction lay principally in this direction, and out of the whole number of his works more than half is devoted to ethical enquiries. We hear of writings on the Good, the Useful, the Pleasant, on Happiness, Wealth, Death, Freewill, the Affections, the nature and teachableness of Virtue, Justice, Equity, Wisdom, Truth, Holiness, Temperance, Courage, Liberality, Concord, Friendship, Domestic Economy, the extended the privilege of immortality to the |598| State, Law, Kingship.58 Thus there is scarcely any department of ethics of which he has not treated; yet, despite this extensive authorship, our knowledge even of his ethical doctrines is very small. We cannot, however, mistake the tendency of his morality, which, in all essential points, was in harmony with that of Plato and the rest of the Academy. All things, according to Xenocrates, are either goods or evils, or neither of the two.59 Goods he divided, like the other Platonists, into those of the soul, the body, and the outer life;60 but the highest and most important of goods he declared to be Virtue. Though, in agreement with the whole Academy,61 he denied virtue to be the only good, he so distinctly gave it the preference62 that Cicero says he despised |599| everything else in comparison.63 External and material goods, — health, honour, prosperity, and the like, — were placed by him in the second rank. He would have them, indeed, regarded as advantageous things, or goods, and their opposites as evils;64 the Stoical view, which reckoned both as alike indifferent, being entirely alien to him.65 It was only as compared with the higher goods and ills that these lesser seemed to him unworthy of consideration. In his conception of the highest good, Xenocrates was therefore forced to include all other goods together with Virtue. Happiness, according to his theory, consists in the perfection of all |600| natural activities and conditions;66 in the possession of human virtue proper, and all the means conducing to it. Virtue alone produces happiness; noble activities and qualities alone constitute the essential nature of happiness, yet happiness cannot be complete without material and external goods,67 which are thus, to use a Platonic expression,68 to be considered not indeed as primary, but as concomitant causes of happiness. For this very reason, however, virtue stands alone as the proper and positive condition of happiness; the virtuous life must be identified with the happy life;69 the wise man must under any circumstances be counted happy.70 That he should not be perfectly happy,71 in the absence |601| of goods of the second order, would be incomprehensible from the Stoic point of view; but it entirely accords with the moderation of the Academy, and with the Xenocratic notion of Happiness. For if the possession of happiness is linked to the convergence of several conditions, it will be more or less perfect, according as these conditions are more or less completely present: happiness will be capable of increase and diminution; a distinction is at once allowed between the happy and the happiest life.
How strong was the conviction of Xenocrates that virtue alone could make men happy, may be seen from the stainlessness and austerity of his character,72 and from the few further particulars that we possess with regard to his theory of morals. To free ourselves from the bondage of sensuous life, to conquer the Titanic element in human nature by means of the Divine, is our problem.73 Purity not only in actions, but also in |602| the wishes of the heart, is our duty.74 To this end Philosophy is our best help, for the philosopher has this advantage,75 that he does voluntarily what others must be compelled to do by law.76 Plato, however, had admitted an unphilosophical virtue, side by side with Philosophy, and Xenocrates still more distinctly emphasized the difference between the theoretic and practical spheres. Like Aristotle, he restricted Wisdom or Science to intellectual activity, and left practical conduct to prudence or discernment.77 Of his numerous ethical treatises scarcely any fragments have been preserved;78 but we cannot doubt his general |603| agreement on these subjects with the Academy.79 Of the contents of his political works, and of his discussions on Rhetoric and other kindred themes,80 only a few unimportant81 particulars are known.
Endnotes
1^ Cf. Iamblicus, Theology of Arithmetic p. 61, g. E: "Speusippus, the son of Plato’s sister Potone, and head of the Academy before Xenocrates, compiled a polished little book from the Pythagorean writings which were particularly valued at any time, and especially from the writings of Philolaus."
2^ The importance he attached to this science is shown by his numerous and apparently comprehensive treatises on Mathematics and Astronomy. Cf. the titles ap. Diogenes iv. 13 sq.: Λογιστικῶν (9 books), τὰ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα (6 books), περὶ γεωμετρῶν, περὶ ἀριθμῶν θεωρία, περὶ διαστημάτων, τὰ περὶ ἀστρολογίαν, περὶ γεωμετρίας. The Πυθαγόρεια may have contained some mathematical elements. He is said to have dismissed a pupil, ignorant of mathematics, as wholly unprepared for philosophy (λαβας ουκ εχεις φιλοσοφιας): Plutarch Virt. Mor. C 12 end, p. 542; Diogenes 10, alibi; Krische, Forsch. p. 317.
3^ V. Diogenes iv. 11 sqq., and Wynpersse ad loc. 190 sq., 197 sqq. The life of Plato is not mentioned (cf. on it p. 337, 1), nor the treatise περι της απο των ζωων τροφης (Clement, Stromata vii. 717 D), unless contained in the Πυθαγόρεια. The satires mentioned in Apuleius, Floril. iv. 20, should perhaps be ascribed to Xenophanes (Diogenes ii. speaks of επη); and the treatise περι της Πλάτωνος πολιτειας (Suidas Zenocrates) may be identical with that περι πολιτειας in Diogenes. Whether the work περι ταγαθου (v. p. 26, 53) is the Platonic discourse edited by Xenophon (Simplicius Phys. 32 b. m.) cannot be decided.
4^ So in Simplicius loc. cit. he is called ο γνησιωτατος των Πλάτωνος ακροατων.
6^ Cf. Cicero, Academy ii. 46, 143; and the titles περὶ σοφίας, περὶ φιλοσοφίας, περὶ ἐπιστὴμης, περὶ ἐπιστὴμοσύνης, περὶ του ψευδους, τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν (twice), περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, λύσις των περι τους λόγους, λύσεις περὶ μαθημάτων, τῶν περὶ τὴν λέξιν, της περι το διαλεγεσθαι πραγματείας, and περὶ μαθητων, unless this is a mistake arising out of μαθημάτων.
7^ περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν, περὶ εἰδῶν (unless this title is equivalent to that of περὶ ἰδεῶν) ἐναντίου α.
8^ Writings περὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου, περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, περὶ ταγαθου, περὶ ἰδεῶν, περὶ αριθμων.
9^ If (which is not certain) he carried out the division so strictly. He may have enunciated it generally, without having assigned its place to each single investigation in one of the three parts.
11^ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, vii. 147: "Xenocrates says that there are three forms of existence, the sensible, the intelligible, and the composite and opinable; and of these the sensible is that which exists within the Heaven, and the intelligible that which belongs to all things outside the Heaven, and the opinable and composite that of the Heaven itself; for it is visible by sense but intelligible by means of astronomy. This, then, being the condition of things, he declared that the criterion of the existence which is outside the Heaven and intelligible is knowledge; and the criterion of that which is within the Heaven and sensible is sense; and the criterion of the mixed kind is opinion. And of these generally the criterion afforded by the cognitive reason is both firm and true, and that by sense is true indeed but not so true as that by the cognitive reason, while the composite kind shares in both truth and falsehood; for opinion is partly true and partly false. Hence, too, we have by tradition three Fates — Atropos, the Fate of things intelligible, she being unchangeable, and Clotho of things sensible, and Lachesis of things opinable." This division of the Actual seems to be referred to by Theophrastus (Metaphysics p. 313; Fr. 12, 12, Wimm.; after the words quoted p. 858, 2): ουτος γαρ απαντα πως περιτιθησι περι τον κόσμον, ομοιως αισθητα και νοητα και μαθηματικά, και ετι δη τα θεια. Μαθηματικά here must mean the ουρανια or the object of astronomy: the θεια, only added incidentally by Theophrastus, form no separate class, but, as we shall see presently, are found in the three others, so far as they are treated from a theological point of view.
12^ This expression resembles the υπερουράνιος τόπος, Phaedrus 247 c.; the comparison of pure mathematical knowledge with philosophical knowledge corresponds with the comparison of the mathematical numbers with the Ideas, etc.; see below.
13^ The former, when he assigned to it the heavenly element as its peculiar province; the latter, when he represented the opposition of truth and error in notions or envisagmements as the combination of thought and perception, by an application of the Platonic principle (see 172, 6; 209, 102); that both spring from the combination of notions.
15^ Simplicius, Categories γ. b. 6; Schol. in Aristotle 47 b. 25: οι γαρ περι Ξενοκράτην και Άνδρόνικον πάντα τω καθ’ αυτο και τω πρός τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκουσιν, ωστε περιττον ειναι κατ’ αυτους τοσουτο των γενων πληθος.
16^ Stobaeus Eclogues i. 62: Ξενπκρατης την μονάδα και την δυάδα θεους, την μεν ως αρρενα πατρος εχουσαν ταξιν, εν ουρανω βασιλεύουσαν, ηντινα προσαγορεύει και Ζηνα και περιττον και νουν, οστις εστιν αυτω πρωτος θεος. Την δε ως θηλειαν, μητρος θεων δικην της υπο τον ουρανον ληξεως ηγουμένην, ητις εστιν αυτω ψυχη του παντός. (The latter, if correct, shows great confusion; Xenocrates, as we shall find later on, considered the soul to be a number; and duality is the one element of every number and also of the soul-number; see below). It is possible that Xenocrates, like the Pythagoreans in their numerical analogies, did not avoid this confusion, at least in expression. Philolaus had already designated duality as Rhea, mother of the gods; the Pythagoreans gave the same name to the central fire: see vol. i. 337, 1; 356, 4. This evidence justifies us in ascribing to Xenocrates, out of the different determinations of the Platonists as to the first principles (see 322, 83), those which placed unity and the indefinite dyad at the head. Theophrastus says (see p. 576, 51 and 583, 11) that he went further than all others in the derivation of the individual from these two principles; and Plutarch an. procr. 2, 1 (see note 26), says that he represented numbers and the soul, so far as it is a number, as springing from them. The opposite of unity and the indefinite dyad was understood in two ways. Some understood the principle opposed to unity as the Unlike or the Great-and-Small, interpreting in this way the δυας αοριστος Metaphysics xiv. 1, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον ὡς ἕν τι, τὴν δυάδα δὲ ἀόριστον ποιοῦντες μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, cf. p. 1087a. 7 sqq.). Others spoke only of the unit and the indefinite dyad, without referring this concept to the Unlike (ibid. c. 2, 1088 b. 28: εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ δυάδα μὲν ἀόριστον ποιοῦσι τὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς στοιχεῖον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄνισον δυσχεραίνουσιν εὐλόγως διὰ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα). Perhaps this was the doctrine of Xenocrates. He may have put the ἀόριστον for duality; a treatise of his περὶ του ἀόριστου is mentioned (Diogenes 11): according to Plutarch loc. cit. he called it still more indefinitely plurality, if Plutarch gives his own words. In order to denote the flux of all corporeal things, he made use of the expression rb ddvvaov. perhaps with reference to the well-known Pythagorean verse (see vol. i. 342 b.). Cf. Stobaeus Eclogues i. 294: Ξενπκρατης συνεσταναι το παν εκ του αενναου, αενναον την υλην αινιττομενος δια του πλήθους [το πλήθος]. Theodoret. cur. gr. aff. iv. 12, p. 57: Ξενπκρατης αενναον την υλην εξ ης απαντα γεγονε προσηγόρευσεν.
17^ He expressly explained, however, that this process is not to be conceived as a temporal origin. Ps.-Alex. ad Metaphysics xiv. 4, 1091 a. 27 refers to him the remark of Aristotle in this passage, that the γεννῆσις των ἀριθμὸν is clearly set forth not merely του θεωρηγαι ενεκεν, and this is made still more credible by the fact that Xenocrates availed himself of the same expedient in his Psychogony; cf. p. 595.
18^ Of the different developments of the doctrine of numbers in Aristotle (see p. 573, 44), that given above probably belongs to Xenocrates: cf. Ravaisson (Speusippus plac. p. 30) and Brandis (ii. b. 1, p. 16) with Metaphysics xiii. b. 1080 b. 23 sqq., where, after the quotation p. 573, Aristotle continues: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεά. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ μαθηματικὰ (sc. μήκη, etc.) καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας (the Platonic view, that mathematical magnitudes are different from Ideal magnitudes, the consequents of the Ideas; see p. 519) τῶν δὲ ἄλλως λεγόντων οἱ μὲν τὰ μαθηματικὰ καὶ μαθηματικῶς λέγουσιν, ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι τὰς ἰδέας ἀριθμοὺς μηδὲ εἶναί φασιν ἰδέας, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ μαθηματικῶς δέ: οὐ γὰρ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε μέγεθος πᾶν εἰς μεγέθη, οὔθ᾽ ὁποιασοῦν μονάδας δυάδα εἶναι (not all unities, when taken two together, produce dualities). In denying that all magnitudes can be resolved into other magnitudes, Xenocrates’ doctrine of indivisible lines can scarcely be mistaken. This assertion is attributed to those who do not wish either to put aside Ideal magnitudes with Speusippus, or to distinguish them from mathematical magnitudes with Plato. These are clearly the persons who treat Ideal number in relation to mathematical in a similar way; and we have therefore every reason to refer both these views to Xenocrates. This supposition is substantiated by the quotation from Sextus, p. 538, 11. According to the fundamental principle that the degrees and forms of knowledge depend upon the object (see p. 225; p. 331, 103), Plato distinguished mathematical knowledge from philosophic knowledge, just as he distinguished mathematical numbers and magnitudes from Ideal. If Xenocrates yielded the first distinction he must be supposed to have done so with the second, making Ideas and mathematical things equal. Both in their coincidence form the super-sensuous world, τα εκτος ουρανου; they comprehend that super-celestial place, in which Plato placed the Ideas only. The coincidence of the mathematical element with the Ideas is mentioned by Aristotle, Metaphysics xiii. 8, 1083 b. 1; ibid. c. 9, 1086 a. 5; xiv. 3, 1090 b. 27; and vii. 2, 1028 b. 24, where Asclep. Schol. in Ar. 741 a. 5, sees a reference to Xenocrates. He remarks, xiii. 9, that this form of the doctrine virtually does away with mathematical numbers, even if they are recognised nominally. Ps.-Alex. ad Metaphysics 1080 b. 11; 1083 b. 1; 1086 a. 2, connects the view of Xenocrates about numbers with that of Speusippus, and attributes to the former the denial of Ideal numbers, and to the latter the identification of Ideal with mathematical numbers. Contradictory as this statement is, it cannot demand consideration as opposed to the statements of Aristotle. "What were the views of the genuine Alexander it is hard to say. According to Syrianus ad Metaphysics 1080 b. 14 (Schol. in Aristotle Supplem. 902 a. 4), he had the following words relating to Speusippus (supra, p. 573): οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ., referring to τους περι Ξενοκράτην οι χωρίζουσι μὲν τὸν μαθηματικόν (sc. ἀριθμὸν), των αισθητων, ου μεντοι μονον ειναι νομίζουσι. This, however, stands in such absolute contradiction with the statement of Aristotle which it is intended to explain, that it cannot be attributed to Alexander; it seems more likely that Syrianus made the addition, οι χωρίζουσι, κ.τ.λ., in his own name, to correct Alexander.
20^ Metaphysics xiv. 3. Aristotle, in the words quoted (p. 519, 8), seems to mean Xenocrates; in any case, the words must partly hold good of him, for (Z 31) he continues: οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν (the same objection which he elsewhere makes to Xenocrates, see previous note) οἱ δὲ πρῶτοι δύο τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ποιήσαντες, τόν τε τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικόν ἄλλον, etc., Themistius De anima i. 2 (ii. 21, 7 Sp.) concludes his elucidation of the passage quoted, 329, 98, in agreement with the statements of Aristotle, with the words: ταῦτα δὲ απαντα λαβεῖν ἔστιν εκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως Ξενοκράτους.
22^ This striking assertion is frequently ascribed to Xenocrates; see Prod, in Timaeus 215 F; Alex, ad Metaphysics 992 a. 19; 1083 b. 8; Themistius Phys. f. 18; i. 122, 13 sqq. Sp.; Simpl.ciusPhys. 30 a. o. u. b. u. 114. b.; De Caelo, 252 a. 42. K (Schol. in Aristotle 510 a. 35); ibid. 294 a. 22; Philoponus Phys. B 16 u.; C 1 o.; M 8 m. (Schol. in Ar. 366 b. 17), who disputes that this was actually the doctrine of Xenocrates. Schol. in Aristotle 323 b. 41; 334 a.: 36 b. 2; 469 b. 16; 25,515 a. 13. Syrian Schol. in Aristotle Suppl. 902 b. 21 sq. According to some of these evidences, the Aristotelian treatise (see vol. ii. b. 64, 1, 2nd edit.), attributed by others 10 Theophrastus, on the indivisible lines was directed against him, and to him it is conjectured belong the grounds for the supposition set forth in the beginning (968 b. 21). One of these (968 a. 9, see following nt.) expressly depends on the doctrine of Ideas; a second (Z 14). perhaps, is connected with the Platonic doctrine of the elements. However, it was not merely this doctrine of the elements which led Xenocrates to his theory; according to Aristotle Metaphysics i. 9, 992 a. 10-22; xiii. 6 (see p. 586, 18), it seems, like the corresponding Platonic statements previously, to have been laid down first in the metaphysical construction of spatial magnitudes. In Phys. vi. 2, 223 b. 15 sqq. Aristotle probably had Xenocrates in his mind, although he does not mention him; Themistius, Philoponus and Simpl. loc. cit. ad Phys. i. 3, 187 a. 1, according to Alex. and Porphyry, refer partly to him and partly to Plato. These passages, however, seem to relate equally to the Atomists. From the passage De anima i. 4 end — where it is remarked against Xenocrates that if the soul were supposed to be a number, and the units contained in this number were identical with the points in the body, no separation of the soul from the body would be imaginable, ει γε διαιρουνται αι γραμμαι εις στγμά — no conclusion can be arrived at with regard to the peculiar doctrines of Xenocrates: the subject here under discussion is merely the generally acknowledged principle, that lines are not composed of points and are not to be resolved into points. Of course it is in itself possible, although Aristotle loc. cit. 409 a. 3 rather seems to contradict it, that Xenocrates held the same views as Plato on this point (see p. 519, 8).
23^ Cf. two passages of Aristotle: De insec. lin. 968 a. 9, where one of the first reasons for the supposition of indivisible lines is: ει εστιν ιδεα γραμμης, η δ’ ιδεα πρωτν των συνωνύμων, τα δε μερη πρότερα του ολου την φυσιν, διαιρετη αν ειη αυτη η γραμμη, τον αυτον δε τρόπον και το τετράγωνον και το τριγωνον και τα αλλα σχήματα, και ολου επίπεδον αυτο και σωμα · συμβήσεται γαρ [? perhaps αρα] πρότερ αττα ειναι τουτων. {Note: "The idea that there are indivisible lines offers an alternative to the view that any extended magnitude must be divisible to infinity." ~ Sylvia Berryman} Gen. et corr. i. 2, 316 a. 10: the atoms of Democritus are far more conceivable than the smallest triangles of the Timaeus. Ἴδοι δ’ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἄτομα εἶναι μεγέθη οἱ μέν φασιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτρίγωνον πολλὰ ἔσται, Δημόκριτος δ’ ἂν φανείη οἰκείοις καὶ φυσικοῖς λόγοις πεπεῖσθαι (which Philoponus ad loc. 7 a. m. explains, without knowing whether it refers to Plato himself or to his scholars). The assertion, that without the supposition of indivisible magnitudes, the Ideas of the line, of the triangle, etc., must be divisible, is less suited to Plato himself than for Xenocrates. The former had, in the separation of the Ideal and mathematical magnitudes, the means of avoiding this conclusion; he could conveniently distinguish Ideal magnitudes from mathematical by means of their indivisibility, just as he distinguished Ideal numbers from mathematical by means of their inconnectibility. Xenocrates, on the other hand, who identified the ideal and the mathematical, was debarred from this expedient. It is, however, expressly (Syrianus, Scholia in Aristotle Suppl. 902 b. 22 sq.) said of him: την αυτογραμμην (cf. the αυτη η γραμμη of the treatise περι ατομων γραμμ.) ουκ ηνείχετο τέμνεσθαι ουδε τας κατα τους μέσους λόγους της ψυχης (see p. 348 sq.) ορωμένας γραμμάς. Now, the treatise on the indivisible lines supposes a special discussion on this subject; we can only ascribe it to Xenocrates and not to Plato; it therefore seems most probable that Xenocrates was the first to express and maintain the supposition of indivisible magnitudes. Cf. Porphyry ap. Simpl. Phys. 30 a. u.: οί δε περι Ξενοκράτην την μεν πρώτην ακολουθιαν (of the people of Elea) υπειναι συνεχώρουν, τουτεστιν οτι ει εν εστι το ον και αδιαίρετον εσται. ου μην αδιαίρετον ειναι το ον. Διο πάλιν μηδε ενμόνον το ον αλλα πλείω. Διαιρετον μέντοι μη επ απειρον ειναι αλλ εις ατομά τινα καταλήγειν. ταυτα μέντοι μη ατομα ειναι· ως αμερη και ελάχιστα, αλλα κατα μεντο ποσον και την υλην τμητα και μέρη εχοντα, τω δε ειδει ατομα και πρωτα πρωτας τινας υποτιθέμενος ειναι γραμμας ατόμους και τα εκ τουτων επίπεδα και στερεα πρωτα. Here the assertion that the indivisible magnitudes of Xenocrates are not intended to be indivisible in space, is probably an explanation of Porphyry himself, with just as little historical value as the expedient which even Simplicius (30 a. below) availed himself of injustifiable wonder at the unmathematical principle of so mathematical a man as Xenocrates. But Xenocrates did probably represent the first surfaces and bodies as indivisible (with the words at the end of the predicate ατομα is to be supplied from what precedes). Stobaeus attributes to him the doctrine of indivisible bodies, when he compares him with Diodorus (see Pt. i. p. 228), who supposed only such, but not indivisible lines (Ecl. i. 350: Ξενοκράτης και Διόδωρος αμερη τα ελάχιστα ωρίζοντο), and i. 368 (see 875, 4) says of him, that he forms the elements out of the smallest bodies. Finally, Aristotle, De caelo, iii. 8, 307 a. 20, seems to refer to Xenocrates where he objects to the Platonic doctrine of the elements that if the tetrahedron must become warm and burn because of its angles, the same must be the case with the mathematical bodies, ἔχει γὰρ κἀκεῖνα γωνίας, καὶ ἔνεισιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄτομοι καὶ σφαῖραι καὶ πυραμίδες, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἄτομα μεγέθη, καθάπερ φασίν. By these ατομα μεγέθη he must mean not merely indivisible lines; or we get indivisible spheres and pyramids among mathematical figures, and have to understand not the Atomists, but the Platonists as intended; it is only they who attribute a self-subsisting existence to mathematical bodies. The point of Aristotle’s objection is that mathematical atoms (the ατομα μεγέθη of Xenocrates) must have elementary qualities just as much as the physical atoms. As we may see in Heraclides and Eudoxus, it was only a short step, from Plato’s doctrine of the elements to Atomistic.
24^ What follows, and the quotation pp. 348, 355; p. 365, 5 seem to have occurred in the treatise on the soul (Diogenes iv. 13). Xenocrates did not write a regular commentary on the Timaeus, as might be supposed from the quotations in Plutarch and Proclus; Proclus in Timaeus 24 A expressly calls Crantor ὁ πρωτος του Πλάτωνος εξηγητής. In the fifth book of his Physics, however, as Themistius De an. i. 4, 5, p. 56, 10 sqq., 59, 19 sqq., Speng. remarks, Xenocrates thoroughly explained his views on the soul.
25^ De anima i. 2, 404 b. 27: some lay stress upon the moving power in the concept of the soul; others, e.g. Plato, upon the capacity of knowledge, while they compose it out of the elements of things in order that it may be able to know everything: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ’ ἑαυτόν. Aristotle then returns to this definition c. 4, 408 b. 32, in order to subject it to a searching criticism. He quotes the same definition Anal. post. ii. 4, 91 a. 35 again, without mentioning its author. That it was not propounded by Plato is clear from the first of these passages; and that it belongs to no one else than Xenocrates is clear from Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo c. i. 5, p. 1012: Ξενοκράτης … τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἀποφηνάμενος. Proclus in Timaeus 190 D (Ξενοκράτην … λέγων κατ’ ἀριθμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴ οὐσίαν). Alex, in Topica, 87 m. 211 o. 238 m.; Simplicius De Anima 7 a. u. 16, b. u.; Themistocles loc. cit. (cf. previous note) and Anal. post. i. 2, p. 68, 12; Sp. Philoponus De Anima A 15 o. B 4 o. 16 m. C 5 o., E 11 m.; Anal. post. 78 b. m.; Schol. in Aristotle 232 b. 38; Macrobius Somn. i. 14; Stobaeus Ecl. ii. 794, who represents the definition as originating with Pythagoras (so Nemes. nat. horn. p. 44), of course without justification. Iambi, apud Stobaeus ii. 862: ως δ’ αυτοκινητικον [ψυχην] Ξενοκράτην. Cicero, Tusc. i. 10, 20: Xenocrates animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse ullum, numerum dixit esse, cuius vis, ut iam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxuma esset. Andronicus apud Themistius De Anima p. 59 Sp. understands Xenocrates’ definition as expressing merely the fact that the soul by its own agency (κινων εαυτον) effects the combination of matter into the organic body, which results in definite numerical relations. He therefore identifies the definition with the denotation of the soul as harmony of its body. This meaning is improbable, and unsupported either by Aristotle’s opposition and criticism of the definition, or the precedent of Plato’s Timaeus.
26^ Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo c. i. 5, p. 1012: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας: ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐπιτιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. … τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι: τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ. τοῦ δὲ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγέντων, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι, μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ἱστάναι καὶ ἵστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν.
27^ Anal. Post. loc. cit.: Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦ ἀντιστρέφειν δεικνύντες τί ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἄλλο οτιουν των οντων, τὸ εξ αρχης αιτουνται, οιον ει τις αξιώσ ειε ψυχην εἶναι τὸ αὑτὸ αυτω αιτιον του ζην, τουτο δ’ αριθμον αυτον αυτον κινουντα.
28^ This we should attribute to him, even apart from Plutarch Comm. note 22, 3, p. 1069.
29^ It has been already remarked, p. 577, 51; and p. 583, 11, on the authority of Theophrastus, that he entered into more detail on this subject than any other Platonist. To this belong the treatises φυσικη ακρόασις (6 books), and τα περι αστρολογίαν (6 books), further π. θεων (see note 32).
30^ This latter point seems to come from the passage of Theophrastus, just mentioned; but how it was worked out we cannot say.
31^ Speusippus, as we have seen, on the contrary, represented the universe as developing itself from incompleteness to completeness.
32^ Stobaeus, Eclogues i. 62, after the quotation in note 16: θεὸν (al. θεῖον) δε ειναι και τον ουρανον και τους αστερας πυρώδεις ολυμπίους θεους και ετερους υποσελήνους, δαίμονας αορατους αρέσκεται [-ω] (here follows a slight lacuna, which Krische, Forsch. 323 fills up with the words θεων θυνάμεις; better, perhaps, θείας ειναι δυνάμεις) και ενδιοικειν τοις υλικοις στοιχειοις. τούτων δε την μὲν (lacuna: supply δια του αερος Ἥραν) προσαγορεύει, την δε δια Ποσειδωνα, την δε δια της γης φυτοσπόρον Δήμητραν. Ταυτα δε (adds the narrator) χορηγήσας τοις Στωϊκοις τα πρότερα παρα του Πλάτωνος εταπέφρακεν. Cicero N.D. i. 13, 34 (following Philodemus): Xenocrates … in cujus libris, qui sunt de natura Deorum (π. Θεων α’ β’ Diogenes 13), nulla species divina describitur: Deos enim octo esse dicit; quinque eos, qui in stellis vagis nominantur; unum qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandns Deus (perhaps a reference to the Orphic mythus of Zagreus); septimum solem adjungit, octavumque lunam. Clement, Protrepticus 44 A: Ξενοκράτης ῾Καλχηδόνιος οὗτος᾿ ἑπτὰ μὲν θεοὺς τοὺς πλανήτας, ὄγδοον δὲ [p. 150] τὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἀπλανῶν 7 συνεστῶτα κόσμον αἰνίττεται.. Xenocrates undoubtedly, like Plato (see p. 38-3 sq.), imagined the stars to be animated.
34^ Cf. nt. 2. These elementary gods are not to be confounded, as Krische, Forsch, p. 322 sq. shows, with the demons of the nether world. Xenocrates, with Plato and the Orphics, draws a definite distinction between demons and gods (see p. 593, 38), and would not have attributed to the former the names of the greater gods.
35^ Connected with the popular belief in the possibility of divination from many animals.
36^ Clement, Strom, v. 590 c.: "There was always a natural manifestation of the one Almighty God, among all right-thinking men; and the most, who … apprehended the eternal beneficence in divine providence. In fine, then, Xenocrates the Chalcedonian was not quite without hope that the notion of the Divinity existed even in the irrational creatures."
37^ Plutarch Plat. qu. ix. 1, 2, p. 1007: Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὕπατον καλεῖ, νέατον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην. Clement, Strom. v. 604 C: "Xenocrates the Chalcedonian, who mentions the supreme Zeus and the inferior Zeus, leaves an indication of the Father and the Son." This denotation refers partly to the υπάτη and νήτη. the highest and lowest string, with which the corresponding parts of the universe might be compared, according to the Pythagorean conception of the harmony of the spheres (Krische, 316, 324, whose further conjectures, attractive as they are, I cannot follow. The supposition of a Ζευς μέσος corresponding to the μέση of the strings, which Ζευς, according to what will be cited note 46, could he placed only in the region of the moon, is forbidden by the position cf the universe. This position is entirely distinct from that of the μέση. Again, to attribute to the elements a soul of the lowest kind, a mere εξις, is not conformable to their divine nature), partly to the Orphic designation of Pluto as Ζευς νέατος (Brandis, p. 24, with reference to Lobeck Aglaoph. 1098). The meaning of that expression can hardly be other than the one supposed in the text; by the soul of Zeus Plato meant the soul of the universe (see p. 200, 122, p. 187, 172); with him Xenocrates looks upon the collective divine souls as one soul. Plato, Laws, x. 898 D, immediately concludes the animation and divinity of the stars from the rule of the soul in the universe.
38^ Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride c. 25, p. 360: (δαιμόνων μεγάλων) οὓς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας; καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἑπόμενοι τοῖς πάλαι θεολόγοις, ἐρρωμενεστέρους μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγουσι καὶ πολὺ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγὲς οὐδ᾽ ἄκρατον ἔχοντας. Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum c. 13, p. 416: παράδειγμα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ Ξενοκράτης μὲν ὁ Πλάτωνος; ἑταῖρος ἐποιήσατο τὸ τῶν τριγώνων, θείῳ μὲν ἀπεικάσας: τὸ ἰσόπλευρον θνητῷ δὲ τὸ σκαληνὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἰσοσκελὲς δαιμονίῳ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον πάντῃ τὸ δ᾽ ἄνισον πάντῃ , τὸ δὲ πῆ μὲν ἴσον πῆ δ᾽ ἄνισον, ὥσπερ ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν. For the facts cf. Plato, Symposium 202 D, etc.
39^ Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum c. 17, p. 419: φαύλους δαίμονας … ἀπέλιπεν … καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride c. 26: 6 ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν, ὅσαι πληγάς τινας ἢ κοπετοὺς ἢ νηστείας ἢ δυσφημίας: ἢ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαιμόνων οἴεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι (the atmosphere around the earth) μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυράς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐθὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται.
40^ E.g. Heraclitus and Democritus; see vol. i. 590, 5; 748, 1: Plato, see p. 501.
41^ Aristotle, Topics ii. 6, 112 a. 37: Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα, which Alex. Top. 94 m. repeats. Cf. Stobaeus, Sermons 104, 24: Ξενοκράτης ελεγεν, ως το κακοπρόσωπον αισχει προσώπου … ουτω δαίμονος κακία τους πονηρους κακοδαίμονας ονομάζομεν. Krische, p. 321, I think too artificially, brings these tenets into connection with the supposition that the souls freed from bodies are δαίμονες.
42^ From Iamblichus V. Pyth. 7 we might conclude that in all points he followed the usual opinion. The passage runs thus: παραιτητέοι γαρ Έπιμενίδης και Ευδοξος και Ξενοκράτης, υπονοουντες, τη Παρθενίδι (the mother of Pythagoras) τοτε μιγηναι τον Άπόλλω και κύουσαν αυτην εκ μη ουτως εχούης καταστησαι τε και προαγγειλαι δια της προφήτιδος, which, however, is quite incredible. We must know more precisely what Xenocrates said, and whether or not he mentioned the Apolline origin of Pythagoras merely as a tradition. In Cicero (see note 32) the want of a species divina is made an objection to him, and, in general, it is scarcely credible that a pupil of Plato, even Xenocrates, would have approved of an anthropomorphism of this kind.
43^ Stobaeus, Eclogues i. 368: Έμπεδοκλης και Ξενοκράτης εκ μικροτέρων ογκων τα στοιχεια συγκρίνει, απερ εστιν ελάχιοστα και οιονει στοιχεια στοιχείων, and the quotation in note 23. Stobaeus expressly distinguishes his view from the Platonic view; the distinction, however, cannot have been very important, since Aristotle nowhere mentions it specially. Xenocrates must have enunciated it only after the completion of Aristotle’s writings on natural science.
46^ Plutarch fac. lun. 29, 3 sq., p. 94, 3: Xenocrates, following the precedent of Plato (Epinomis 981 c. sq.), recognised that the stars must be composed out of all the elements: ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης τὰ μὲν ἄστρα καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός φησι καὶ τοῦ πρώτου πυκνοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, πυκνοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου ἀέρος, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν πυκνῶν ὅλως δὲ μήτε τὸ πυκνὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μήτε τὸ μανὸν εἶναι ψυχῆς δεκτικόν.
47^ Aristotle De Caelo, i. 10, 279 b. 32: Ἣν δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσι φέρειν ἑαυτοῖς τῶν λεγόντων ἄφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι [sc. Τον κόσμον] γενόμενον δέ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὡς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν ὡς μᾶλλον γνωριζόντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους. Simpl. ad loc. p. 136 b. 33 Karst, remarks that Xenocrates is here meant, Schol. 488 b. 15 (he is followed by two further scholia, ibid. 489 a. 4, 9; one of them extends the statement to Speusippus, apparently quite arbitrarily); and to put the fact beyond all doubt, Plutarch an. procr. 3, p. 1013, says, after quoting the explanations of Xenocrates and Crantor: ὁμαλῶς δὲ πάντες οὗτοι χρόνῳ μὲν οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ᾽ εἶναι γενητήν, πλείονας δὲ δυνάμεις ἔχειν, εἰς ἃς ἀναλύοντα θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς λόγῳ τὸν Πλάτωνα γιγνομένην ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ συγκεραννυμένην τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον ἐπίστασθαι μὲν ἀίδιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον, τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γενητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν … τραπέσθαι. (cf. note 17, on a similar expedient, made use of by Xenocrates on a like occasion). Hence Censorinus, di. nat. 4, 3, reckons Xenocrates and all the old Academy, together with Plato, amongst those who seem to have supposed that mankind was always in existence.
48^ Stobaeus, Eclogues i. 250: Ξενοκράτης [τον χρόνον φησι] μέτρον των γεννητων και κίνησιν αιδιον. Both definitions are Platonic; see Timaeus 38 A, 39 B sq., and supra, p. 383.
49^ Stobaeus, Eclogues i. 514 (Plutarch plac. ii. 15, 1): Ξενοκράτης κατα μιας επιφανείας οιεται κεισθαι (Plutarch κινειςθαι) τους αστερας, οι αλλοι Στωϊκοι προ των ετέρων τους ετέρους εν υψει και βάθει. This statement can refer only to the planets, which Xenocrates with Plato would have placed in the plane of the ecliptic, whereas neither he nor anyone else could misplace the collective fixed stars in the same plane with the planets. The words, αλλοι Στωϊκοι, indicate that some other name than Xenocrates, perhaps Zeno or Cleanthes, preceded, which is, perhaps, to be substituted for Xenocrates, or, more probably, has fallen out of the text.
50^ Cicero Acad. ii. 39, 124: the soul, according to Xenocrates, is mens nullo corpore. Nemes. nat. horn. 31: he proves the incorporeality of the soul with the principle: ει δε μη τρέφεται, ταν δε σωμα ζωου τρέφεται, ου σωμα η ψυχή.
51^ Aristotle, De Anima i. 4, end (in the criticism of the Xenocratic definition): ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, κ.τ.λ. This definition is clear in reference to the disciple of Plato, but Philoponus, ad loc. e. 14, is not to be regarded as an authentic source.
52^ Stobaeus, Eclogues i. 790: Pythagoras, Plato, Xenocrates, and others teach θύραθεν εισκρίνεσθαι τον νοῦν, where the Aristotelian expression is to be reduced to Platonic notions as above.
55^ Clement, Stromata, vii. 717 D: Now Xenocrates, treating by himself of "the food derived from animals," and Polemon in his work On Life according to Nature, seem clearly to say that animal food is unwholesome, inasmuch as it has already been elaborated and assimilated to the souls of the irrational creatures. In the treatise of Xenocrates here mentioned the discussions on the three laws of Triptolemus were found, and on the prohibition against killing animals, which is attributed to him, and noticed by Porphyry, De Abstin. iv. 22.
56^ Cf. Tertullian and Lactantius; the former says (De an. 15) that the principale has its seat, according to Xenocrates, in the crown of the head, the latter, Opif. D 16: sive etiam mentis locus nullus est, sed per toturn corpus sparsa discurrit, quod et fieri potest et a Xenocrcite, Platonis discipulo, disputatum est. Only in this case Lactantius must have put mens, where Xenocrates had spoken not of νοῦς but of the ψυχῆ.
57^ He would found the origin of philosophy in its moral influence; Galen, hist. phil. c. 3, end: αἰτία δε φιλοσοφίας ευρέσεώς εστι κατα Ξενοκράτη, το ταραχωδες εν τω βιω καταπαυσαι των πραγμάτων.
58^ Diogenes mentions writings περὶ σοφίας, περὶ πλούτου, περὶ του παιδίου (? perhaps περὶ παιδίψν or περὶ παιδίψν aαγωγης, or something of the sort, ought to be read; περὶ αιδους is also a possible suggestion), περὶ ἐγκρατείας, περὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, θανάτου, ἑκουσίου, φιλίας, ἐπιεικείας, εὐδαιμονίας, περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, περὶ φρονήσεως, οἰκονομικὸς, περὶ σωφροσύνης, δυνάμεως νόμου, πολιτείας, ὁσιότητος, ὅτι παραδοτὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ, περὶ παθῶν, περὶ βίων (on the value of the different way of life, e.g. the theoretic, the political, and the life of pleasure), περὶ ὁμονοίας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀρετῆς, ἡδονῆς, βίου, ἀνδρείας, πολιτικὸς, τἀγαθοῦ, βασιλείας. (Cf. Plutarch adv. Col. 32, 9, p. 1126.) Also the treatise on animal food; see supra, notes 3 and 55.
59^ Xenocrates apud Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematici xi. 4: παν τὸ ὂν ἢ αγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν ἢ οὔτε αγαθόν ἐστιν οὔτε κακόν ἐστι {It is neither good nor bad, or not good, nor is it bad}, which is followed by an awkward argument in a circle.
60^ Cic. Acad. i. 5, 19 sq., on the authority of Antiochus, attributes this distinction to the Academy generally; and this statement, in. itself not absolutely certain, is substantiated by the citation p. 520, 11.
61^ Cf. Cic. Legg. i. 21, 55; Tusc. v. 10, 30; Plutarch com. not. 13, 1, p. 1065, and following note.
62^ Cic. Fin. iv. 1 8, 49: Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit (the principle that only the Laudable is a good); quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. Et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant. Cf. Legg. i. 13, 37 (supra, p. 579, 62).
63^ Tusc. v. 18, 51: quid ergo aut hunc [Critolaum] prohibet, aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abjicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam sed etiam beatissimam ponere? On account of the strictness of his morality Plut., Comp. Cini. c. Luc. c. 1, opposes the doctrines of Xenocrates to the Epicurean doctrines, just as he elsewhere opposes the Stoic to the Epicurean.
64^ Cic. Fin. iv. 18; see supra, note 62. Legg. i. 21, 35: if Zeno with Aristo explained virtue alone to be a good, and everything else quite indifferent, valde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab ilia Platonis familia discreparet. … Nunc vero cum decus … solum bonum dicat; item dedecus … malum … solum: divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas; paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem in commodas, non malas: sentit idem quod Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo. Plutarch c. notit. 13, see p. 579, 62. Ibid. 22, 3, p. 1069: Aristotle and Xenocrates did not, like the Stoics, deny, ωφελεισθαι μεν ανθρώπους υπο θεων, ωφελεισθαι δε υπο γονέων, ωφελεισθαι δε υπο καθηγητων {And when they benefit from the benefit of the people, they benefit from the benefit of the parents, and the benefit of the students}. Also, Tusc. v. 10, 30, Cic. reckons Xenocrates amongst those who consider poverty, disgrace, loss of goods or fatherland, severe bodily pains, sickness, banishment, slavery, as indeed evils, but at the same time maintain semper beatum esse sapientem. From these passages it follows that Wynpersse is wrong (166 sq.) in believing that Xenocrates divided the things which are neither good nor bad into things useful (health, etc.) and things prejudicial (sickness, etc.). Good and useful, evil and prejudicial, are with him, as with Socrates and Plato, equivalent conceptions, but not all goods have the same value, nor are all evils equally bad.
65^ As Cicero says; see previous note.
66^ Cicero attributes this tenet to the Academy generally, and refers to Polemo in support of it; Acad, ii. 42, 131: honeste autem vivere fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (sc. finem bonorum), ut indicant scripta Polemonis. Cf. Fin. ii. 11, 34. He explains this determination with more detail, Fin. iv. 6 sq. (cf. v. 9 sqq.), with the remark that the Stoics themselves acknowledge in it the doctrines of Xenocrates and Aristotle; that it belongs not only to Polemo is clear from Plutarch comm. not. c. 23, p. 1069: τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις ἠκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ [p. 314] φύσιν.
67^ Clement, Stromata ii. 419 A: Xenocrates the Chalcedonian defines happiness to be the possession of virtue, strictly so called, and of the power subservient to it. Then he clearly says, that the seat in which it resides is the soul; that by which it is effected, the virtues; and that of these as parts {as members} are formed praiseworthy actions, good habits and dispositions, and motions, and relations; and that corporeal and external objects are not without these.}
69^ Aristotle, Topics vii. 1, 152 a. 7: Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἱρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἓν γὰρ τὸ αἱρετώτα καὶ μέγιστον. Cf. p. 875, 2.
70^ Cic. Tusc. v. 10; see notes 41 and 71.
71^ Cic. Tusc. v. 13, 39 sq. (cf. 31, 87): omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt: on that point he agrees with Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemo: sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi: which is immediately supported by the remark that whoever (as they do) supposes three kinds of different goods can never attain to certainty as regards true happiness. Ibid. c. 18; see supra, note 62. Seneca, epist. 85, 18 sq.: Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est … illud autem absurdum est, quod dicitur, beatum quidem futurum vel sola virtute, non futurum autem perfecte beatum. Ep. 71, 18: Academici veteres beatum quidem esse (seil. virum bonum) etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum nec ad plenum.
73^ This appears to me the most probable meaning of two obscure passages. Tertull. ad nat. ii. 2 says: Xenocrates Academicus bifariam facit (formam divinitatis), Olympios et Titanios qui de Caelo et Terra. If this division of the divinities in Xenocrates is intended for anything more than a historical notice, with reference to the old theogonies, it can only be understood by supposing that he interpreted the myth of the battle of the Olympians and the Titans with a moral purpose, and explained these two kinds of existences as being in mankind. In Xenocrates’ own theology we look in vain for any point of connection; the daemons perhaps, on account of their intermediate position between heaven and earth, may be denoted as the sons of these two kinds of deities; but they could scarcely be called Titans in opposition to the Olympians. Further, according to the Scholiast ap. Finckh, Olympiod. in Phaedon. p. 66, nt. 2, he spoke of the Titanic prison in which we are banished; the scholiast remarks ad Phaedrus 62 B: ηφρουρα … ως Ξενοκράτης, Τιτανική εστι και εις Διόνυσον αποκορυφουται, where, however, it is not clear whether he compared men to the Dionysus of the Orphic hymns, in the power of the Titans, or to the imprisoned Titans whom Dionysus is to set free.
74^ Aelian, V. H. xiv. 42: Ξενοκράτης ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖρος ἔλεγε μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι: ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν τόν τε ἐς ἃ μὴ δεῖ χωρία βλέποντα καὶ ἐς οὓς μὴ δεῖ τόπους παριόντα. One cannot help thinking of Matthew 5: 28.
76^ Plutarch, virt. mor. c. 7, p. 446, adv. Col. c. 30, 2, p. 1124; Cic. Republic i. 2, 3; Serv. in Aen. vii. 204. The same statement is also attributed to Aristotle, who, indeed, Eth. N. iv. 14, 1128 a. 31, says of the χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. The saying may have had several authors, and it may also have been wrongly transferred from one to another.
77^ Clement, Stromata ii. 369 C: Since also Xenocrates, in his book on "Intelligence," says "that wisdom is the knowledge of first causes and of intellectual essence." He considers intelligence as twofold, practical and theoretical, which latter is human wisdom. Consequently wisdom is intelligence, but all intelligence is not wisdom. Aristotle, Topics vi. 3, 141 a. 6: ὡς Ξενοκράτης τὴν φρόνησιν ὁριστικὴν καὶ θεωρητικὴν τῶν ὄντων φησὶν εἶναι, which Aristotle censures as superfluous; ὁριστικὴν alone would have been sufficient.
78^ There is only, perhaps, the saying ap. Plut. De audiendo, c. 2, p. 38, cf. qu. conv. vii. 5, 4, p. 706; that it is more necessary to guard the ears of children than of athletes.
79^ We may include Xenocrates in what Cicero says, Acad. ii. 44, 135 (specially of Crantor): that the apathy of the wise man was alien to the Older Academy.
80^ περὶ μαθημάτων τῶν περὶ τὴν λέξιν (31 books), περὶ τέΧνης, περὶ τοῦ γράφειν.
81^ Plutarch ap. Proclum in Hesiod, Works and Days v. 374 (Plutarch Fragm. ii. 20 Dübn.) remarks that he advises that only one heir should be appointed. Sextus Math. ii. 6 quotes from him the definition of Rhetoric as επιστήμη τοῦ εν λέγειν, ibid. 61, as πειθους δημιουργός; Quintil. Instit. ii. 15, 4, 34, attributes both to Isocrates, i.e. to a writing bearing his name. The two names are often confused. The calculation mentioned by Plutarch Qu. conv. viii. 9, 3, 13, p. 733 of the number of syllables which could be formed out of the whole alphabet, might have occurred in one of the writings quoted.
Chapter XVI. Other Philosophers of the Academy
Enquiries into primary causes, Ideas, and numbers were pursued by many other Platonists besides Xenocrates and Speusippus. We learn that the two principles of the later Platonic metaphysics were variously apprehended in the Academy, but that metaphysical science as a whole was neither advanced nor elucidated.1 Besides the three principal theories of the relation of numbers to Ideas, — the Platonic, Speusippean, and Xenocratic, — Aristotle mentions a fourth, which assumed the absolute and independent existence of the Ideal numbers only,2 and treated the mathematical sphere as a separate genus, without conceding to it an existence of its own above and beyond the things of sense.3 Many different views were also taken of the origin of material things from numbers, and of numbers from first causes. This we |605| gather from the language of Aristotle, who censures the Platonists for describing numbers sometimes as unlimited, sometimes as limited by the number ten.4 He says of the adherents of the latter view that they reduced the various derived concepts (for example, Emptiness, mathematical Proportion, Crookedness), some to numbers within the decad, others (for example, the contrasts of rest and motion, of good and evil5) to primary causes. With regard to the derivation of spatial magnitudes, there existed, as we have seen,6 a variety of theories without much positive result. Most of these philosophers, however, did not attempt any explanation of the Derived from First Causes, but contented themselves, like the Pythagoreans, with indefinite and disconnected analogies.7 Hestiaeus alone is mentioned, with Xenocrates,8 as having adopted a more satisfactory method; but our knowledge of him is pretty nearly comprised in that statement.9 |606|
Heraclides. Some noteworthy divergences from the doctrine of Plato were made by Heraclides of Pontus. With reference to his general point of view, he may certainly be considered a Platonist. The Epicurean in Cicero charges him with having sometimes treated spirit, sometimes the universe, as a Deity, and with having raised the stars, the earth, and the planets to the dignity of gods.10 In this it is easy to recognise the Platonic view of the Divine Reason, the divine and animate nature of the world and of the heavenly bodies; for Heraclides would only have called these latter gods in the sense that Plato did, when he discriminated between the invisible God and the visible gods. His cosmology, however, differed from that of his master in several theories, chiefly the result of Pythagorean influences11 to which he was very susceptible.12 We learn that he assumed as the primary |607| constituents of all corporeal things minute bodies, not compounded of any ulterior parts. But, unlike the atoms of Democritus, these bodies are capable of affecting one another, and are therefore combined not by a merely mechanical union, but by actual interdependence.13 What gave rise to this theory, which is carried out through various analogies14 in his works, we do not know; but we can scarcely be wrong in |608| connecting it not only with the Platonic theory of the elements, but with the Pythagorean theory of atoms, of which Ecphantus is the well-known adherent.15 Heraclides also agrees with Ecphantus in supposing the world to have been formed from the atoms by means of the Divine Reason.16 He seems to have held the cosmos to be unlimited.17 It is, however, of more importance to know that he taught, like Hicetas and Ecphantus,18 the diurnal rotation of the earth and the immobility of the fixed stars: but the annual revolution of the earth around the sun, and the heliocentric system, were unknown to him.19 He thought the sun |609| had only two satellites, Mercury and Venus.20 Like the Pythagoreans, he held that the heavenly bodies, especially the moon, were orbs similarly constituted to ours.21 The globular shape of the earth, then generally believed by philosophers, he takes for granted.22 Passing over some other physical theories23 of Heraclides, and turning to his doctrine of the human soul, we find that here too he adopted the more ancient Pythagorean view rather than the Platonic. He declared the soul to be a luminous ethereal essence.24 Before entering into bodies, souls were to abide in |610| the Milky Way,25 the bright points in which were themselves such souls. There is no record to show how he brought his daemonology26 and belief in divination27 into combination with this, or whether he even attempted to do so.
Although, however, there were many points on which Heraclides differed from Plato, he agreed with him at least in his moral principles. From his treatise on Justice we find instances quoted to show that wrong-doing is overtaken by punishment;28 and in his work on Pleasure he cites, as against a Hedonic panegyric,29 numerous cases in which want of temperance has led to ruin, arguing the question of the acutest pleasure being found in a madman.30 This is quite as much Pythagorean as Platonic;31 the two |611| schools coincide even more in their moral doctrines than in their philosophic theories.32
Eudoxus. Eudoxus widely departed from Platonic precedents in Ethics as well as in his Physics. In the sphere of Physics, the theory of Ideas seems to have been too ideal for him, and the participation of things in Ideas too shadowy. In order to connect material things more closely with his philosophy of Nature, he assumed that they receive their qualities by means of the admixture of the substances to which these qualities originally belong; and he accordingly set in the place of the Ideas Anaxagorean homoeomeries.33 It is therefore of little consequence whether or not he retained the Ideas in name.34
“Eudoxus so greatly diverged from Plato that he can
scarcely be called a follower.” – Eduard Zeller
In his Ethics, he agreed with Aristippus in pronouncing Pleasure the highest good, appealing to the fact that all men desire pleasure and avoid pain; that all strive for pleasure for its |612| own sake, and that there is absolutely nothing to which Pleasure does not give additional value.35 These divergences from Plato are so important that Eudoxus can scarcely be called a follower of his, however greatly the Academy may otherwise be indebted to him.
The Epinomis. In the author of the Epinomis,36 on the contrary, we recognise a true Platonist; but a Platonist who, like the Pythagoreans, made all science to consist in the knowledge of numbers and quantities, and the stars, and in a theology bound up with this. The Epinomis, intended as a supplement to the Laws, is an enquiry into the nature of that knowledge which we distinguish by the name of wisdom; the knowledge which alone can make happy men and good citizens, and give capacity for the administration of the highest offices; which is the final goal of the actions of the best educated, and insures a blessed existence after death.37 This knowledge, we are told, does not lie in those mechanical skills which supply our common necessities, nor in the imitative arts, which have no serious purpose beyond mere amusement, nor in either of those activities which are without true intelligent discernment, and are regulated by uncertain opinion, such as the art of the physician, the pilot, or the lawyer; nor does it consist in merely natural docility |613| and acuteness.38 The indispensable condition of true wisdom is the knowledge of number, and all connected with it, — that great science which has been given us by Uranos, highest of the gods, and author of all good things. He who is ignorant of number,39 and cannot distinguish the straight from the crooked, may indeed possess courage and temperance, and every other virtue, but is destitute of wisdom, the greatest virtue of all.40 It is number which not only is required by all arts, but always produces what is good and never what is evil; it follows that where number is lacking, and there alone, evil and disorder are present. Only the man conversant with number is capable of understanding and teaching what is right and beautiful and good.41 Dialectic2 is to be regarded as a help to this scientific education; but the culminating point is Astronomy, which is concerned with the fairest and divinest of all visible things;43 and the chief reason of this pre-eminence is that Astronomy makes possible to us a true piety, which is the best virtue. Only by means of Astronomy are we delivered from that baneful ignorance which keeps us from the real knowledge and |614| worship of the heavenly gods.44
If we may believe that there are gods who care for all things and fill all things, if the soul be really prior to the body, and nobler,45 if a Divine reason, a good soul,46 have fashioned the Cosmos and directs its course, overcoming the working of the evil soul,47 where can that reason be more active in operation than in the most glorious and best ordered parts of the Cosmos, the stars? Is it conceivable that such great masses could be moved by any other power than a soul, that the perfect regularity of their motions could proceed from any cause except their own inherent reason? Can we suppose that earthly creatures were endowed with souls, and the shining heavenly natures left destitute of them?48 On the contrary, we should ascribe to them the most blessed and perfect souls; we should consider them either as gods or the images of gods, as bearers |615| of powers divine, as absolutely immortal, or at any rate possessing all-sufficient length of life.49 They are, in a word, the visible gods, and are all (not merely the sun and moon) entitled to equal veneration:50 the popular mythical divinities, on the other hand, are treated in the same apologetic manner by this author as by Plato.51 After these gods come the Daemons. As there are five distinct elements,52 so there are distinct genera of living beings, in each of which some one element preponderates.53 In this order, the heavenly gods with their fiery nature occupy the highest place; mankind, animals and plants, as earthly creatures, the lowest;54 midway between them are three classes of Daemons. Of these, two are invisible, with bodies of aether or of air; the Daemons of the third class, provided with watery or vapoury bodies, sometimes hide themselves and sometimes visibly appear. All intercourse between men and gods is by means of these daemons: they reveal themselves in dreams and oracles, and in various ways: they know the thoughts of men: they love the good and hate the bad: they are susceptible of pleasure and the reverse; whereas the gods, exalted above these emotions, are in their nature only |616| capable of intelligence and thought.55 Far beneath them is man: his life is full of trouble, disorder, unreason: and few of his race find true happiness in this world.56 But whoever combines the above-mentioned knowledge of heavenly things with virtue and morality, shall be rewarded with happiness,57 and look forward to an entrance after death, as elect and consecrate, into a blessed existence, where, freed from the multifariousness of his present nature, he shall live in the contemplation of the heavens.58 We recognise the spirit of the Platonic School, not only in this expectation, but in the further contents of this work: in the propositions concerning the worth of knowledge, the passionlessness of the gods, the reason that governs the universe, the dependency of the corporeal upon the soul, the animate nature of the world, and the divinity of the stars. Yet, not to mention minor differences, how great is the distance between the astronomer, to whom astronomy is the acme of wisdom, and the starry heaven the highest object of contemplation, and the philosopher who would lead us from the visible to the Idea, from Mathematics and Astronomy to Dialectic! As, therefore, the Epinomis in all probability belongs to the first generation of Plato’s disciples,59 it serves to confirm |617| the fact, sufficiently attested otherwise, that the Old Academy had even then, in many of its members, departed very far from genuine Platonism, and had sacrificed pure philosophic enquiry to a predilection for mathematics and mathematical theology.
Polemo. After the death of Polemo, this mathematical speculation and, generally speaking, purely theoretic philosophy would seem to have receded more and more in favour of Ethics, if, indeed (as we see exemplified in Crantor), they did not entirely die out. Polemo had himself advanced a principle which reminds us of the Cynics,60 but was probably intended by him in a sense less strict than theirs — viz. that man should exercise himself in actions, and not in dialectical theories.61 And certainly this philosopher appears to have effected more by his own personal influence than in any other way.62 In his theory of morals he faithfully follows his master. His maxim is, Life according to Nature.63 |618| But this he makes to depend on two conditions, — Virtue, and the possession of those goods which Nature originally prompts us to desire — such as health and the like.64 Although, however, the second condition is indispensable to perfect happiness,65 it is of far less consequence than the first. Without virtue, says Polemo, no happiness is possible; without material and external goods, no complete happiness. In this, his teaching is in full agreement with that of Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates. In other respects we know little of him, except what may be gathered from some isolated definitions.66
Crates. Of his successor Crates we know still less: but as |619| his name is invariably associated with the Academy,67 and from his personal relations with Polemo and Crantor, we may conclude that he was a loyal adherent of the School.
Crantor. We possess a few more explicit details concerning Crantor, partly from his exposition of the Timaeus,68 partly from his Ethical writings, but chiefly from his book on Grief. From the first of these sources we learn that he disputed, like Xenocrates, the beginning of the soul in time; and regarded the account in the Timaeus merely as an expository form:69 that with a true comprehension of his author, he conceived of the soul as compounded out of the primary constituents of all things, and more particularly out of these four elements — the Sensible, the Intelligible, the Same, and the Other; so that it is in a position to know all things:70 that he explained the harmonious numbers in the Timaeus in a manner that modern writers have recognised as the true one:71 and that he (certainly erroneously) held the mythus of Atlantis to be a real history.72 If his views of Plato correspond, as can hardly be doubted, with his own views, his comments sufficiently prove that he held the Platonic doctrine of the soul in its original sense. How far such was the case with other parts of Metaphysics, we cannot be sure; but in his Ethics, Crantor appears as a true representative of the |620| Academy. We find, from a fragment73 of considerable length, and full of oratorical grace, that he accorded the first place among goods to virtue; the second to health; the third to pleasure; the fourth to riches; which can only be understood as agreeing with the generally received doctrine of the Academy. We further read that he denounced the Stoical indifference to pain as the murder of natural human feelings, and advocated moderation in grief,74 which is also truly Platonic.75 He was opposed, like the rest of the School, to the entire suppression of the affections, and required only their due limitation, appealing in defence of this view to the uses which Nature designed for these emotions.76 We may judge of the reputation which he |621| enjoyed, and of the purity of his principles, from the fact that he was associated with Chrysippus as teacher of Ethics.77 His various fragments contain evidence that he believed, like Plato, in souls being placed upon earth for their punishment and purification; and that, sensible of the evil inseparable from human life, he saw in death the transition to a better existence.78 All this is in thorough accord with the thought of the Older Academy. When, therefore, Cicero mentions Crantor among those who remained faithful79 to the doctrine of Plato, it is at least so far true, that he made no deviations from that form of it which prevailed after Speusippus and Xenocrates. Its original spirit and contents, however, were but very imperfectly reproduced in the Platonic School. Though the Ethics there taught may be the Ethics of Plato, even the earliest representatives of his philosophy had already departed from the speculative groundwork of pure Platonism.
The next generation seems to have |622| confined its attention entirely to Morality; and when Arcesilaus inaugurated a new period in the history of the School, this led still farther away from the position of the founder. Only a portion of Plato’s spiritual legacy descended with his garden to the Academy: the full inheritance passed over to Aristotle, who was thereby qualified to transcend his master.
{Editor's note: We fail to comprehend why Zeller, having completed such an exhaustive compendium and analysis of Plato’s life, works, and doctrines could have concluded with naming Aristotle as Plato’s heir surpassing his master in any sense, whether intellectual or spiritual. Plato never closed the question, yet Aristotle’s extant works prove that he lived to do so. Plato’s mind and spirit remained open; Aristotle closed his mind, and the minds of subsequent generations with the chains and locks of mere intellect, forever barring the way to spiritual illumination for those who follow this lesser path. – Linda Mihalic}
Endnotes
1^ Aristotle, Metaphysics xiv. 1 sq. (see p. 332, 83; cf. p. 584, 16), c. 5, 1092 a. 35 sq.
2^ Metaphysics xiii. 6, in the words quoted p. 573: ἄλλος δέ τις, κ.τ.λ.
3^ Metaphysics iii. 2, 998 a. 7: εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν εἶναι μὲν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λεγόμενα τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐ μὴν χωρίς γε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις. As this assertion immediately connects with and completes the one just mentioned, to the effect that only the Ideal numbers exist for themselves, both may probably be attributed to the same persons.
4^ xii. 8, 1073 a. 18; xiii. 8, 1084 a. 12, c. 9, 1085 b. 23, cf. xiv. 4, beginn.; Phys. iii. 8, 206 h. 30.
5^ Metaphysics xiii. 8, 1084 a. 31: πειρῶνται δ᾽ [γενναν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] ὡς τοῦ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος τελείου ὄντος ἀριθμοῦ. γεννῶσι γοῦν τὰ ἑπόμενα, οἷον τὸ κενόν, ἀναλογίαν, τὸ περιττόν, τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐντὸς τῆς δεκάδος: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδιδόασιν, οἷον κίνησιν στάσιν, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς. Cf. Theophrastus supra, 576, 51.
6^ See p. 519, 8, cf. 571, 40, and Metaphysics xiv. 2, 1089 b. 11; vii. 11, 1036 b. 12: ἀνάγουσι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ γραμμῆς τὸν λόγον τὸν τῶν δύο εἶναί φασιν. Καὶ τῶν τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογραμμὴν τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γραμμῆς, ἔνια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὗ τὸ εἶδος ̔οἷον δυάδα καὶ τὸ εἶδος δυάδοσ̓.
7^ Theophrastus see 576, 51; Aristotle Metaphysics xiii. 8 (see nt. 4). Still, however, from Metaphysics i. 9, 991 b. 10; xiii. 8, 1084 a. 14; xiv. 5, 1092 b. 8 sqq., we cannot infer that many Platonists actually explained definite numbers as those of mankind, of beasts, etc.
8^ Theophrastus after the quotation, p. 576, 51: πειραται δε και Έστιαιος μέχρι τινος (to derive everything beside spatial magnitude) ουχ ωσπερ· ειςηται περι των πρώτων μόνον.
9^ Besides the editing of the Platonic discourses on the Good, we have (from Stobaeus Eclogues i. 250) the definition of time (φορα αστρων προς αλληλα) as his, which does not deviate from the Platonic definition.
10^ N. De. i. 13, 34: Heraclides … modo mundum tum meutem divinam esse putat; errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit, sensuque Deum privat et ejus formam mutabilem esse vult, codemque in libro rursus terram et caelum (i.e. the απλανης); the planets are already mentioned) refert in Deos. The words sensuque … vult contain (as Krische, Forsch, p. 335 sq., correctly remarks) simply the conclusions of the Epicurean, and not historical statements as to Heraclides’ views.
11^ Besides the doctrines to be quoted immediately, and the statement of Diogenes v. 86, that he had been a pupil of the Pythagoreans, this is clear from his treatise on the Pythagoreans (ibid. 88), from his fictitious account of Abaris (see the two fragments which Müller, Pragm. Hist. gr. ii. 197, quotes out of Bekker’s Anec. 145, 178, and Plutarch And. po. c. i. p. 14) and from the accounts, probably borrowed from the former treatise, of the wonderful vanishing of Empedocles after the reanimation of an apparently dead man (Diogenes viii. 67), and of the change of a bean into the form of a man after it has been buried in dung forty days (Joh. Lyd. de mens. iv. 29, p. 181).
12^ On account of these peculiar doctrines, Plutarch adv. Col. 14, 2, p. 1115, reckons Heraclides amongst the number of those who πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπεναντιούμενοι τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ μαχόμενοι διατελοῦσι.
13^ Dionys. ap. Eusebius praep. ev. xiv. 23, 3, after mentioning the Atomist theory: οι δε, τας ατόμους μεν ονομάσαντες [read ουκον.] αμερη φασιν ειναι σώματα, του παντος μέρη εξ ων αδιαιρέτων οντων συντίθεται τα πάντα και εις α διαλύεται, και τούτων φασι των αμερων ονοματοποιον Διόδωρον γεγονέναι, ονομα δε, φασιν, αυτοις αλλο Ήρακλείδης θέμενος, εκάλεσεν ογκους. {"others change the name of the atoms, and say that they are bodies which have no parts, but are themselves parts of the universe, out of which in their indivisible state all things are composed, and into which they are resolved. And they say that it was Diodorus who invented the name (τὰ ἀμερῆ) of these bodies without parts. But Heracleides, it is said, gave them a different name, and called them ‘weights.’"} Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 32: Heraclides and Asclepiades (on whom see vol. iii. a. 352, 2nd edit.) explain ανάρμους ογκους {irregular molecules} to be the causes of all things. Math. x. 318 on the same: (την των πραγμάτων γένεσιν εδόξασαν) εξ ανομοίων μεν, παθητων δε (this is in opposition to the Atomists, whose atoms were equally unlike, but were απαθη), καθάπερ των ανάρμων ογκων (ανάρμους means not compacted, not composed out of any parts). Stobaeus Eclogues i. 350: Ήρακλείδης θραύσματα (sc. Τα ελαχιστα ωρίζετο). Galen, h. phil. c. 5, end (Opp. xix. 244): Ήρακλείδης … και Άσκληπιάδης … αναρμόστους (rd. ανάρμους) ογκους αρχας υποτιθέντες των ορων [rd. ολων].
14^ In the fragment of a work on Music, which Porphyry quotes in Ptol. Harm. pp. 213-216 Wall., and Roulez reprints, p. 99 sqq., Heraclides asserts that every note is properly an impact (πληγη) transmitted to the ear, and, as such, occupies no time but the moment between the act and the completion of the act of impact; but the dullness of our hearing makes several impacts following after one another appear as one; the quicker the impacts follow, the higher the note, and the slower, the lower the note. As he composed apparently continuous bodies out of Atoms, as discrete magnitudes, he imagined in notes discrete magnitudes as elements of the apparently continuous. — In the same fragment he also expresses the view, which we found in Plato, p. 428, 113, that the sight perceives objects by contact with them (επιβάλλουσα αυτοις), and from that he derives the conclusion that the perceptions of sight are quicker and more reliable than those of hearing. Of hearing he remarks: τας αισθήσεις μη εςτώσας, αλλ’ εν ταράχω ουσας.
16^ Cf. the passage quoted supra, note 10. On Ecphantus see loc. cit.
17^ Stobaeus Eclogues i. 440: Σέλευκος ο Έρυθραιπς (the well-known astronomer) καιΉρακλείδης ο Πονυικος απειρον τον κόσμον. The Placita mention only Seleucus, ii. 1, 5; but the account of Stobseus, who frequently has the more complete text, is not, therefore, to be rejected. The Placita even confirm that account, ii. 13, 8 (see vol. i. 366, 2); there only remains a doubt whether the concept of the unlimited is to be taken here quite strictly.
18^ The first who propounded this view was, according to Theophrastus ap. Cic. Acad. ii. 39, 123 (with which cf. Böckh d. Kosm. Syst. Pl. 122 sqq.), the Syracusan Hicetas, and the fact that the Placita mention only Ecphantus with Heraclides seems the less important, if we suppose with Böckh that he was a pupil of his fellow-countryman Hicetas, and was the first who promulgated the theory in a written treatise. However this may be, in any case it seems that Heraclides is indebted for it to Ecphantus, with whom his atomic theory also is connected.
19^ Plutarch plac. iii. 13, 3: Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος και Ἔκφαντος ο Πυθαγόρειος κινουσι μεν την γην, ου μήν γε μεταβατικως, τροχπυ [δε] δικην ενιζομένην απο δυσμων επ ανατολας περι το ιδιον αυτης κέντρον. (The same, with some variations, is found apud Eusebius pr. evan. xv. 58; Galen, hist. phil. c. 21.) Simplicius De Caelo Schol. in Arist. 495 a. 31: δια το γεγονέναι τινας ων Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος ην και Άρίσταρχος, νομίζοντας σώζεσθαι τα φαννόμενα του μεν ουρανου και των αστέρων ηρεμούντων, της δε γης περι τους του ισημερινου πόλους απο δυσμων κινουμένης εκάστης ημέρας μίαν εγγιστα περιστροφήν. Το δε εγγιστα πρόσκειται δια την του ηλίου μιας μοίρας επικίνησιν. Ibid. Schol. 506 a. 1 (cf. ibid. 505 b. 46): εν τω κέντρω δε ουσαν την γην και κυκλω κινουμένην, τον δε ουρανον ηρεμειν Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος υποθέμενος σώζειν ωετο τα φαινόμενα. Schol. 508 a. 12: ει δε κυκλω περι το κέντρον [εποιειτο την κίνησιν η γη] ως Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος υπετίθετο. Geminus ap. Simplicius Physics 65, loc. cit.: διο και παρελθών τις φησιν Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος ελεγεν, οτι και κινουμένης πως της γης, του δ’ ηλίου μένοντός πως δύναται η περι τον ηλιον φαινομένη ανωμαλία σώζεσθαι. (Cf. on these passages, and in opposition to the perverse conclusions which Gruppe, Kosm., Syst. d. Gr. 126 sqq., has drawn from them. Böekh, loc. cit., p. 127 sqq.) Prod, in Timaeus 281 E: Ήρακλείδης … κινων κύκλω την γην.
20^ Chalcid. in Timaeus p. 200; Meurs. and Böekh, loc. cit., p. 138, 142 sq. Cf. also Ideler, Abh. d. Berl. Akad. 1830; Phil. hist. Kl. p. 72.
21^ Stobaeus Eclogues i. 514 (Plac. ii. 13, 8); see Pt. i. 366, 2; cf. 561, 2; ibid. i. 552: Ήρακλείδης και Ωκελλος [την σελήνην] γην ομίχλη περιεχομένη. The comets, on the other hand, and some similar phenomena, Heracleitus considered to be luminous clouds: Stobaeus Eclogues i. 578 (Plac. iii. 2, 6; Galen, h. phil. c. 18, p. 288). The myth of Phaethon (who, as Jupiter, is transferred to the sky, Hyginus, poet, astron. ii. 42), he gives merely historically.
22^ To this supposition we may refer the narrative of a circumnavigation of the earth, ap. Strabo, ii. 2, 4, 5, p. 98, 100.
23^ On ebb and flow, Stobaeus Eclogues i. 634; on the shivering in ague, Galen, De tremore, c. 6, vol. vii. 61 5 K; on the perceptions of sense, which he explained, according to Plutarch, plac. iv. 9, 3, with Empedocles, by the hypothesis of affluxes and pores; cf. also note 14.
24^ Stobaeus Eclogues i. 796: Ήρακλείδης φωτοειδη την ψυχην ωρίσατο. Tertull. De anima c. 9: the soul is not lumen, etsi hoc placuit Pontico Heraclidi. Macrobius Somn. i. 14: he designated the soul as a light. Philip. De An. A 4 u.: he considered the soul to be an ουράνιον σωμα {celestial body}, which is equivalent to αιθέριον {ethereal}. In a treatise attributed to him, περι των εν αδου, the genuineness of which might reasonably be doubted, the activities of the soul were explained as merely a product of the body: Plutarch utr. an. an corp. etc.; Fragm. i. 5.
25^ Iamblichus, ap. Stobaeus Eclogues i. 904, cf. supra, p. 28, 4.
26^ For the daemons, a doctrine natural in such a Pythagorean, cf. Clement, Protrept. 44 c.: τί γαρ Ήρακλείδης ο Ποντικος; ουκ εσθ οπη ουκ επι τα Δημοκρίτου και αυτος κατασύρεται ειδωλα (i.e. in the description of the divine). The ειδωλα {idols} of Democritus are, in fact, daemons {spirits} (see vol. i. 757), and to the daemons airy or vaporous bodies are attributed; cf. Epinomis, 984 B sqq. (see below).
27^ Some instances of prophetic dreams are adduced by Cic. Divin. i. 23, 46; Tertullian De anima c. 46; Plutarch Alex. 26, from Heraclides. His interest in oracles is proved by his treatise π. χρηστηρίων, of which fragments are given by Rouler, 67 sq.; Müller, Fragm. hist. gr. ii. 197 sq.
28^ From Athen, xii. 521 c. sq.; 533 sq.
29^ The fragment apud Athen. xii. 512 a. sqq., in which it must remain undecided what adversary he had immediately in view, can only be considered in this way, not as the philosopher’s own opinion.
30^ Cf. the fragments apud Athen. xii. 525 sq.; 533 c; 536 sq.; 552 sq.; 554 c.
31^ The definition of happiness quoted vol. i. 398, 3, refers also to the Pythagorean Ethics. On the other hand, the quotation of Hermias in Phaedrus p. 76 ed. Ast, is genuinely Platonic: φιλίαν [φιλίας] {friendship} ειναι τον ερωτα και ουκ αλλου τινος, κατα συμβεβηκος δέ (this Aristotelian expression must belong to the narrator of the account) τινας εκπίπτειν εις αφροδίσια.
32^ This holds good only of the practical results, for the scientific substantiation and development of the Platonic Ethics were wanting in the Pythagoreans.
33^ Aristotle, Metaphysics i. 9, 991 a. 14: the Ideas contribute nothing to the stability of things, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν: οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως αἴτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν (the white colour) μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ (the white object). ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος, ὃν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὔδοξος δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔλεγον. Ibid. xiii. 5, 1079 b. 18, almost the same, word for word. On the first passage, Alexander remarks, subsequently appealing (Schol. 573 a. 12) to the second book of the Aristotelian treatise περὶ ἰδεῶν: Ευδοξος των Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει των ἰδεῶν εν τοις προς αυτας το ειναι εχουςιν ηγειτο εκαστον ειναι, και αλλοι δέ τινες, ως ελεγε. … μίξει των ἰδεῶν τα αλλα. The editor of Alexander ad Metaphysics 1079 b. 15 classes Eudoxus with Anaxagoras: ουτοι δ’ ου συντάττουσι τας ἰδέας.
34^ This point cannot be made out, because Aristotle says nothing about it; as regards Alexander, again, we cannot be sure whether he kept strictly to the exposition of the Aristotelian treatise on the Ideas.
35^ Arist. Eth. N. i. 12, 1101 b. 27; x. 2 beginn, (cf. Diogenes viii. 88) with the addition: επιστεύοντο δ’ οι λόγοι δια την του ηθους αρετην μαλλον η δι αυτος. Διαφερόντως γαρ εδόκει σώφρων ειναι, etc. Alex. Top. 119 m. following Arist.
36^ The Platonic origin of which, even apart from the unplatonic nature of the contents, and other proofs (see p. 561, 15), would be at once refuted by the dry and wearisome manner of its exposition.
37^ 973 A sq.; 976 D; 978 B; 979 B sq.; 992 A sqq.
39^ Together with the pure doctrine of numbers, the author, 990 c. sqq., mentions, in agreement with Plato (Republic vii. 524 D sqq.; see p. 216), geometry, stereometry, and harmony.
40^ 976 C-977 D; cf. 978 B sqq.; 988 A sq.
41^ 977 D sqq.; 979 A sqq., with which cf. the quotation from Philolaus, vol. i. 294, 1.
42^ 991 C: πρὸς τούτοις δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ ἓν (the individual) τῷ κατ᾽ εἴδη προσακτέον ἐν ἑκάσταις ταῖς συνουσίαις, ἐρωτῶντά τε καὶ ἐλέγχοντα τὰ μὴ καλῶς ῥηθέντα: πάντως γὰρ καλλίστη καὶ πρώτη βάσανος ἀνθρώποις ὀρθῶς γίγνεται, ὅσαι δὲ οὐκ οὖσαι προσποιοῦνται, ματαιότατος πόνος ἁπάντων. The latter words seem to apply to astronomers who would rely exclusively on observation, like Eudoxus.
44^ 989 A sqq.; 985 D; 980 A sq.; cf. also 988 A (on the religious prejudice against meteorology).
45^ 980 C; 988 C sq.-991 D, with reference to the discussions of the Laws mentioned p. 344, 384 sq.; 500, 32.
46^ λόγος ὁ πάντων (986 C): this reason coincides with the soul, to which, in 981 C alibi, the formation of the living being is ascribed, the ἀρίστη ψυχὴ, which effects the φορὰν καὶ κίνησις ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν (988 D).
47^ 988 D sq., with which cf. the remarks p. 544, sq.; 549, 129.
48^ 981 E-984 A. As regards the magnitude of the stars, it is remarked, 983 A sq., that we are to suppose the sun larger than the earth, and likewise all the planets of wonderful magnitude. With respect to the sequence and rotation of the stars, the Epinomis, 986 A — 987 D, agrees with Plato: still there is one deviation from the Platonic exposition (according to the προλ. τ. Πλάτωνος φιλος. c. 25, already made use of by Proclus as an argument against its Platonic origin), in that, according to 987 B, the Planets are made to move towards the right, the firmament of the fixed stars towards the left; see p. 382, 40. The author remarks, 986 E, 987 D sqq., that Astronomy came to the Greeks, like everything else, from the barbarians; he hopes, however, that the Greeks will soon bring it to a higher state of perfection.
49^ 981 Esq.; 983 Esq.; 986 B, where undoubtedly the meaning is that the star-spirits ought to be considered as the true gods, The author leaves it undecided whether the visible body of the stars is connected with them in a loose or in a strict and inseparable union.
51^ 984 D (cf. supra, p. 500). Moreover, here also (985 C sq.) we find the principle that legislation ought not to interfere with the established worship, nor to introduce fresh objects of reverence without pressing reasons.
52^ Aether, besides the four Empedoclean elements. The author assigns to aether a place between fire and air: 891 0-984 B sqq.
53^ 981 C sq.; cf. supra, p. 521, 14 and p. 505, 46.
55^ 984 E-985 C; cf. supra, p. 593.
56^ 973 D sqq.; 982 A; 983 C; 985 D; 992 C.
59^ This supposition is supported by 1) the tradition indicated p. 561, 15, which alone, of course, would be too weak to prove it completely. But 2) in support of the tradition we see that the contents of the treatise are very suitable to a man like Philippus, a mathematician and astronomer, no stranger to ethical, political, and theological enquiries. The magnitude of the stars, which is here (983 A sq.) so strongly emphasised, was discussed by Philippus in a special treatise (π. μέγεθος ἥλιου καὶ σελήνης καὶ γῆς) 3) The treatise before us, 986 A sqq., discovers no advance in astronomical knowledge beyond Plato; in 986 E, 987 D sq., it designates the science of astronomy as still young amongst the Greeks, and looks forward to a completion of what has been learnt from the barbarians as a thing of the future. The fact that Aristotle does not mention the Epinomis, not even Politicus ii. 6, 1265 b. 18, seems unimportant, even apart from what is remarked p. 74 sqq. It may, of course, have been written by a contemporary of Aristotle, even if it is later than the Politics, or, at least, if it was not in circulation as Platonic at the time of the composition of the Politics.
61^ Diogenes iv. 18: ἔφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι, καθάπερ ἁρμονικόν τι τέχνιον καταπιόντα καὶ μὴ μελετήσαντα, ὡς κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐρώτησιν θαυμάζεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διάθεσιν ἑαυτοῖς μάχεσθαι.
63^ Clement (see p. 597, 55) mentions special συντάγματα περι του κατα φυσιν βίου belonging to him.
64^ Plutarch c. not. 23 (see p. 600, 66); Cic. Acad. ii. 42 (ibid.); Fin. ii. 11, 33 sq.: omne animal, simul ut ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit; duasque quae maximae sunt imprimis amplectitur, animum et corpus; deinde utriusque partes … in his primis naturalibus voluptas insit, necne, magna quastio est. Nihil vero putare esse pr ester voluptatem (Cic. is engaged with an Epicurean), non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem summa mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni, etiam ante Aristoteli, ea prima visa sunt, qua paulo ante dixi: ergo nata est sententid veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, i.e. virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Ibid. iv. 6, 14 sq.: cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, his verbis tria significari Stoici dicunt … tertium autem, omnibus aut maximus rebus iis, qua secundum naturam sint, fruentem vivere, which, according to the account of the Stoics, was adopted by Xenocrates and Aristotle in their determination of the highest good.
65^ Clement, Stromata, ii. 419 A: Polemo, the disciple of Xenocrates, seems of the opinion that happiness is sufficiency of all good things, or of the most and greatest. (Cf. Cic. Fin. iv. 6; v. previous note.) He lays down the doctrine, then, that happiness never exists without virtue; and that virtue, apart from corporeal and external objects, is sufficient for happiness. Cic. Tusc. V. 13; v. supr. 600, 71.
66^ E. g. ap. Plutarch Ad princ. inerud. iii. 3, p. 488: τον Ἔρωτα ειναι θεων υπηςεσίαν εις νεων επιμέλειαν, and the quotation from Clement on p. 597, 55.
67^ E.g. ap. Cic. Acad. i. 9, 34, where Crates is expressly classed with the true keepers of Platonic doctrine.
68^ The first commentary on that work; v. supr. 590, 24.
69^ Proclus in Timaeus 85 A; Plutarch an. procr. iii. 1, p. 1013.
70^ Plutarch i. 5; ii. 4 sq.; v. supr.
71^ Plutarch xvi. 8, 20; iii. 29, 4. Cf. supr. and Kayser, De Crantore, pp. 22-33.
73^ Ap. Sext. Math. xi. 51-58.
74^ Plutarch, Consol. ad Apoll, i. 3, p. 102: μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν’ φησὶν ὁ ἀκαδημαϊκὸς Κράντωρ, ‘νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις αἴσθησις, εἴτ᾽ οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων εἴτ᾽ ἀποσπῷτο. τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίγνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: τεθηριῶσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον 1 ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχήν. Cic. Tusc. iii. 6, 12, translates this; and we may infer that the words at the beginning of the chapter — οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς ὑμνοῦσι τὴν ἄγριον καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν — are also from Crantor. Of what follows, we can only conjecture that it belongs to him in substance, and that, accordingly, he regarded apathy as doing away with benevolence and friendship, and sought for ‘metriopathy’ instead (cf. note 76). Kayser rightly recognises traces of this passage in Seneca, Cons. ad Helv. 16, 1; Cons, ad Polyb. 17, 2; cf. ibid. 18, 5 sq.
75^ Kayser (p. 6 sq.; 39 sq.) sees an innovation of Crantor’s here, and seeks its explanation in the ill-health of the philosopher. Brandis, however (ii. b. 1, 40), rightly refers to Cic. Acad. i. 9; ii. 44 (v. following note), and the agreement of his doctrine with the tenets of the other Academics on happiness. It has been pointed out, 444, 1, that Plato declared himself against apathy, and with special reference to the case contemplated by Plutarch loc. cit. c. 3 beginning.
76^ Cic. Acad. ii. 44, 135. Sed quaero, quando ista fuerint ab Academia vetere decreta ut animum sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent? Mediocritates illi probabant, et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum (which almost presupposes the term μετριοπάθεια). Legimus omnes Crantoris, veteris Academici, de luctu: est enim non magnus verum aureolus et, ut Tubcroni Panaetius precipit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus. Atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas; metum cavendi causa: misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae: ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant.
78^ Plutarch loc. cit. c. 27: πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν ἀλλὰ πάλαι κέκλαυσται τἀνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην, repeated, according to Lactantius, Inst. ii. 18 fin., by Cicero in his work on Consolation (Kayser, p. 48). Crantor expresses himself on the miseries of life ap. Plutarch loc. cit. c. 6, 14; Kayser points out (p. 45) from Tusc. i. 48, that in the latter place the story about Euthynous comes from Crantor (we get similar complaints of the evils of life in the Epinomis). In c. 25 Crantor observes how great a consolation it is not to suffer by one’s own fault. On Cicero’s use of Crantor, cf. Heine, De fonte Tuscul. Disp. 10 sqq.
Eduard G. Zeller, a German philosopher and Protestant theologian of the Tübingen School of theology, was well known for his writings on Ancient Greek philosophy. Although he published in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, his meticulous research, documentation, and footnotes remain a
valuable resource.
Reference
Zeller, Eduard. Plato and the Older Academy. Sarah Frances Alleyne and Alfred Goodwin, trans. New York and London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1876. This work is in the Public Domain.